Ross-Gaffney, Inc. v. Noah Production Co.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Ross-Gaffney, Inc. v. Noah Production Co.

68 A.D.2d 820, 414 N.Y.S.2d 150, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11014

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 8, 1979

StatusPublished

This text of 68 A.D.2d 820 (Ross-Gaffney, Inc. v. Noah Production Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ross-Gaffney, Inc. v. Noah Production Co., 68 A.D.2d 820, 414 N.Y.S.2d 150, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11014 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered June 2, 1977, which, inter alia, granted defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, without costs or disbursements, to the extent of denying the cross motion and, except, as thus modified, affirmed. Special Term’s grant of the cross motion was based on a provision of the agreement of November, 1968 by which plaintiffs, as creditors of defendant, delegated to one Ross "the irrevocable authority and power to deal with Noah [the defendant] on their behalf with regard to the subject matter of this Agreement and [Ross represented] that he shall not be required to consult with the other creditors in the exercise of this power.” It was further provided that Ross’ "written authorizations shall be deemed [821]*821those of all creditors, insofar as the performance of this agreement or any amendments thereof are concerned.” This same agreement acknowledged defendant’s respective indebtedness to plaintiffs, and is the basis of the complaint. The agreement also provided that defendant’s obligations were deferred to "no later than October 1, 1970.” Ross, however, states that he extended the due date, and subordinated plaintiffs’ claims to those of subsequent creditors. Thus, Special Term concluded that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The letter, however, by which Ross professes to have deferred the due date, does not mention the date to which the obligation to pay was extended. In the absence of a specific date upon which the indebtedness was to be paid, the so-called extension may be void for indefiniteness. (See Consolidated Film Ind. v Talking Picture Epics, 236 App Div 422.) It may be that Ross orally extended the time for payment to a date certain, but this presents an issue of fact, as does the threshold question of whether Ross had the authority to extend the due date, and, if so, for what duration. The cross motion should have been denied. Concur— Sullivan, J. P., Lane, Markewich, Silverman and Bloom, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered June 2, 1977, which, inter alia, granted defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, without costs or disbursements, to the extent of denying the cross motion and, except, as thus modified, affirmed. Special Term’s grant of the cross motion was based on a provision of the agreement of November, 1968 by which plaintiffs, as creditors of defendant, delegated to one Ross "the irrevocable authority and power to deal with Noah [the defendant] on their behalf with regard to the subject matter of this Agreement and [Ross represented] that he shall not be required to consult with the other creditors in the exercise of this power.” It was further provided that Ross’ "written authorizations shall be deemed [821]*821those of all creditors, insofar as the performance of this agreement or any amendments thereof are concerned.” This same agreement acknowledged defendant’s respective indebtedness to plaintiffs, and is the basis of the complaint. The agreement also provided that defendant’s obligations were deferred to "no later than October 1, 1970.” Ross, however, states that he extended the due date, and subordinated plaintiffs’ claims to those of subsequent creditors. Thus, Special Term concluded that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The letter, however, by which Ross professes to have deferred the due date, does not mention the date to which the obligation to pay was extended. In the absence of a specific date upon which the indebtedness was to be paid, the so-called extension may be void for indefiniteness. (See Consolidated Film Ind. v Talking Picture Epics, 236 App Div 422.) It may be that Ross orally extended the time for payment to a date certain, but this presents an issue of fact, as does the threshold question of whether Ross had the authority to extend the due date, and, if so, for what duration. The cross motion should have been denied. Concur— Sullivan, J. P., Lane, Markewich, Silverman and Bloom, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

68 A.D.2d 820, 414 N.Y.S.2d 150, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11014, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ross-gaffney-inc-v-noah-production-co-nyappdiv-1979.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack