Roper Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board

712 F.2d 306, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3557, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 25779
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJuly 15, 1983
Docket82-2696
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 712 F.2d 306 (Roper Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roper Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 712 F.2d 306, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3557, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 25779 (7th Cir. 1983).

Opinion

PELL, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal petitioner Roper Corporation seeks review of an order of the National Labor Relations Board (Board), which found that Roper violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. The Board cross-petitions for enforcement of its order.

I. Facts

Roper has its corporate headquarters in Illinois and two production facilities in Maryland. Prior to September, 1979, Roper used a merit review system to determine wage rates for all non-bargaining unit employees. The Baltimore facility employed eight security guards who were covered by the merit review system. Under this system, guards whose salaries fell below the midpoint of their labor grade were reviewed every six months, while guards who earned above the midpoint were reviewed once a year. The guards received raises depending upon the quality of their work. Although the raises were minimal or nonexistent on some occasions, the average raise ranged from 16 cents to 25 cents an hour.

A representative election was conducted in August, 1979, after which the Board certified the International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America (Union) as the bargaining representative of the guards. The Union was certified during September, and negotiations with Roper began in October. After extended negotiations, the parties signed a contract in June, 1980.

In the wake of the Union’s certification, Roper decided to abandon the merit wage reviews for the guards. Roper based this decision partly upon the advice of counsel, who thought that merit raises during contract negotiations would run afoul of the Act, and partly upon the Union’s expressed antipathy toward merit raises. There is considerable conflict as to when and how Roper informed the Union of this change in working conditions.

None of the guards was due a merit raise until February. During February, Andrew Eisner, Roper’s Manager of Safety and Security, told several guards that he could not give them raises while Roper and the Union were negotiating the contract. Eisner allegedly also told one guard that they had “a beautiful deal,” but “blew it by getting the ' Union in.” Eisner denied saying this, but. we must credit the finding of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that Eisner did in fact make this statement.

II. Decision of the AU

An employee of Roper filed a charge with the Board, which eventually led to a formal *309 complaint against the company. The complaint charged that Roper failed to bargain in good faith with the Union and coerced employees concerning the exercise of their rights by informing them that they lost benefits when they selected the Union as their bargaining representative. An ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Roper was guilty of both charges.

Three guards appeared at the hearing and testified about Eisner’s statements. In addition, Dana Schubert, former Director of Industrial Relations for Roper, and Eisner • each testified about the contract negotiations with the Union. Schubert and Eisner represented Roper during the negotiations, while Max McDermott and one of the guards, Shan Carroll, represented the Union. Another guard, Luther Hempe, sat in on the final two negotiation sessions. Of the three men who represented the Union, only Hempe appeared at the hearing. McDermott died prior to the hearing, but General Counsel for the Board offered no reason to explain Carroll’s absence.

Schubert testified that he informed McDermott during the early negotiation sessions that Roper would not conduct any more merit reviews, including those scheduled for February. Schubert also testified that McDermott was firmly, against continuation of merit raises in the contract, a contention borne out by the exclusion of merit reviews in the final contract. Eisner confirmed that McDermott opposed merit raises, but did not know whether Schubert informed McDermott that no reviews would be conducted during the negotiations.

The ALJ recognized that the General Counsel had failed to present any witnesses to support the Board’s contention that the company did not inform the Union that scheduled reviews were to be cancelled. The ALJ did not consider the Board’s failure to produce Carroll as indicative of what Carroll’s testimony might be, but did discredit Schubert and Eisner because “they seemed less than candid and forthright.” Having discredited all of the evidence in Roper’s favor, the ALJ found that it was “clear that at no time during the negotiations did Respondent notify the Union that it had discontinued the merit increase system.” Based upon this factual premise, the ALJ found that Roper failed to give the Union adequate notice of a change in working conditions and therefore did not bargain in good faith. The Board adopted the ALJ’s findings, conclusions, and order.

The ALJ also found Eisner’s explanations to the guards as to why no merit reviews were forthcoming, and his statement that he thought the guards were better off without a Union, violative of section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Board also adopted this finding.

III. Failure to Bargain

Under section 8(a)(5) of the Act it is an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.” It is well settled that an employer fails to bargain in good faith when it unilaterally changes existing working conditions while negotiating with a union. An employer must give advance notice to ■ the union, which must be adequate to allow the union to bargain about the proposed change. Failure to give adequate notice constitutes a violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 1113-1114, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir.1981); American Cyanamid Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 356 (7th Cir.1979); NLRB v. Proof Co., 242 F.2d 560, 562 (7th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 831, 78 S.Ct. 45, 2 L.Ed.2d 43. Roper does not contest these principles, but rather argues that the ALJ and the Board erred in finding that the company violated the duty to bargain. As this is essentially a challenge to the ALJ’s fact findings, we must turn out attention to the evidence presented during the hearing.

The ALJ’s conclusion that Roper did not give the Union notice of the change in working conditions, a finding that was adopted by the Board, must be affirmed if “supported by substantial evidence on the *310 record considered as a whole.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).

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Bluebook (online)
712 F.2d 306, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3557, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 25779, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roper-corporation-v-national-labor-relations-board-ca7-1983.