STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP-18-75
BRUCE ROSS, DMD, Petitioner
v. DECISION AND ORDER (M.R. Civ. P. 80C)
MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent
Before the court is Petitioner Bruce Ross' (Ross) M.R. Civ. P. 80C Appeal of
Final Agency Action against the Maine Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS or Department). For the reasons explained below, the court concludes that
the Petition for Review filed by Dr. Ross should be denied and the decision of the
Acting Commissioner should be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Dr. Ross, DMD, who has been practicing dentistry since 1988, works in a solo
practice office in Rumford, Maine, and employs one dental hygienist, Maureen
Leavitt, and an officer manager, Jennifer Herbert. In early 2013, DHHS, Division
of Audit, initiated an audit of records and billings for dental services that Dr. Ross
provided to MaineCare members, for the period from February 1, 2008 to December
31, 2012. (CR 000033). Although Dr. Ross provided DHHS with the documents
1 requested by the agency, the Department claims that most of them were illegible and
unsigned. Based on a review of records within the audit time period, DHHS issued
a Notice of Violation dated January 29, 2016, seeking recoupment of $216,371.06.
The requested recoupment was based on a number of alleged violations, including
lack of legible documentation, failure to sign medical records as required by rule,
inaccurate or duplicate billing, and failure to adequately document some specific
services, among others.
Dr. Ross timely requested an informal review. After Herbert Downs, the
Director of the Audit Di vision, performed the informal review, DHHS reduced the
recoupment sought to $173,536.88. Dr. Ross then timely requested a de novo
administrative hearing, which was held in South Paris on July 10, 2017. That hearing
focused on a number of issues, including; whether Dr. Ross should have been
penalized at all for the illegible documents, and if so, whether the penalties levied
against him were justified by MaineCarerules; whether DHHS was justified in
seeking 100% recoupment for certain billings, and; whether DHHS sought to recoup
overpayments it had already recouped. On October 27, 2017, the Administrative
Hearing Officer issued her Recommended Decision, in which she recommended that
the Acting Commissioner affirm the recoupment sought of $173,536.88. A few days
later, on October 31, 2017, the Acting Commissioner, Bethany Hamm, issued her
Final Decision. Although she agreed with much of the Hearing Officer's
2 recommendations, her Final Decision found that DHHS "failed to properly exercise
its discretion in assessing a 20% penalty for Ross' violation of the signature
requirement." (CR 001170). She ultimately reduced the penalty for these violations
from 20% to 1%. As a result of this reduction, the final, extrapolated recoupment
number was reduced to $42,971.69. Dr. Ross now timely appeals. Oral argument
before this court was held on September 4, 2019.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When an administrative agency's decision is appealed pursuant to M.R.Civ .
P. 80C, the court "reviews the agency's decision directly for abuse of discretion,
errors of law, or findings not supported by the evidence." Centamore v. Dep't of
Hum. Servs', 664 A.2d 369,370 (Me. 1995). "The focus of the appeal is not whether
the court would have reached the same conclusion as the agency, but whether the
record contains competent and substantial evidence, which supports the result,
reached by the agency." CWCO, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins ., 1997 Me 226, ~ 6,
703 A.2d 1258. "The agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to
considerable deference on judicial review. Such deference is particularly appropriate
in an area as complex as Medicaid reimbursement." Trull Nursing Home, Inc. v.
Dep 't ofHuman Servs., 461 A.2d 490,496 (Me. 1983). In particular, a party seeking
to overturn an agency's decision bears the burden of showing that "no competent
evidence" supports it. Stein v. Me. Crim. Justice Academy, 2014 ME 82, ~ 11, 95
3 A.3d 612. Ultimately, the court's review is limited to whether the agency's decision
is: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the
agency's statutory authority; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by bias
or error of law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6)
arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion. 5 M.R.S. §
11007(4)(C).
DISCUSSION
DHHS' Summary Table
Dr. Ross first attacks the validity of the use by DHHS of a summary table for
the MaineCare claims. Because of the extensive findings and data that DHHS
accumulated (totaling 139 pages of spreadsheet data), the Department made a
summary table of 13 records as a representative sample of Dr. Ross' documentation
deficiencies in conjunction with the full spreadsheet. Dr. Ross contends that Janie
Turner, a DHHS employee who conducted the initial audit, compiled the summary
table using the same data, and he argues that the summary table "was not to
summarize the dental records themselves, but rather to summarize Janie Turner's
interpretation of those records." Dr. Ross challenges the summary table as being
impermissibly "interpretive," see State Office Sys., Inc. v. Olivetti Corp., 762 F.2d
843, 845-46 (10th Cir. 1985), and thus more than a simple compilation of
voluminous records, as contemplated by the rules of evidence. See M.R. Evid. 1006.
4 DHHS counters that Dr. Ross challenged the admissibility of the summary table only
after Acting Commissioner Hamm's Final Decision, meaning that his argument
should be deemed waived. Although Dr. Ross' original argument before the Hearing
Officer amounted to little more than claiming that the "DHHS spreadsheet is entitled
to no weight," it is sufficient for the court to decide the issue on the merits.
Nonetheless, the court agrees with DHHS that the Hearing Officer was
entitled to rely upon the summary table. This is because administrative hearings in
Maine do not follow the rules of evidence, see 10-144 C.M.R. Ch. 1, § VII(A)(3)
("Formal rules of evidence shall not be observed"), and instead allow for a much
broader range of evidence that would otherwise be excluded from a court of law,
see, e.g., 10-144 C.M.R. Ch. 1, §VII(A)(S)("Hearsay evidence shall not be excluded
because of its hearsay nature"). On this basis alone, Dr. Ross' contention that the
Hearing Officer improperly relied upon the summary tables fails. But even if the
Hearing Officer were required to rely on the Maine Rules of Evidence, the court
would still disagree with Dr. Ross. The Rules of Evidence give courts considerable
leeway in deciding what types of summaries to admit. See, e.g., United States v.
Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 547 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that Rule 1006 is "broadly
interpreted").
5 De Novo Review -The Electronic Documents
Dr. Ross next argues that the Hearing Officer did not independently evaluate
the evidence, and instead gave too much deference to the initial audit findings. In
other words, he essentially argues that the Hearing Officer failed to conduct a de
novo review, as is statutorily required. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 42(7)(D) ("The hearing
officer shall conduct a hearing de novo on issues raised in the notice of appeal filed
by the provider. ..."). Although this argument is presented in a separate section of
Dr. Ross's brief, it also permeates throughout his brief, as he alleges that the Hearing
Officer's failure to properly conduct the hearing de novo meant that Janie Turner's
initial audit, and her notes of that audit, was given far too much deference, and that
his evidence was not given proper weight.
The Law Court has elaborated on the usage and meaning of de novo in the
context of an agency hearing:
When a Board holds a hearing de novo, it does not examine evidence presented to the decision maker or tribunal below, nor does it review the procedure below except to assure that the matter is properly before it. Instead, it looks at the substantive issues afresh, undertakes its own credibility determinations, evaluates the evidence presented, and draws its own conclusions. Thus, in the absence of an explicit ordinance creating a purely appellate review by the Board, the function of the Board is to take evidence, make factual findings, and apply the laws and ordinances to the petition or application at issue, and to do so independently of the decision, if any, of a lower tribunal.
Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 2000 ME 157, ~ 7, 757 A.2d 773; See also Zablotny
v. State Bd. of Nursing, 2014 ME 46, ~ 29, 89 A.3d 143 (holding that "de novo
6 judicial review" means that the fact-finder "does not examine the evidence presented
to the decision maker or tribunal below," but instead "looks at the substantive issues
afresh, undertakes its own credibility determinations, evaluates the evidence
presented, and draws its own conclusions") (quoting Stewart, supra).
To the extent that Dr. Ross makes a generalized claim that the Hearing Officer
did not conduct a de nova hearing because she gave too much "deference" to the
Department's evidence as opposed to his, the court rejects that argument. The court
has closely scrutinized the administrative record in its entirety and has reviewed the
Hearing Officer's Recommended Decision numerous times. The court is satisfied
that the Hearing Officer properly exercised her independent judgment in evaluating
the evidence and testimony presented at the administrative hearing.
The assertion that the Hearing Officer failed to conduct a de nova hearing is
primarily focused on her treatment of electronic records Dr. Ross offered at the
administrative hearing, but failed to produce for the initial audit or at the informal
review. These electronic documents were records for 100 patients that Ross sought
to admit at the administrative hearing to show that: the services he provided to the
patients were medically necessary; his patient records did, in fact, contain his
electronic signature, and; the electronic records essentially cured the otherwise
illegible and indecipherable records he produced for the initial audit and informal
review. Because Dr. Ross did not submit these electronic records until November
7 2016, shortly before the formal administrative hearing originally scheduled for
November 28, 2016 in South Paris, and well after both the initial audit and the
informal review, DHHS did not review them and, more importantly, the Hearing
Officer ruled that she was unable to consider them as well. The Hearing Officer
concluded that she was constrained by the MaineCare Benefits Manual, which states
that "[s]ubsequent appeal proceedings will be limited only to those issues raised
during the informal review process." 10-144 C.M.R. Ch. 101, sub-Ch. 1, 1.23-l(A).
The Hearing Officer admitted the electronic records into the record, but
"counseled the Department that it should argue how much evidentiary weight, if any
the hearing officer should provide these records." (CR-001140). The Department
objected to any consideration of the electronic records, arguing that their production
for the first time prior to the administrative hearing was not permitted by the
MaineCare Benefits Manual (Manual), and constituted a waiver of their use before
the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer addressed the question of the electronic
records in multiple contexts, which the court will now review .
A. Illegible Records
The Department assessed a 100% recoupment against Dr. Ross in those
circumstances where his patient records were so illegible as to provide no
information about the medical necessity for the services he provided or even what
the services were. In short, the Department maintained that the documents submitted
8 by Ross were so illegible as to be tantamount to no documentation at all. Ross
argued before the Hearing Officer that the electronic records should be considered
in the de novo hearing and, when considered by the Hearing Officer in combination
with the paper records and his testimony at the hearing, the medical necessity of the
services rendered was adequately shown.
As a factual matter, the Hearing Officer found that the illegible records were .. "indecipherable and hence did not reveal what services were provided and whether
the services were medically necessary." (CR-001141). She then concluded that the
Department was correct to impose a 100% recoupment for those cases where the
records were illegible. Id.
With respect to her consideration of the electronic records, the Hearing Officer
relied upon Chapter 1, §1.21(A) of the Manual (CR-402) for her determination that
the de novo appeal before her was to "be limited only to those issues raised during
the informal review process. Therefore, the hearing officer is barred from reviewing
the electronic records when the Department did not review them or cite them in the
informal review." (CR-1141). She ultimately concluded:
In addition, while Dr. Ross testified at hearing as to several patients in this category (and was permitted to make an offer of proof in regards to others (See Ross-112)), the fact that, in order for the records to be legible required not only the review of the electronic records and his explanation, reveals that the documents submitted by Dr. Ross for the audit were deficient and violated both Chapter II, §25-06-l(A) and the MaineCare Provider Agreement.
9 Id.
Dr. Ross contends that the Hearing Officer was required to admit and consider
the electronic records because 22 M.R.S. § 42(7)(D) provides that she "shall conduct
a hearing de novo on issues raised in the notice of appeal filed by the provider . .. ."
The Notice of Appeal filed by Dr. Ross on October 4, 2016 is not particularly
enlightening as it merely states that he is "requesting an administrative hearing on
this matter." (CR-16). Moreover, the Order of Reference dated October 17, 2017
framed the issue to be addressed in the de novo appeal to be:
Was the department correct when it determined for the review period from 2/1/2008 through 12/31/2012, Bruce Ross, DMD breached the terms of the MaineCare Provider/Supplier Agreement, and/or the requirements of Section 1.03-3 for provider participation, as specified in the Final Informal Review Decision dated August 9, 2016, resulting in a recoupment of $216,371.06 owed to the department? (CR-13).
Dr. Ross is certainly correct, and the Department agrees, that 22 M.R.S. §
42(7)D) requires the appeal before the Hearing Officer to be a de novo proceeding.
The Hearing Officer herself explicitly recognized this in her Recommended
Decision. (CR-1141). Section 42(7) also directs the Department, however, to amend
the rules governing the appeals of informal review decisions "that seek to impose
repayment, recovery or recoupment obligations or sanctions or fines on providers . .
. ." One such rule is Chapter 1, Section 1.21 (General Principles), which provides
in pertinent part: "Issues that are not raised by the provider, individual, or entity
10 through the written request for an informal review or the submission of additional
materials for consideration prior to the informal review are waived in ubsequent
appeal proceedings." (CR-402).
It is undisputed that Dr. Ross never produced the electronic records until
November 2016, well after the issuance of the Informal Review Decision.
Furthermore, his letter to Herbert Downs requesting an informal review did not
suggest the existence of any electronic records. (CR-174). Dr. Ross, did, in fact,
provide records upon the request of Janie Turner as part of the initial audit and prior
to the issuance of the Notice of Violation. (CR-1188). After the Notice of Violation
had been issued, Ms. Turner personally spoke to Dr. Ross and informed him that he
had 60 days to request an informal review and that he should submit any additional
records or documentation he wanted to be considered during the informal review
that would tend to support the MaineCare claims he had filed. Ms. Turner called Dr.
Ross a second time to make sure he understood that he could file additional materials
for the informal review. (CR-1204-05). Dr. Ross did provide further documentation
for the informal review, but did not submit or mention any electronic records. (CR
1206-07).
In light of the clear language of the Manual that issues not raised through the
submission of additional materials for consideration prior to the informal review are
waived in later appeal proceedings, the decision of the Hearing Officer not to
11 consider the newly produced electronic records was not clearly erroneous or an
abuse of discretion.
The fact that Dr. Ross was unrepresented by counsel during the initial audit
and the informal review proceedings does not change this result. See Gallagher v.
Penobscot Cmty. Healthcare, 2019 ME 88, ~ 15,209 A.3d 106 quoting Richards v.
Bruce, 1997 ME 61, ~ 8, 691 A.2d 1223 ("[Pro se litigants are held to the same
standards as represented litigants.").
B. Electronic Signatures
After the initial audit and the informal review, the Department assessed a 20%
recoupment for Dr. Ross' documentation that failed to contain his required signature.
The Hearing Officer recommended that the Acting Commissioner uphold this
recoupment. Nevertheless, in her Final Decision, the Acting Commissioner reduced
the recoupment to 1 %. On appeal to this court, Dr. Ross contends that the Hearing
Officer (and ultimately the Acting Commissioner) committed legal error and acted
arbitrarily and capriciously by falling to find that the electronic records he produced
for the de nova administrative hearing contained the necessary signatures. In
particular, Dr. Ross maintains that the electronic signatures in the belatedly produced
electronic records complied with the Manual and the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act - 10 M.R.S. § 9407(1)(A).
12 With respect to this issue, it appears to the court that the Hearing Officer did,
in fact, consider the electronic records, but determined that the electronic signatures
offered by Dr. Ross did not satisfy the requirements of the MaineCare benefits
Manual. Specifically, the Hearing Officer found:
The hearing officer agrees with the Department that any "electronic" signature that Dr. Ross used does not meet the specifications of the MaineCare Benefits Manual. According to Chapter 1, § l.03-3(N), providers must adhere to certain requirements when using an electronic signature. The Department is correct that the electronic records do not necessarily identify the correct individual (there is no dispute that Dr. Ross examined the patient at the Dental Hygienist's work station), that the Department has no signature on file, and there is no time indicated on the records.
(CR-1144) .
Because the alleged electronic signatures submitted by Dr. Ross failed to meet
the requirements of the Manual, the Hearing Officer was not clearly erroneous, nor
was she arbitrary or capricious, in concluding that they were not in compliance and
could not qualify as an appropriate electronic signature for purposes of the Manual.
Penalties Imposed
Dr. Ross next argues that the recoupment the Department sought was largely
unsupported by substantial evidence in the whole record. In particular, Dr. Ross
contends that DHHS submitted evidence of only a handful of actual overpayments;
that DHHS charged the wrong percentage for certain penalties, and; that DHHS
13 demanded recoupment for overpayments it had already recouped. The court
addresses each argument in turn.
DHHS submitted evidence of only a handful of actual overpayments
Dr. Ross asserts that DHHS submitted evidence of only 13 charges and claims
for recoupment. He alleges that this is the only evidence DHHS brought against him,
and that this evidence fell far short of establishing the full $42,971.69 recoupment
amount, since those 13 charges amount to only $519.00. This argument is similar to
his theory, previously discussed, that the Hearing Officer impermissibly relied upon
the summary spreadsheet - here, he argues that even if the summary spreadsheet was
properly admitted before the Hearing Officer, it could not have established more
than the $519.00 in recoupment claims.
Like Dr. Ross' first argument, this argument ignores the basic purpose behind
Rule 1006 of the Rules of Evidence. See M.R. Evid. 1006; see also State v. Huff,
157 Me. 269, 276, 171 A.2d 210, 214 (1961) ("In this connection it is noted that
courts quite uniformly permit relaxation of the best evidence rule where records are
voluminous and involve intricate details so that an inspection thereof would
seriously and unnecessarily delay and inconvenience the court and jury."). As noted
above, the Department's full spreadsheet of all claims for recoupment against Dr.
Ross totaled 139 pages, each page with roughly 10 separate claims and
accompanying notes. It can hardly be said that 139 pages is insufficiently
14 voluminous to seriously and unnecessarily delay the hearing, and it was well within
the Hearing Officer's discretion to allow DHHS to submit a summary table giving
only a representative sample of the recoupment claims against Dr. Ross. Even more
importantly, and as noted above, the DHHS regulations specifically note that
administrative hearings before the Hearing Officer are not subject to any formal rules
of evidence, meaning it is even more within the Hearing Officer's discretion to
decide what evidence to consider and the weight to be accorded that evidence. The
court cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the Hearing Officer to rely on
the spreadsheet to find for the full recoupment amount ordered by the Acting
Commissioner.
It was legal1 y erroneou for the Department to charge a 100% recoupmen_t penalty
on ce1tain charges
Dr. Ross argues that it was legal error for the Hearing Officer to allow DHHS
to recoup 100% of certain payments DHHS made to Ross, because the regulations
allow for only up to a 20% recoupment. The Manual provides:
H. Imposition of penalty due to lack of adequate documentation. When the Department proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a provider has violated MaineCare requirements because it lacks mandated records for MaineCare covered goods or services, the Department in its discretion may impose the following penalties:
1. A penalty equal to one hundred percent ( 100%) recoupment of MaineCare payments for services or goods, if the provider has failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the disputed goods or services were
15 medically necessary, MaineCare covered services, and actually provided to eligible MaineCare members.
2. A penalty not to exceed twenty-percent (20%), if the provider is able to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the disputed goods or services were medically necessary, MaineCare covered services, and actually provided to eligible MaineCare members. The penalty will be applied against each MaineCare payment associated with the missing mandated records.
10-144 C.M.R. Ch. 101, sub. Ch. 1, l.20-2(H). Dr. Ross maintains that he was able
to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the relevant recoupment
claims were for services that were medically necessary, and that DHHS nonetheless
imposed a 100% penalty. In addition to the illegible office records noted above, Dr.
Ross also attempted to introduce the electronic records the Hearing Officer declined
to consider, to show that these procedures were medically necessary. The court has
already concluded that the Hearing Officer did not commit legal error by deciding
she was not permitted to consider the electronic records that were never submitted
prior to the issuance of the informal review decision. Dr. Ross also contends,
however, that his and Ms. Leavitt's testimony before the Hearing Officer established
that these charges were for medically necessary procedures. Dr. Ross claims that,
had the Hearing Officer properly taken this evidence into consideration, he would
have undoubtedly met his burden of demonstrating that the charges were for
medically necessary services and, as a result, could not be penalized more than 20%
of those charges.
16 The court disagrees with Dr. Ross' characterization of the Hearing Officer's
review of the evidence he presented. While the court agrees that the Hearing Officer
was required to conduct the hearing de nova, such a review does not require the fact
finder to give the same weight to all pieces of evidence. Indeed, a de nova hearing
compels the fact-finder to independently decide how much weight to assign to any
item of evidence. Cf Zablotny, 2014 ME 46, ~ 29 ("[de novo review] obligates the
court to hear the evidence presented, independently evaluate the testimony offered,
make its own credibility determinations, and reach its own decision ...."). The court
does not find that the Hearing Officer simply ignored the evidence that Dr. Ross
presented, with the exception of the electronic records. Rather, the Hearing Officer's
recommendation shows that she did not find his evidence to be persuasive. Given
that his evidence in this instance amounted to testimony from him and from Ms.
Leavitt, along with documents that were so illegible as to constitute "no
documentation," it is not surprising that the Hearing Officer decided this way .
Indeed, since it was Dr. Ross's burden to demonstrate that the services provided
were medically necessary, the court views his failure to persuade the Hearing Officer
as being a product of his lack of sufficient evidence, rather than a failure to conduct
the hearing de nova.
17 DHHS demanded recoupment of overpayments it had already recouped
Dr. Ross argues that legal error was committed when the Department sought
recoupment of overpayments that it had previously recouped. Although Dr. Ross and
Ms. Leavitt testified before the Hearing Officer about this, Dr. Ross was unable to
provide any documentary evidence to support this assertion, aside from the
electronic records noted above. Dr. Ross argues that because DHHS produced no
contrary evidence, it was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial
evidence on the whole record to find that he had not already returned these payments.
As with Dr. Ross' prior argument, this argument fails because it was his burden to
demonstrate that DHHS was seeking double recoupment. Even if DHHS presented
no evidence to the contrary, Dr. Ross himself was unable to produce any
documentary evidence, and offered only his and Ms. Leavitt's testimonies to suggest
that he met his burden. The Hearing Officer was not persuaded by this testimony,
and the court cannot substitute its judgment for the Hearing Officer's on questions
of fact. The court finds that Dr. Ross failed to persuade the Hearing Officer, not
because she "completely discounted" his evidence, but instead because he failed to
meet his burden of persuasion.
Lack of Independent DHHS Review
Dr. Ross next argues that the informal review process was conducted in a
biased manner that was inconsistent with the Department's own rules and, therefore,
18 his failure to provide evidence during the informal review process must be excused.
Dr. Ross claims that, instead of Herbert Downs performing the informal review, it
was Janie Turner who actually conducted the informal review, and Mr. Downs did
nothing more than sign off on Turner's work. Because Ms. Turner was the DHHS
employee who conducted the initial audit, Ross points to the MaineCare Benefits
_Manual, which provides that the informal review "will be conducted by the Director
of MaineCare Services, or other designated Department representative who was not
involved in the decision under review." 10-144 C.M.R. Ch. 101, sub. Ch. 1, 1.23-1.
Ross, however, has not provided any evidence that this occurred. Indeed, his brief
points to no record evidence whatsoever, meaning that this claim acts as little more
than an unsubstantiated assertion. Furthermore, the MaineCare Rules do not require
that the employee who conducted the initial audit be completely "walled off' from
the subsequent informal review. There is nothing that prohibited Mr. Downs from
seeking Ms. Turner's advice and expertise in conducting his own review; to
conclude otherwise would require Mr. Downs to seek the assistance of another staff
employee who would need to duplicate the work that Ms. Turner already performed.
See Palian v. DHHS, Ken. Docket No. AP-18-49 (May 17, 2019) (Stokes, J.).
Because the MaineCare Rules do not plainly compel a contrary result, Downeast
Energy Corp. v. Fund Ins. Review Bd., 2000 ME 151, ~ 13,756 A.2d 948, it was not
an error of law for Ms. Turner to provide staff support during the informal review
19 process and to draft the informal review decision, which was ultimately conducted
and approved by Mr. Downs.
CONCLUSION
The entry is:
The Petition for Judicial Review is DENIED and the decision of the
Department of Health and Human Services is AFFIRMED.
The Clerk is directed to incorporate this order into the docket by reference
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).
Date: November 12, 2019
William R. Stokes Justice, Superior Court
Ent~~~d or, the. docket \ \ f \ ~ \ 1 q