OPINION
JAN P. PATTERSON, Justice.
The central issue in this will construction case is whether, when a testator directs that all transfer taxes be paid out of the residuary estate but the residue contains no assets, the default statutory apportionment provisions of section 322A of the probate code apply. Appellant Ricki Rosen is the widow of Daniel Rosen, independent executrix of his estate, and primary beneficiary of his will; she appeals by two issues. In her first issue, she contends that the probate court erred in allocating the tax burden to the probate assets. Under the apportionment statute, appellant argues, only the taxable assets, here specifically the non-probate life insurance proceeds passing to the children of Daniel Rosen’s first marriage, incur the transfer taxes. In her second issue, she contends that the probate court erred in failing to apportion any interest and penalties on transfer taxes and failing to award the estate its costs and legal fees in pursuing this matter. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the probate court’s order in part, reverse in part, render judgment that only the taxable assets of Rosen’s estate bear the transfer tax burden, and remand this cause in part for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
[148]*148FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Although the parties disagree about the application of the law, the facts in this ease are undisputed. Daniel Rosen died unexpectedly on June 14, 2000. At the time of his death, he was married to appellant, his second wife. He also had two children, Rachael and Dorian, from his first marriage to appellee Eileen Rosen that ended in 1996. Rosen died testate, and his will executed on May 28, 1997, was admitted to probate in the Travis County Probate Court. The total value of his gross estate was approximately $2,632 million.
Article III of the will left all of Rosen’s personal property, as well as his interests in all employee benefit plans and retirement accounts, to appellant. Articles IV and V placed the remainder of the estate in two trusts: the marital trust and the family trust. Rosen provided that the income of the marital trust was to be used for the benefit of appellant during her lifetime. The income of the family trust was to be used for the benefit of both appellant and Rosen’s descendants. The remainder of both trusts was to be distributed to his descendants, per stirpes. Article VIII contained administrative provisions, including a directive that all transfer taxes “shall be paid out of the residue of my estate without apportionment.” However, no residue existed because all of the probate assets were disposed of through other provisions in the will.
Rosen also had substantial non-probate assets, the bulk of which were designated for the benefit of his children. These included a $963,000 life insurance policy, payable to appellee Wells Fargo Bank, as trustee for Rosen’s children, and a $216,000 life insurance policy, payable to Wells Fargo as guardian of the children.1 The non-probate assets also included $64,542 held in a Uniform Gift to Minors Act (UGMA) account for the benefit of Rachael Rosen. Because Rosen was custodian of the UGMA account, it was included in his estate for tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 2036 (West 2002).
In June 2001, appellant filed an application for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that, because there was no residuary estate from which to pay the taxes, the taxes should be apportioned under section 322A of the probate code. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 322A (West 2003). Wells Fargo and Eileen Rosen opposed the declaratory judgment, asserting that the will specifically directed that the probate assets would bear the tax burden. It is undisputed that if the probate assets bear the transfer tax burden, the total taxes will be $224,447. If the non-probate assets bear the burden, the total taxes will be $132,442.
After an evidentiary hearing in July 2001, the probate court signed an order in October 2001, directing that all transfer taxes, expenses attributable to the determination of the taxes, plus any interest and penalties on the taxes, be paid solely from the probate assets. The court further ordered that each party pay its own attorney’s fees and costs for pursuing the declaratory judgment action. It is from this order that appellant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
We review a declaratory judgment action under the same standards as [149]*149other orders, judgments, and decrees. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 37.010 (West 1997); Black v. City of Killeen, 78 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied). We must uphold the judgment of the trial court if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. See Bell v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist, 994 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Oak Hills Props, v. Saga Rests., Inc., 940 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ). We have a duty to render the judgment the trial court should have rendered. See City of Galveston v. Giles, 902 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Scurlock Permian Corp. v. Brazos County, 869 S.W.2d 478, 488-89 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). We may only render judgment when, as here, the material facts are undisputed. See Mitchell v. Rancho Viejo, Inc., 736 S.W.2d 757, 762 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ refd n.r.e.) (citing Donald v. Carr, 407 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. Civ.App.-Dallas 1966, no writ)).
Will Construction
In addressing appellant’s first issue, whether the default statutory apportionment provisions apply, we must first examine what Rosen intended in his will. Testamentary intent is the critical inquiry when construing a will. San Antonio Area Found, v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.2000); Huffman v. Huffman, 161 Tex. 267, 339 S.W.2d 885, 888 (1960). In determining the testator’s intent, we are limited to the language within the four corners of the will. Lang, 35 S.W.3d at 639; Shriner’s Hosp. for Crippled Children of Tex. v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex.1980). We focus not on what the testator intended to write, but the meaning of the words actually used. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d at 151; Rekdahl v. Long, 417 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex.1967). “An appellate court must give the words in a will their normal meaning, in light of the testator’s intent.” Barker v. Rosenthal, 875 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ). We should construe the will to give effect to every part of it, as long as the language is reasonably susceptible of that construction. See Perfect Union Lodge No. 10, A.F. & A.M. v. Interfirst Bank of San Antonio, N.A., 748 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.1988);
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OPINION
JAN P. PATTERSON, Justice.
The central issue in this will construction case is whether, when a testator directs that all transfer taxes be paid out of the residuary estate but the residue contains no assets, the default statutory apportionment provisions of section 322A of the probate code apply. Appellant Ricki Rosen is the widow of Daniel Rosen, independent executrix of his estate, and primary beneficiary of his will; she appeals by two issues. In her first issue, she contends that the probate court erred in allocating the tax burden to the probate assets. Under the apportionment statute, appellant argues, only the taxable assets, here specifically the non-probate life insurance proceeds passing to the children of Daniel Rosen’s first marriage, incur the transfer taxes. In her second issue, she contends that the probate court erred in failing to apportion any interest and penalties on transfer taxes and failing to award the estate its costs and legal fees in pursuing this matter. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the probate court’s order in part, reverse in part, render judgment that only the taxable assets of Rosen’s estate bear the transfer tax burden, and remand this cause in part for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
[148]*148FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Although the parties disagree about the application of the law, the facts in this ease are undisputed. Daniel Rosen died unexpectedly on June 14, 2000. At the time of his death, he was married to appellant, his second wife. He also had two children, Rachael and Dorian, from his first marriage to appellee Eileen Rosen that ended in 1996. Rosen died testate, and his will executed on May 28, 1997, was admitted to probate in the Travis County Probate Court. The total value of his gross estate was approximately $2,632 million.
Article III of the will left all of Rosen’s personal property, as well as his interests in all employee benefit plans and retirement accounts, to appellant. Articles IV and V placed the remainder of the estate in two trusts: the marital trust and the family trust. Rosen provided that the income of the marital trust was to be used for the benefit of appellant during her lifetime. The income of the family trust was to be used for the benefit of both appellant and Rosen’s descendants. The remainder of both trusts was to be distributed to his descendants, per stirpes. Article VIII contained administrative provisions, including a directive that all transfer taxes “shall be paid out of the residue of my estate without apportionment.” However, no residue existed because all of the probate assets were disposed of through other provisions in the will.
Rosen also had substantial non-probate assets, the bulk of which were designated for the benefit of his children. These included a $963,000 life insurance policy, payable to appellee Wells Fargo Bank, as trustee for Rosen’s children, and a $216,000 life insurance policy, payable to Wells Fargo as guardian of the children.1 The non-probate assets also included $64,542 held in a Uniform Gift to Minors Act (UGMA) account for the benefit of Rachael Rosen. Because Rosen was custodian of the UGMA account, it was included in his estate for tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 2036 (West 2002).
In June 2001, appellant filed an application for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that, because there was no residuary estate from which to pay the taxes, the taxes should be apportioned under section 322A of the probate code. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 322A (West 2003). Wells Fargo and Eileen Rosen opposed the declaratory judgment, asserting that the will specifically directed that the probate assets would bear the tax burden. It is undisputed that if the probate assets bear the transfer tax burden, the total taxes will be $224,447. If the non-probate assets bear the burden, the total taxes will be $132,442.
After an evidentiary hearing in July 2001, the probate court signed an order in October 2001, directing that all transfer taxes, expenses attributable to the determination of the taxes, plus any interest and penalties on the taxes, be paid solely from the probate assets. The court further ordered that each party pay its own attorney’s fees and costs for pursuing the declaratory judgment action. It is from this order that appellant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
We review a declaratory judgment action under the same standards as [149]*149other orders, judgments, and decrees. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 37.010 (West 1997); Black v. City of Killeen, 78 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied). We must uphold the judgment of the trial court if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. See Bell v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist, 994 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Oak Hills Props, v. Saga Rests., Inc., 940 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ). We have a duty to render the judgment the trial court should have rendered. See City of Galveston v. Giles, 902 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Scurlock Permian Corp. v. Brazos County, 869 S.W.2d 478, 488-89 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). We may only render judgment when, as here, the material facts are undisputed. See Mitchell v. Rancho Viejo, Inc., 736 S.W.2d 757, 762 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ refd n.r.e.) (citing Donald v. Carr, 407 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. Civ.App.-Dallas 1966, no writ)).
Will Construction
In addressing appellant’s first issue, whether the default statutory apportionment provisions apply, we must first examine what Rosen intended in his will. Testamentary intent is the critical inquiry when construing a will. San Antonio Area Found, v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.2000); Huffman v. Huffman, 161 Tex. 267, 339 S.W.2d 885, 888 (1960). In determining the testator’s intent, we are limited to the language within the four corners of the will. Lang, 35 S.W.3d at 639; Shriner’s Hosp. for Crippled Children of Tex. v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex.1980). We focus not on what the testator intended to write, but the meaning of the words actually used. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d at 151; Rekdahl v. Long, 417 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex.1967). “An appellate court must give the words in a will their normal meaning, in light of the testator’s intent.” Barker v. Rosenthal, 875 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ). We should construe the will to give effect to every part of it, as long as the language is reasonably susceptible of that construction. See Perfect Union Lodge No. 10, A.F. & A.M. v. Interfirst Bank of San Antonio, N.A., 748 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.1988); Republic Nat’l Bank of Dallas v. Fredericks, 155 Tex. 79, 283 S.W.2d 39, 43 (1955). All rules of construction must yield to the testator’s basic intent and purposes as reflected by the entire instrument. Welch v. Straach, 531 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex.1975). However, we will not redraft the will or add provisions under the guise of construction to effectuate some presumed intent of the testator. See Perfect Union Lodge No. 10, 748 S.W.2d at 220; Stahl, 610 S.W.2d at 151; Huffman, 339 S.W.2d at 888.
The overarching intent of Rosen’s will was to pay as little in transfer taxes as possible. To fulfill this intent, his will employed two common methods to avoid taxation of his estate — the unified credit and the unlimited marital deduction. Article III of the will made specific gifts of probate assets to appellant. Article IV established a marital trust for the benefit of appellant, funded by assets entitled to the marital deduction. Under the Internal Revenue Code, property passing to a surviving spouse is entitled to an unlimited marital deduction, which is deducted from the value of the decedent’s taxable estate. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 2056(a) (West 2002). The gift was “intended to entitle [the] estate to the maximum marital deduction ... and any provision in this Will which may conflict with or fail of this intention shall be disregarded, reconciled or amplified to accomplish this objective.”
[150]*150The amount of the marital trust was to be “reduced by an amount, if any, needed to increase my taxable estate as determined for Federal estate tax purposes to be the largest amount which ... will result in the least amount of Federal estate tax imposed on my estate.” This clause ensured that assets would fund the unified credit, also deducted from the value of the taxable estate, before funding the marital trust. At the time of Rosen’s death, the unified credit was $675,000. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 2010 (West 2000), superseded by 26 U.S.C.A. § 2010 (West 2001). The effect of Article IV was that all probate assets not otherwise devised in Article III would fund the marital trust, less the amount necessary to fund any unused portion of the unified credit. The amount of unused unified credit thus would become the residue of the estate.
Article V placed all of the residue of the estate in the Daniel Hunt Rosen Family Trust, with appellant as primary beneficiary if she survived Rosen. Article VIII directed that transfer taxes be paid out of the residue, as follows:
All estate, inheritance or similar taxes ..., all funeral expenses and all expenses incurred with the administration of my estate shall be paid out of the residue of my estate without apportionment; provided, however, if my wife fails to survive me, to the extent the residue of my estate is insufficient for the payment of such taxes and expenses, then any excess, except as otherwise specifically provided in this Section, shall be paid on a pro rata basis from all of the assets included in my gross estate.
(Emphasis added.) Because the combined taxable value of the non-probate assets exceeded the unified credit, there was no residue of the estate to fund the family trust or pay the transfer taxes. The dissent’s reasoning rests on its finding that the marital trust contains the residue of the estate. “The residuary is what is left after all debts and legal charges have been paid and other testamentary gifts have been satisfied.” Stahl, 610 S.W.2d at 152 (emphasis added). The dissent disregards Rosen’s intent to create a marital trust by testamentary gift separate from the creation of the residue. The marital trust clause specifically designated that portion which, when read in conjunction with the family trust clause, would be the residue: the amount, “if any,” needed to fulfill the unified credit. Because the non-probate assets satisfied the unified credit, there was no residue. The will contained no alternative provision for the payment of taxes if the residue were unfunded or insufficient to pay the taxes. Thus arose the parties’ dispute about which assets would bear the burden of the taxes.
The dispute centers on whether section 322A of the probate code, the default apportionment statute, should apply when the will contains an ineffective directive for payment of taxes out of the residue of the estate. This is an issue of first impression in Texas.2 The default apportionment provisions apply unless the will “specifically directs the manner of apportionment of estate tax or grants a discretionary power of apportionment to another person.” [151]*151Tex. Prob.Code Ann. § S22A(b)(2).3 Appellant argues that the lack of a residuary estate negates any specific direction for apportionment and therefore the default apportionment provisions of section 322A should apply. We agree. Because Ro-sen’s only specific directive — payment of taxes out of the residuary estate — -was ineffective, and because his will did not anticipate an alternative for payment of taxes if the residue were insufficient, we hold that the default apportionment provisions of section 322A apply. To hold otherwise would give effect to a provision in the will that failed of its purpose. See Perfect Union Lodge No. 10, 748 S.W.2d at 220; Stahl, 610 S.W.2d at 151; Huffman, 339 S.W.2d at 888.4
Assets Subject to Payment of Transfer Taxes
Now we must decide which estate assets bear the tax burden. Appellees argue that Rosen’s “clear and unequivocal intent” was for taxes to be paid without apportionment out of the probate estate if no residuary estate existed. Appellees support their argument with the following clause from the will:
Non-probate assets payable to my testamentary Trustee shall not be liable for or used to pay (but may be loaned for such purpose) any taxes, liabilities, debts or any other claims against my estate: provided, however, such assets may be
used to pay estate, inheritance or similar taxes assessed with respect to such assets.
We disagree with appellees. This clause, when read in conjunction with the rest of Rosen’s will, supports appellant’s position because it directs that non-probate assets may be used to pay taxes that those assets incur. The will contains no provision, however, for payment of taxes out of the marital trust.
Section 322A provides that “the portion of each estate tax that is charged to each person interested in the estate must represent the same ratio as the taxable value of that person’s interest.” Tex. Prob.Code Ann. § 322A(b)(l). Here, under the directives of the will, the probate assets qualify for the unlimited marital deduction and therefore are not taxable. The non-probate assets that did not qualify for the unified credit are the only taxable assets and must therefore bear the burden of paying the taxes under section 322A(b)(l). Having the non-probate assets bear the tax burden results in less estate taxes, as the parties agree, in turn leaving more assets overall to pass to the beneficiaries. This comports with Rosen’s overarching intent to have his estate pay as little transfer taxes as possible.
Having sustained appellant’s first issue, we reverse the probate court’s order that [152]*152the probate estate bear the tax burden and render that portion of the declaratory judgment in favor of appellant, holding that only the non-probate assets of Rosen’s estate bear the tax burden.
Interest, Penalties, Attorney’s Fees, and Other Expenses
In her second issue, appellant contends that the probate court erred in charging any interest and penalties on transfer taxes against the probate estate. She argues that the probate court further erred in failing to award the estate its costs and legal fees in pursuing this matter. Concerning interest on transfer taxes, section 322A(m) of the probate code provides:
Interest on an extension of estate tax and interest and penalties on a deficiency shall be apportioned equitably to reflect the benefits and burdens of the extension or deficiency and of any tax deduction associated with the interest and penalties, but if the assessment or penalty is due to delay caused by the negligence of the representative, the representative shall be charged with the amount of assessed penalty and interest.
Id. § 322A(m). Section 322A(q) further provides for apportionment of the interest and penalties “unless, on application by any person interested in the estate, the court determines that the proposed apportionment is not equitable.” Id. § 322A(q). Appellees made an application below that appellant bear the costs of interest and penalties because the transfer taxes were not timely paid, but it is unclear from the record whether the taxes have been paid. In light of our decision to apportion the taxes under section 322A, we reverse the probate court’s order that the probate estate pay interest and penalties and remand this issue to the probate court for further determination in accordance with this opinion.
Concerning the payment of appellant’s costs, the probate court ordered that each party bear its own attorney’s fees, costs, and other expenses. Section 322A(r) of the probate code states:
Expenses reasonably incurred by a representative in determination of the amount, apportionment, or collection of the estate shall be apportioned among and charged to persons interested in the estate in the manner provided by Subsection (b) of this section unless, on application by any person interested in the estate, the court determines that the proposed apportionment is not equitable.
Id. § 322A(r). Section 322A(y) provides that prevailing party in an action to collect estate taxes from a person “to whom estate taxes were apportioned and charged under Subsection (b) of this section shall be awarded necessary expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” Id. § 322A(y). Appellees argued below that each party be responsible for its own costs and expenses, which the probate court ordered.
Normally, we review a court’s decision of whether to award attorney’s fees under an abuse of discretion standard. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1998). Despite the mandatory nature of the word “shall” in the probate code provisions, section 322A(r) allows a court to take equitable considerations into account in apportioning fees and costs. Appellant also sought costs under section 37.009 of the civil practice and remedies code, under which a court has discretion to award attorney’s fees in a declaratory judgment action. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.009 (West 1997). Construing these provisions together, we hold that it was within the probate court’s discretion to award fees and costs. Because appellant presents no evidence on appeal that the probate court abused its discre[153]*153tion, we affirm the probate court’s order that each party bear its own costs and expenses.
CONCLUSION
We hold that Rosen’s directive that all transfer taxes be paid out of the residuary estate failed because the residue contained no assets, and therefore the default statutory apportionment provisions of section B22A of the probate code must apply. Tex. Prob.Code Ann. § 322A. We further hold that under section 322A(b)(l), only the taxable assets of the estate bear the burden of the transfer taxes. Id. § 322A(b)(l). Here, under the directives of the will, the probate assets qualify for the unlimited marital deduction and therefore are not taxable. The non-probate assets that did not qualify for the unified credit are the only taxable assets and must therefore bear the burden of paying the taxes under section 322A(b)(l). Accordingly, we reverse the probate court’s order to the extent that it ordered the probate estate to bear the tax burden and render judgment that only the taxable assets of the non-probate estate bear the tax burden.
We affirm that part of the probate court’s order directing each party to bear its own costs and expenses. Finally, we remand the issue of who bears the burden of paying any interest and penalties on the transfer taxes to the probate court for further determination in accordance with this opinion.
Dissenting opinion by Justice MACK KIDD.