Ross Seed Co. v. Sturgis Implement & Hardware Co.

181 S.W.2d 426, 297 Ky. 776, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 824
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedJune 13, 1944
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 181 S.W.2d 426 (Ross Seed Co. v. Sturgis Implement & Hardware Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ross Seed Co. v. Sturgis Implement & Hardware Co., 181 S.W.2d 426, 297 Ky. 776, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 824 (Ky. 1944).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Van Sant, Commissioner

Reversing.

Appellant, Boss Seed Company, is engaged in the business of selling 'farm seed, at wholesale, in Louisville,' Kentucky. Appellees, C. G-. Davis and Mrs. Nell S. O’Nan, administratrix of Edd O’Nan, deceased, partners doing business under the firm name and style of Sturgis Implement & Hardware Company, are engaged in the seed business in Sturgis, Union County, Kentucky. C. D. Boss, representing appellant, entered into a contract with appellees, through C. Gr. Davis, one of-the partners, whereby appellant agreed to purchase 200.000 pounds of Korean lespedeza seed. The contract was reduced to writing on a form prepared and used by appellant in the course of its business. The contract reads: , .

“Boss Seed Co.
“Wholesale Dealers in Field Seeds,
N. W. Cor. 15th. & Lytle
Louisville, Ky. U. S. A.
Date Sept. 29th — 42
Bot of Sturgis Imp & Hdw Co.
Post Office — Sturgis State Ky.
hereby orders in duplicate, of Boss Seed Company the following described items on the terms and conditions set forth herein and on the reverse side hereof.
To Be Shipped To: Louisville, Ky.
How Ship:-Bail When: Beady after
F.O.B. Louisville, Ky. Harvest.
Louisville, Ky. 1942
200.000 lb. 1942 Crop Korean To be recleaned by buyer basis No. 1 Korean 98% Purity, not over 2 D pr oz @ *778 3.50 cwt. and No. 2 Recleaned Seconds @ $1.50 cwt. Sax to be furnished by buyer.
“Seller — Sturgis Imp. ’& Hdw Co.
“By C. Gr. Davis
“Accepted by Home Office,
“Ross Seed Company “By C. D. Ross”
“Terms and Conditions
“Purchaser’s order must be accepted by home office of Ross Seed Co. within 5 days by mailing to buyer one of the duplicate offers duly signed by seller. Terms: Payable at time of delivery, subject to demand draft. Prices are net without discount and are not subject to revision because of market changes and are P. O. B. Louisville, Ky., unless otherwise noted.
“Bags, unless otherwise specified, are to be charged for extra and are' not returnable.
“If purchaser is to ‘call for’ merchandise at seller’s 'warehouse and same is not called for on date herein specified, seller, at his option, may ship such merchandise to purchaser within five days from such date, or give written notice of cancellation of this agreement of sale, or sell for buyer’s account, market loss to be paid by purchaser.
“No special agreement entered into with salesman or other agents will be recognized unless noted on the original of this contract and confirmed in writing by the ' Ross Seed Company.
“The seller assumes no liability whatsoever for delay or failure to ship or to deliver goods caused by fire, flood, strike, or other causes beyond our control.
“The seller gives no warranty, express or implied, as to description, (including Kind, Variety and name), quality productiveness or any other matter of any seeds sold by it, and will not be in any way responsible for the crop.”

The order was confirmed by appellant in the time specified under the terms and conditions. Appellees made no delivery under the contract, and on December 10, 1942, notified appellant that they might have to default in its performance. Upon appellees’ failure to *779 deliver the seed, appellant purchased the same quantity-on the open market, being required to pay therefor the sum of $4,319 in excess of the contract price. It then filed this action for damages in that amount.

Appellees did not attempt to reform the written contract, but sought to avert liability solely upon the following pleas contained in their answer and amended answer:

“The defendant further answering and traversing, says that the instrument filed with plaintiff’s petition, as Exhibit A, was not the complete contract between the plaintiff and defendant, but only a memorandum of agreement; that it was within the knowledge and in the contemplation of both parties that the seed agreed to be furnished by the defendant to the plaintiff was to be harvested from that part of the area in Union County, Ky., embraced. within the confines of Camp Breckinridge, and that the seed to be furnished was only such as could be raised and harvested within said area, and the defendants further say that the amount of seed to be furnished was merely an approximation and the only thing agreed upon as absolute, was the purchase price of same, to be paid therefor by the said plaintiff.
“The defendant answering further says that at the time of the memorandum, entered into between the parties, that this defendant had a contract with Young & Conway of Morganfield, Ky., to furnish said firm-lbs. of lespedeza seed to be raised and harvested from said area, and that at the time said plaintiff, Ross Seed Company, was informed of the contract and that same was superior and took precedence over the seed to be furnished him, under said memorandum.
“The defendant answering further says that after he furnished said Young and Conway the seed contracted to be furnished, all of which the said plaintiff was aware, known and agreed to, the said defendant was unable to harvest or procure any further seed from said area, and that by reason thereof, he was unable to and did not furnish to the said plaintiff any seed under said memorandum agreement.
‘ ‘ The said defendant pleads said facts as an absolute bar of said plaintiff’s petition to recover anything from it.
“The defendant, Sturgis Implement & Hardware *780 Co., says that during the time that the seed was ready to be harvested, excessive, rainfalls and floods occurred over this Camp Breckinridge area, to such an extent, that it was unable to harvest said seed, or to get them ready for market, or to furnish same to plaintiff as set out in plaintiff’s petition, and this defendant pleads said causes as a bar to the plaintiff’s right to recover anything in this action.”

Appellant filed motion to strike the language above quoted, upon the ground that it contradicted and varied the terms of the contract sued on. The motion was overruled, to which ruling appellant excepted. Appellant then demurred to the answer and amended answer, and to each and every allegation and paragraph thereof. The demurrer was overruled in each particular, to which exceptions were taken.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Murphy v. Torstrick
309 S.W.2d 767 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1958)
M. R. Kopmeyer Co. v. Barnes
276 S.W.2d 21 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1955)
C. C. Leonard Lumber Co. v. Reed
236 S.W.2d 961 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1951)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
181 S.W.2d 426, 297 Ky. 776, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 824, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ross-seed-co-v-sturgis-implement-hardware-co-kyctapphigh-1944.