ROSS EDWARD MASON MILLER v. GOLDEN PEANUT COMPANY, LLC

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedOctober 6, 2023
DocketA21A1270
StatusPublished

This text of ROSS EDWARD MASON MILLER v. GOLDEN PEANUT COMPANY, LLC (ROSS EDWARD MASON MILLER v. GOLDEN PEANUT COMPANY, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
ROSS EDWARD MASON MILLER v. GOLDEN PEANUT COMPANY, LLC, (Ga. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

THIRD DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., BROWN and WATKINS, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

October 6, 2023

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A21A1269, A21A1270. GOLDEN PEANUT COMPANY, LLC et al. v. MILLER et al.; and vice versa.

WATKINS, Judge.

This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of Georgia. In the

original case, Golden Peanut Company, LLC v. Miller (“Miller I”),1 we granted the

application for interlocutory appeal filed by defendants Golden Peanut Company,

LLC, and its parent company, Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”) (Case

Number A21A1269). Plaintiffs Ross Miller, individually and as next friend and

natural guardian of his minor son and the administrator of Kristie Miller’s estate, and

Hayden Miller, Kristie’s adult son, (collectively “Miller”) filed a cross-appeal (Case

Number A21A1270). We affirmed the denial of Miller’s motion to exclude certain

1 363 Ga. App. 384 (870 SE2d 511) (2022). evidence in Case Number A21A1270 and reversed the denial of Golden Peanut’s and

ADM’s motions for summary judgment and related motions for reconsideration and

clarification in Case Number A21A1269.

In Miller v. Golden Peanut Company, LLC (“Miller II”),2 the Supreme Court

of Georgia granted certiorari to consider:

1. Under what circumstances must a law enforcement officer who conducts an investigation of an accident in the course of his official duties be qualified as an expert under OCGA § 24-7-702 (b) if called to testify in a civil case resulting from the accident as both a fact witness and an expert witness? How is the portion of the testimony considered to be expert testimony to be determined? 2. If such a law enforcement officer must be qualified as an expert under OCGA § 24-7-702 (b), did the trial court properly deny the motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony and part of the officer’s report in this case?3

The Supreme Court held that the portion of the investigating officer’s

testimony that was disputed constituted expert testimony within the meaning of

OCGA § 24-7-702 (“Rule 702”)4 and that the trial court abused its discretion by

2 __ Ga. __ (__ SE2d __) (S22G0905 decided Aug. 21, 2023). 3 Id. at __ (S22G0905 at *4). 4 Miller II, __ Ga. at __ (1) (a) (S22G0905 at *8-*10).

2 failing to fully exercise its gatekeeping function under Rule 702.5 “Specifically, the

trial court did not consider either the reliability or helpfulness of [the officer’s]

testimony.”6 In directing us to vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for

further proceedings, the Supreme Court reiterated that “an appellate court should not

conduct the analysis of the expert’s methodology in the first instance.”7

Now that the case is before us on remand, we vacate Division 4 (addressing

Case Number A21A1270) of our opinion in Miller I. The Supreme Court’s opinion

in Miller II is adopted and made the judgment of this Court for Division 4. We

therefore vacate the trial court’s order denying Miller’s motion to exclude certain

portions of the investigating officer’s testimony and the Georgia State Patrol’s

Specialized Collision Reconstruction Team (“SCRT”) report. The Supreme Court of

Georgia did not address or consider Divisions 1 through 3 of our earlier opinion, in

which we reversed the orders denying Golden Peanut’s and ADM’s motions for

summary judgment and related motions for reconsideration and clarification. Because

5 Id. at __ (2) (S22G0905 at *14 (2)). 6 Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (113 SCt 2786, 125 LE2d 469) (1993)). 7 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Miller II, __ Ga. at __ (2) (S22G0905 at *15-*16 (2)).

3 Divisions 1 through 3 (addressing Case Number A21A1269) are consistent with the

Supreme Court’s opinion, those divisions become binding upon the return of the

remittitur.8

Judgment reversed in Case no. A21A1269. Judgment vacated and case

remanded for further proceedings in Case No. A21A1270. Doyle, P. J., and Brown,

J., concur.

8 See Shadix v. Carroll County, 274 Ga. 560, 563 (1) (554 SE2d 465) (2001).

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Related

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
509 U.S. 579 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Shadix v. Carroll County
554 S.E.2d 465 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2001)

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