Rothschild v. United States

179 U.S. 463, 21 S. Ct. 197, 45 L. Ed. 277, 1900 U.S. LEXIS 1887
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedDecember 10, 1900
Docket59
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 179 U.S. 463 (Rothschild v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rothschild v. United States, 179 U.S. 463, 21 S. Ct. 197, 45 L. Ed. 277, 1900 U.S. LEXIS 1887 (1900).

Opinion

*465 Me. Justice McKenna,

after stating the ease, delivered the opinion of the court.

In paragraph 214, the statute defines wrapper tobacco to be that quality of leaf tobacco which is suitable for cigar wrappers, and filler tobacco to be all other leaf tobacco. Paraphrasing the paragraph and paragraph 214, Judge Lacombe classified the tobacco, and assigned duty as follows:

. “ A duty of 35 cents per pound shall he paid on (A) all leaf tobacco not suitable for cigar wrappers and not otherwise provided for.
“ A duty of one dollar and eighty-five cents per pound shall be paid on—
“(A) All leaf tobacco of any kind, and wherever grown, which may be packed or mixed with any other leaf tobacco, which other tobacco is the product of any other country or dependency.
“ (B) All leaf tobacco not suitable for cigar wrappers, which shall be found to be mixed or packed with more than fifteen per cent of tobacco which is suitable for cigar wrappers.
“ (C) All leaf tobacco suitable for cigar wrappers.”

To this classification the appellants oppose that of the board of appraisers, as follows :

“First. Wrapper tobacco.
“ Second. Filler tobacco mixed or packed with more than 15 per cent of wrapper tobacco.
“Third. All other filler tobacco.”

If the classification of Judge Lacombe is correct the questions certified should be answered in the affirmative ; if the classification of the board of appraisers is correct they should be answered in the negative.

The language and arrangement of paragraph 213 supports Judge Lacombe. Regarding the language of the paragraph alone, it requires some ingenuity to create ambiguity. Dealing with wrapper tobacco, the paragraph provides, “ wrapper tobacco- . . . $1.85 per lb.” That is all unstemmed wrapper tobacco. There is no limitation or exception whatever. Dealing with filler tobacco, the paragraph provides, “ filler tobacco, *466 when mixed or packed with more than 15$ of wrapper tobacco, if unstemmed, $1.85 per lb.; if stemmed, $2.00 per lb.; filler tobacco not specially provided for in* this act, if unstemmed, 35 cts. per lb.; if stemmed, 50 cts. per lb.” In other words, so mixed, and as it is stemmed or unstemmed, $2.00 or $1.85 per lb. Filler not so mixed, as it is stemmed or unstemmed, 50 cts. or 35 cts. per lb. But all wrapper tobacco is dutiable at least at $1.85. There is no condition except being stemmed or unstemmed that excepts any part of it or affects the rate upon it. And all filler tobacco is dutiable, but not all at the same rate. There is a condition which affects the rate. That condition is to be mixed w,ith wrapper tobacco. The statute deals with each kind of tobacco separately. It does not qualify wrapper; it does qualify filler — mix wrapper with filler to the extent of more than 15 per cent and the wrapper does not become dutiable as filler — but filler becomes dutiable as wrapper — the mixture becomes in legal effect wrapper, and is dutiable at the same rate.

The appellants contest this interpretation, and contend that wrapper so mixed with filler, by the very terms of the statute escapes duty or would escape duty, “ except that it falls under the last clause of the statute and is to be classified as filler tobacco, not specially provided for in this act.” If this contention is justified, it would seem as if wrapper tobacco becomes filler even by name and the provisions of the statute are reversed, and their care to make wrapper dutiable and prevent and penalize evasions of the . duty becomes a means of either exempting fifteen per cent of it from duty or making it dutiable only as filler'.

Consideration's outside of the statute are, however, urged as tests of its meaning, and two propositions are advanced which, it is claimed, Congress must be presumed to have known and to which it addressed its legislation.

These are, (1) that in commerce and among dealers in leaf tobacco the bale is the unit; (2) there is in bales of wrapper a certain amount of filler, and in filler bales there may be a small per cent of wrapper, but in trade it is not recognized. It is therefore contended (and we quote counsel) “ that the words *467 ‘ wrapper tobacco ’ in this section (213) have reference to the commercial terms ‘ wrapper tobacco,’ meaning thereby bales of tobacco known as wrapper, although in every bale there is a quantity of tobacco not suitable for wrapper.” That is not the tobacco as such, but the form of its importation determines the duty. The bale is the unit, and the unit must always be regarded. The different kinds of tobacco cannot be separated; they mingle in the unit bale as (the illustration is) different percentages of blood mingle in an animal, and by holding in mind that the bale is the unit, it will be seen that wrapper tobacco (fifteen per cent or less) cannot be “ segregated and assessable as such any more logically than could the fifteen per cent of Holstein blood in an eighty-five per cent Ayreshire cow.”

But the difficulty is not holding in mind the idea that the bale is the unit, but in accepting it. To accept it we should have to impose it upon the statute. It is certainly not there by expression, and it is not new. It was contended for under the act of 1883 and supported by about the same arguments upon which it is now attempted to be supported. It was rejected in Falk v. Robertson, 137 U. S. 225, in which the leaf and not the bale was decided to be the unit, and the act of 1883 dealt with percentages as much as the, act of 1897. The act of 1883 provided that “ leaf tobacco of which eighty-five per cent is of the requisite size and of the necessary fineness of texture to be suitable for wrappers, and of which more than one hundred leaves are required to weigh a pound, if not stemmed, seventy-five cents per pound; if stemmed, one dollar per pound. All other tobacco in leaf, unmanufactured, and not stemmed, thirty-five cents per pound.”

But it is claimed that Falk v. Robertson is distinguishable from the case at the bar in that the different kinds of tobacco were not mingled, but were carefully separated and distinguishable in quantity and quality. Upon principle we think the difference does not distinguish the case from that at bar. The contention is besides answered by Erhardt v. Schroeder, 155 U. S. 124, 133. To the claims of the parties — one that the bale was the unit — the other that the different kinds of tobacco were, the court, by Mr.. Justice Shiras, said:

*468 “ The proper answer to this question seems to depend upon the particular circumstances of a given case.
‡*#****#

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Bluebook (online)
179 U.S. 463, 21 S. Ct. 197, 45 L. Ed. 277, 1900 U.S. LEXIS 1887, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rothschild-v-united-states-scotus-1900.