Rosario-Ramon v. Doe

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 24, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-03045
StatusUnknown

This text of Rosario-Ramon v. Doe (Rosario-Ramon v. Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rosario-Ramon v. Doe, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MATIAS ROSARIO-RAMON, Plaintiff, 19-CV-3045 (CM) -against- ORDER TO AMEND JOHN DOE, Defendant. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in the Otis Bantum Correctional Center (OBCC) on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant violated his constitutional rights. By order dated August 2, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. After separating legal

conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Matias Rosario-Ramon alleges the following facts. On December 16, 2018, he was eating an apple in the OBCC mess hall when his tooth came out, and four of the brackets that sustain his other teeth came off. He went to the clinic on January 3, 2019, but he did not agree with the decision to use acrylic to fix his tooth. He asserts that the doctor was not willing to take care of him because of his lack of English. Plaintiff attaches to his complaint copies of medical records showing that he received treatment on the following dates: August 1, 2018, August 9, 2018, September 10, 2018, September 12, 2018, and January 3, 2019. The treatment notes suggest that on each date, Plaintiff complained about dental issues. The records reflect that on August 1, 2018, Plaintiff was given wax to cover the brackets, and he was prescribed Ibuprofen for pain. On August 9, 2018, Plaintiff was seen for a cracked tooth, and on September 10, 2018, a splint was applied on both

sides of the tooth to secure it. The notes for the treatment that Plaintiff received indicate that Spanish to English translation was provided on that date. The notes for the treatment Plaintiff received on January 3, 2019, also reflect that Spanish to English translation was provided. The dentist attempted to fix Plaintiff’s tooth with acrylic, but Plaintiff didn’t like it, so the acrylic was removed. The dentist informed Plaintiff that orthodontic services were not provided. Plaintiff seeks “$55,000.00 dollars and assuming that the orthodontic work will be completly [sic].” (ECF No. 2 at 5.) DISCUSSION A. Deliberate Indifference The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting deliberate-indifference claims under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.2 To state a

deliberate-indifference claim, a plaintiff must allege that a correction official was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to him. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). A convicted prisoner must show that a correction official “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both [have been] aware of facts from

2 If Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the events that are the basis of his claims, his claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; if he was a convicted prisoner, such claims arise under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979); Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996). which the inference could [have been] drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must [have] also draw[n| the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. A pretrial detainee must show that “that the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. Because it appears that Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee on the date of incident, the more generous standard applies. Even under this standard, however, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(11). 1.

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Rosario-Ramon v. Doe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rosario-ramon-v-doe-nysd-2019.