Rose v. Department of Parole

• Court: District Court, E.D. New York
• Decided: August 7, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-04595
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KING LUQMAN LAQUAN ROSE AKA LAQUAN ROSE, Plaintiff, 25-CV-5714 (LTS) -against- TRANSFER ORDER DEPARTMENT OF PAROLE, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently detained in the George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was falsely arrested in Brooklyn, New York. He sues the “Department of Parole,” which the Court understands to be the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), the state agency responsible for the administration of parole in New York. For the following reasons, this action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. DISCUSSION Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2). Plaintiff does not plead the residence of DOCCS, but as an agency of the State of New York, DOCCS can likely be considered a resident of this District and every other district in the state. Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that he was arrested in Brooklyn, New York, and records maintained by the New York City Department of Correction confirm that the arrest that forms the basis of Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Brooklyn.1 Brooklyn is in Kings County, which falls

within the Eastern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(c). Because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Brooklyn, venue is proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Eastern District of New York. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), even if a case is filed in a jurisdiction where venue is proper, a court may transfer the case to any other district where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following ten factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the

location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors).

1 See https://a073-ils-web.nyc.gov/inmatelookup/pages/home/home.jsf (last viewed Aug. 6, 2025) [https://perma.cc/HWL8-YE3C]. Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The underlying events occurred in Brooklyn, and it is reasonable to expect that the relevant documents and witnesses also would be in Brooklyn. The Eastern District of New York appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”). CONCLUSION The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this court. This order closes this case in this court. The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an

appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED. Dated: August 7, 2025 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge