Rosenberg v. Latif (In Re Phoenix Restoration Specialists, Inc.)

14 B.R. 115, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2967
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedSeptember 15, 1981
Docket19-10571
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 14 B.R. 115 (Rosenberg v. Latif (In Re Phoenix Restoration Specialists, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rosenberg v. Latif (In Re Phoenix Restoration Specialists, Inc.), 14 B.R. 115, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2967 (Mass. 1981).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND FINDINGS ON DAMAGES

HAROLD LAVIEN, Bankruptcy Judge.

Phoenix Restoration Specialists, Inc., hereinafter called Phoenix, contracted to construct three retail food stores in malls in Peabody, Holyoke and Framingham. The work started in Peabody on August 6, 1979 and was substantially completed on October 3, 1979. In Holyoke, the contract was signed on August 24, 1979, work started September 4, 1979 and was completed November 14, 1979. The Framingham contract was signed October 19,1979 and Phoenix performed one or two days’ work, starting October 19,1979, before abandoning the project. This somewhat protracted litigation commenced on July 14, 1980, when the Trustee filed a complaint seeking payment for extras. The Defendant, Edward Latif, hereinafter called Latif, answered and filed a counterclaim for work not performed, work improperly performed, the failure to construct Framingham, and liquidated damages for delay. Originally, answer and counterclaim were filed by counsel, then Latif insisted on appearing pro se but, after urging by the Court, he retained counsel prior to the liability trial. At the request of counsel, the trial was bifurcated with the liability trial commencing on November 19, 1980 and utilizing the better part of five nonconsecutive days, concluding on January 5, 1981 with findings announced from the bench.

Prior to the liability trial, both Latif and the Trustee filed requests for production of *117 documents covering plans, bills, receipts, etc., and the Trustee also filed interrogatories seeking a detailing of Latif’s counterclaim. Latif, then acting pro se, failed initially to produce or answer interrogatories. After an Order by the Court and an explanation to Latif of his obligation, the interrogatories were answered and some plans were produced. The Trustee sought to default Latif for failure to produce and Latif, when pushed during the pre-trial, October 10, 1980, for the bills for the so-called corrective work, told the Court that he had not done any of the work yet, he had not spent any money yet and, therefore, he had no bills. On that basis, the default was not granted.

During the liability trial, all of the plans introduced were provided by Latif. Phoenix’s president testified he could not find any of the plans, bills or most records.

A pre-trial hearing was held on March 19, 1981, prior to the damage trial. Parties were to exchange bills, plans, and documents, but very little was exchanged. The trial began on May 12, 1981 and ended August 31,1981 after seven non-conseeutive days of trial.

During the trial on damages, there were three unexpected developments. First, the electrical sub-contractor testified that the electrical plans for Peabody and Holyoke that had been introduced by Latif in the liability trial were not plans on which he bid, although they looked similar and had the same date and signature. Second, the electrical engineer who drew the plans for Latif testified that the plans offered in liability trial were the finished set and the set used by the electrical contractor was a preliminary set but that it was not his practice to indicate by date or words the progression of the plans so that there was no way of telling the earlier from the later plan. Third, Rasczkowski, the Debtor’s President who had sat with Trustee’s counsel throughout the trial, now, in mid-June, discovered some additional plans, some bills, and some records. All of this so-called newly discovered evidence was found in a garage, a location previously searched. Unfortunately, this find still did not include the very important bid and estimate computation sheets.

The Trustee filed a motion for new trial, based on the so-called newly discovered evidence because of both the importance of this matter and its effect on Latif’s credibility. The new trial was denied but the Trustee was given the opportunity to specify those areas where additional evidence might be warranted because of confusion as to what might be considered an extra under the new plans and where the new material might justify review by the Court of its findings that were based on Latif’s credibility. The Plaintiff, in his submission, was to include any bills or charges now in his possession covering any claimed extras and a copy of bid computations. Latif was given an opportunity to reply and, in light of the new plans, to specify those items in his counterclaim still claimed, making reference to the particular plan on which his claim was based.

Both parties made their submissions, the Trustee not including the bid computations or copies of the bills and Latif detailing his claims but failing to include bills or to tie his claims to particular plans.

The Court reviewed the Trustee’s contentions and advised the parties in writing seven days before the resumption of trial as to which items it would receive evidence, would hear argument, or would foreclose as merely an attempt by the Trustee to re-try his case.

As to the electrical sub-contractor, I not only found his testimony credible, but that two plans bearing the same date, signature and legend, with no indication of a revision, could only intentionally, or otherwise, mislead Phoenix and the electrical sub-contractor. I find the electrical subcontractor had only the original set from which he prepared his bid and worked. Even if Phoenix had both sets, a matter I am not prepared to find, there was no reason for Rasczkowski, who was not an electrician, to be aware that he was not dealing with merely additional copies. I am willing to accept that Latif was unaware of what *118 occurred but, deliberate or otherwise, this unacceptable failure to distinguish the revised plan can only mislead and the owner, Latif, must bear the responsibility. I, therefore, accept as extras, the work performed by the electrician in Peabody and Holyoke that exceeded the first electrical plan.

However, as to the other preliminary sketches on Holyoke, they are in reality a red herring. I have no doubt that Ra-sczkowski, in his eagerness for the job, started his bid computation from early sketches but the contract for Holyoke was not signed until August 24, 1979. By then, the August 1st blueprint had been received. Not only did Latif testify that Rasczkowski went with him to the architect’s office to pick it up, but when it was offered at the very beginning of the liability trial, Trustee’s counsel in a colloquy with the Court, admitted it was the bid plan. So all the other plans were clearly preliminary and though it would have been forthright of Latif to have detailed the progression of the plans, they are of little practical significance except as it might affect my evaluation of Latif’s testimony. Of course, Phoenix would be entitled to extras for the difference between the August 1 plan and the September 15 plan, a date subsequent to the agreement.

I. PLAINTIFF’S RECOVERY FOR EXTRA WORK PERFORMED

Based on the evidence on damages presented over five days of trial, I make the following findings as to the amount owing the Plaintiff by the Defendant for work found to be authorized “extras”. As a preliminary matter, note that findings as to the labor costs are expressed in man-hours. Each man-hour is valued at $9.00 for regular employees and $15.00 for supervisors (i.e. Thompson and Rasczkowski) which includes employer contribution for taxes, insurance and pensions.

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14 B.R. 115, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2967, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rosenberg-v-latif-in-re-phoenix-restoration-specialists-inc-mab-1981.