Rosibel Del Carmen Munoz Palacios v. Christopher J. Larose, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROSIBEL DEL CARMEN MUNOZ Case No.: 26-CV-3534 JAO (SBC) PALACIOS, 12 ORDER GRANTING IN PART Petitioner, 13 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. 14 (ECF No. 1) CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Rosibel Del Carmen Munoz Palacios’s 19 (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 20 1. Also before the Court is Respondents Christopher J. LaRose’s (Senior Warden, Otay 21 Mesa Detention Center), Patrick Divver’s (Field Office Director ICE, Enforcement and 22 Removal Operations San Diego Field Office), Todd M. Lyon’s (Director, Immigration 23 and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)), and Markwayne Mullin’s (Secretary of the U.S. 24 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)) (collectively, “Respondents” or the 25 “Government”) Return to the Petition, ECF No. 5, and Petitioner’s Traverse, ECF No. 6. 26 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition on due process grounds. 27

28 1 BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner, a citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States on or about May 22, 3 2023. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. Having requested asylum upon entry and subsequently been 4 issued a conditional parole, Petitioner sought asylum on May 9, 2024, receiving a five- 5 year work permit (valid until December 25, 2029) and Temporary Protective Status 6 (“TPS”) (valid until April 2, 2025) shortly thereafter. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. Petitioner began 7 working in the United States and applied for a renewal of her TPS upon expiry, but TPS 8 was later cancelled for Venezuelans. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. In the meantime, Petitioner attended all 9 her immigration court hearings and had been scheduled for a final hearing on April 27, 10 2027. Id. ¶ 45. 11 On or around March 6, 2026, Petitioner was re-detained during a traffic violation 12 and transferred to ICE custody, and thereafter to Otay Mesa Detention Center. Id. ¶¶ 4– 13 5. Petitioner was not told, before or during her detention, that her conditional parole had 14 been revoked. Id. ¶ 48, 53. Petitioner has not been convicted of any crimes of violence, 15 crimes involving moral turpitude, or aggravated felonies, and has no intention of fleeing 16 the country. Id. ¶ 47. 17 LEGAL STANDARD 18 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 19 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district 20 of his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole 21 judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or 22 removal is the court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas 23 v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109- 24 13, 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral 25 issues arising independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of 26 indefinite detention—federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 27 Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other 28 1 grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. 2 Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted). 3 DISCUSSION 4 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of her parole without justification or 5 consideration of her individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. See 6 ECF No. 1 ¶ 55. The Court agrees. 7 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 8 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 9 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 10 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 11 533 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment 12 entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 13 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a 14 hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 15 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their 16 liberty or over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a 17 protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 18 July 25, 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an 19 individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to 20 release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that 21 individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the 22 . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 23 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen 24 pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody [he] has a 25 protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Id. at *3 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, 26 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). 27 Upon arrival, Petitioner was released on conditional parole. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1–3. 28 Petitioner has complied with all conditions of her release: Petitioner has work 1 authorization, has been working and living in the community for more than three years, 2 and has applied for asylum, with a final hearing scheduled for 2027. Id. ¶¶ 1–4, 45. 3 Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 4 2025 WL 2084921, at *4 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial 5 apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight 6 risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at 7 liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 8 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country 9 for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth 10 Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Matute v. Wofford, 2025 WL 11 2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest 12 in his release). 13 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 14 procedural protections before she can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. 15 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally 16 sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 17 See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be 18 affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 19 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 20 procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function 21 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 22 procedural requirement would entail.” Id. 23 The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s 24 revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be 25 heard, denied Petitioner of her due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner 26 has a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to her conditional 27 parole. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other 28 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] 1 protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining in her 2 community and continuing the process of seeking asylum. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 3 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free 4 to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal 5 life.”). 6 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high because 7 Petitioner’s parole was revoked without providing her a reason for revocation or giving 8 her an opportunity to be heard. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 55–61. “Where, as here, ‘the petitioner has 9 not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty 10 is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to 11 determine whether there is any valid basis for [his] detention.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 12 2084921, at *5 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 13 2025)) (cleaned up). Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner should be paroled, 14 there is no evidence that their determination has changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. 15 Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the 16 government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). 17 Petitioner has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble, has work authorization, 18 and is working towards asylum status. ECF No. 1 ¶ 47. “Once a noncitizen has been 19 released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is 20 subject to removal proceedings.” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. “Rather, the federal 21 agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely, 22 evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk[.]” Id. 23 Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 24 and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, 25 at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the 26 government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps 27 toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail 28 1 to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice, 2 reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally ECF No. 5. 3 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking her parole in 4 violation of the Due Process Clause, her detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Navarro Sanchez, 5 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from 6 custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds).1 7 CONCLUSION 8 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 9 Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) on due process grounds. The Court ORDERS Respondents 10 to immediately release Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of her 11 preexisting parole. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that 12 Petitioner is entitled to notice of the reasons for revocation of her parole and a hearing 13 before a neutral decision maker to determine whether detention is warranted. The 14 Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that 15 Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 16 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 17 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 18 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025); Isaev, v. LaRose, et al., 2026 WL 1162758, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 19 Apr. 29, 2026). The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by July 1, 2026, 20 confirming that Petitioner has been released. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 23

24 1 The Court need not address Petitioner’s claim arising under the APA because the 25 Petition can be resolved on due process grounds. However, the Court notes that other courts have found violations of the APA based on similar grounds. See, e.g., Navarro 26 Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (finding revocation of petitioner’s parole arbitrary and 27 capricious because respondents did not state any reasons for the revocation); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *3 (“Petitioner’s parole was revoked without an individualized 28 1 ||Dated: June 24, 2026 2 IER, ‘

4 uf □□ 5 Jill A. Otake > US United States District Judge 6 Ty wk ty 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28