Rosemary Smith, Brady Smith, and Donna Hubbard, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Heirs and Estate of Dorman Smith v. Kelly-Moore Paint Company, Inc.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 25, 2010
Docket02-08-00198-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Rosemary Smith, Brady Smith, and Donna Hubbard, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Heirs and Estate of Dorman Smith v. Kelly-Moore Paint Company, Inc. (Rosemary Smith, Brady Smith, and Donna Hubbard, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Heirs and Estate of Dorman Smith v. Kelly-Moore Paint Company, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Rosemary Smith, Brady Smith, and Donna Hubbard, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Heirs and Estate of Dorman Smith v. Kelly-Moore Paint Company, Inc., (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

                                                COURT OF APPEALS

                                                 SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                                                FORT WORTH

                                        NO. 2-08-198-CV

ROSEMARY SMITH, BRADY SMITH,                                     APPELLANTS

AND DONNA HUBBARD,

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HEIRS

AND ESTATE OF DORMAN SMITH,

DECEASED

                                                   V.

KELLY-MOORE PAINT COMPANY, INC.                                      APPELLEE

                                              ------------

           FROM THE 153RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

                                             OPINION


This is an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of appellee Kelly-Moore Paint Company, Inc. in this asbestos exposure products liability case.[1] In a single issue, appellants Rosemary Smith, Brady Smith, and Donna Hubbard, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Heirs and Estate of Dorman Smith, Deceased (collectively, the Smiths), contend that the trial court erred by granting a no-evidence summary judgment on the ground that the Smiths failed to adduce sufficient evidence that Dorman had been exposed to chrysotile asbestos in Kelly-Moore=s drywall joint compounds in a dose sufficient to have been a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma.

                                        Background Facts

Dorman began working in the construction business, specifically as a self-employed drywaller finisher using joint compound, around 1955, and he performed the same type of work through the mid 1980s.  Doctors eventually diagnosed him with mesothelioma in early 2005.  As a result, the Smiths sued several defendants, including Kelly-Moore, in Tarrant County, claiming that exposure to the asbestos in those defendants= joint compound products proximately caused Dorman=s mesothelioma.  Dorman died after filing suit, on December 9, 2005.


The case was transferred to the 11th District Court, the Texas multidistrict litigation pretrial court.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 90.010(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009); Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 13, reprinted in Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. tit. 2, subtit. F app. (Vernon Supp. 2009).  Before trial, Kelly-Moore moved for both a no-evidence and traditional summary judgment, contending that the Smiths had presented no evidence that Dorman=s exposure to any of Kelly-Moore=s chrysotile asbestos-containing joint compound product caused his mesothelioma, under the test set forth in the supreme court=s opinion in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. 2007).[2]  The 11th District Court granted Kelly-Moore=s no-evidence motion for summary judgment and transferred the remaining claims back to the 153rd District Court in Tarrant County for trial; however, the remaining claims against the other defendants were either settled or dismissed, making the summary judgment final.  The Smiths then appealed the summary judgment ruling in favor of Kelly-Moore.


                 No-Evidence Summary Judgment Standard of Review

After an adequate time for discovery, the party without the burden of proof may, without presenting evidence, move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the nonmovant=s claim or defense.  Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).  The motion must specifically state the elements for which there is no evidence.  Id.; Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009).  The trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant produces summary judgment evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) & cmt.; Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008).


When reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion.  Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex. 2006).  We review a no‑evidence summary judgment for evidence that would enable reasonable and fair‑minded jurors to differ in their conclusions.  Hamilton, 249 S.W.3d at 426 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005)).  We credit evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and we disregard evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not.  Timpte Indus., Inc., 286 S.W.3d at 310 (quoting Mack Trucks, Inc.

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Related

MacK Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez
206 S.W.3d 572 (Texas Supreme Court, 2006)
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores
232 S.W.3d 765 (Texas Supreme Court, 2007)
Hamilton v. Wilson
249 S.W.3d 425 (Texas Supreme Court, 2008)
Timpte Industries, Inc. v. Gish
286 S.W.3d 306 (Texas Supreme Court, 2009)
Purcell v. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd.
959 P.2d 89 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1998)
Purcell v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd.
963 P.2d 729 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1998)
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner
953 S.W.2d 706 (Texas Supreme Court, 1997)
Temple-Inland Forest Products Corp. v. Carter
993 S.W.2d 88 (Texas Supreme Court, 1999)
Lubbock County v. Trammel's Bail Bonds
80 S.W.3d 580 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
City of Keller v. Wilson
168 S.W.3d 802 (Texas Supreme Court, 2005)
Wehmeier v. UNR Industries, Inc.
572 N.E.2d 320 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1991)
McClure v. Denham
162 S.W.3d 346 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Stephens
239 S.W.3d 304 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Sudan v. Sudan
199 S.W.3d 291 (Texas Supreme Court, 2006)
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.
782 F.2d 1156 (Fourth Circuit, 1986)

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Rosemary Smith, Brady Smith, and Donna Hubbard, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Heirs and Estate of Dorman Smith v. Kelly-Moore Paint Company, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rosemary-smith-brady-smith-and-donna-hubbard-individually-and-as-texapp-2010.