Ross v. Wu

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Ross v. Wu

27 A.D.3d 237, 811 N.Y.S.2d 26

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 7, 2006

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 27 A.D.3d 237 (Ross v. Wu) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ross v. Wu, 27 A.D.3d 237, 811 N.Y.S.2d 26 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006).

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Opinion

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan A. Madden, J.), entered May 4, 2004, dismissing the complaint after a nonjury trial, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The binder for the $800,000 all-cash sale of defendant Sam Wu’s building was not a sufficient memorandum under the statute of frauds (General Obligations Law § 5-703; see RAJ Acquisition Corp. v Atamanuk, 272 AD2d 164 [2000]) in that it failed to identify the corporate seller (see Bhutta Realty Corp. v Sangetti, 165 AD2d 852 [1990]). Atai v Dogwood Realty of N.Y., Inc. (24 AD3d 695 [2005]) and Kursh v Verderame (87 AD2d 803 [1982], lv denied 57 NY2d 608 [1982]), upon which plaintiff relies, are factually distinguishable. In addition, the further negotiations and exchange of drafts here showed that there was never a meeting of the minds on all essential terms (see e.g. Yenom Corp. v 155 Wooster St. Inc., 23 AD3d 259 [2005]; Frankel v Ford Leasing Dev. Co., 7 AD3d 757 [2004]).

[238]*238In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to address plaintiffs other contentions. Concur—Friedman, J.P., Nardelli, Williams and Sweeny, JJ.

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Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan A. Madden, J.), entered May 4, 2004, dismissing the complaint after a nonjury trial, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The binder for the $800,000 all-cash sale of defendant Sam Wu’s building was not a sufficient memorandum under the statute of frauds (General Obligations Law § 5-703; see RAJ Acquisition Corp. v Atamanuk, 272 AD2d 164 [2000]) in that it failed to identify the corporate seller (see Bhutta Realty Corp. v Sangetti, 165 AD2d 852 [1990]). Atai v Dogwood Realty of N.Y., Inc. (24 AD3d 695 [2005]) and Kursh v Verderame (87 AD2d 803 [1982], lv denied 57 NY2d 608 [1982]), upon which plaintiff relies, are factually distinguishable. In addition, the further negotiations and exchange of drafts here showed that there was never a meeting of the minds on all essential terms (see e.g. Yenom Corp. v 155 Wooster St. Inc., 23 AD3d 259 [2005]; Frankel v Ford Leasing Dev. Co., 7 AD3d 757 [2004]).

[238]*238In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to address plaintiffs other contentions. Concur—Friedman, J.P., Nardelli, Williams and Sweeny, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

27 A.D.3d 237, 811 N.Y.S.2d 26, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ross-v-wu-nyappdiv-2006.

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