Ronsberg v. United States

798 F. Supp. 582, 72 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6029, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13356, 1992 WL 209665
CourtDistrict Court, D. North Dakota
DecidedJune 11, 1992
DocketCiv. A3-90-72
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 798 F. Supp. 582 (Ronsberg v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. North Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ronsberg v. United States, 798 F. Supp. 582, 72 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6029, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13356, 1992 WL 209665 (D.N.D. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BENSON, Senior District Judge.

John Ronsberg initiated this suit against the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the United States after he was assessed a one-hundred percent penalty pursuant to 26 I.R.C. § 6672. Ronsberg was assessed the penalty in his capacity as a “responsible person” for purposes of collecting withholding and employment taxes of Pavement Maintenance, Inc. (PMI). The matter is currently before the court on plaintiff Ronsberg’s motion for summary judgment.

Summary Judgment is available to a party when a review of the pleadings and other documents filed indicate there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A Court considering a motion for summary judgment must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. The non-moving party is entitled to all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Vacca v. Viacom Broadcasting of Missouri, Inc., 875 F.2d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir.1989).

*583 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

It appears that PMI failed to remit to the Internal Revenue Service certain sums, held in trust, representing employment and withholding taxes for the three quarterly periods commencing July 1, 1982, and ending March 31, 1983. In such a situation, the IRS can assess a one hundred percent penalty against those persons in the business entity who are responsible for the collection and payment to IRS of the entity’s withholding tax liabilities. 26 I.R.C. § 6672.

In early January, 1987, Ronsberg received a notice from the IRS informing him that he was being charged a one-hundred-percent penalty, pursuant to 26 I.R.C. § 6672, for failing, as a responsible person of PMI, to collect, account for, or pay over trust fund taxes. The penalty was assessed in one lump sum for the amount of $126,603.91. The parties agree that the government, in assessing a one-hundred-percent penalty pursuant to 26 I.R.C. § 6672, must do so as described in 26 I.R.C. § 6671. Section 6671 provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) Penalty assessed as tax. The penalties and liabilities provided by this sub-chapter shall be paid upon notice and demand by the Secretary, and shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes ...

Id. At the core of this litigation is the opposing views of the parties as to the interpretation of section 6671. Plaintiff construes the statute as requiring the government to assess and collect section 6672 penalties in exactly the same manner as the underlying tax was to be assessed and collected. Plaintiffs brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 36) at 4. The government’s position is that the penalty must be assessed as taxes are assessed but argues there is no requirement that the penalty assessment be done in exactly the same manner as the assessment of the underlying tax. Defendant’s Brief in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 38) at 3.

In this case the IRS based its assessment of the penalty in question on PMI’s failure to retain and pay over to the IRS, employment and withholding taxes as required by 26 I.R.C. §§ 3402(a) and 3501. Those taxes are required to be reported on a quarterly basis unless another method is approved by the IRS. Id. Plaintiff acknowledges that the IRS initially made a quarterly assessment of the taxes in question. Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 36) at 3. Plaintiff argues, however, that once IRS sought to hold him personally liable, they were required to assess the penalty on a quarterly basis, exactly as the original tax was assessed and to be paid. Id. at 5.

Defendant admits that the underlying tax was to be paid on a quarterly basis but alleges there is no requirement that the IRS assess a section 6672 penalty in exactly the same manner as the underlying tax. Defendant’s Brief (Doc. # 38) at 3.

DISCUSSION

A resolution of the issues presented requires a determination of the applicable rules; whether there was a violation of the rules; and the consequence of a violation.

1. Applicable Rules

Plaintiff has read into the plain language of 26 I.R.C. § 6671 a requirement that section 6672 penalties be assessed and paid in exactly the same manner as the taxpayer was to voluntarily pay the underlying tax. Plaintiff has failed, however, to direct the court to authority, statutory or case precedent, which directly supports this theory. The majority of plaintiffs argument, and the authority cited to in his briefs, address the issue of the consequences of a failure of the IRS to adhere to the exact requirements of the tax laws.

A section 6672(a) penalty imposes personal liability upon the responsible individual employee or officer, which is distinct and separate from the tax liability imposed upon the employer. Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 733 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Pomponio, 635 F.2d 293, 298 (4th Cir.1980); See also Kelly v. Lethert, 362 F.2d 629 (8th Cir.1966) (“The result of section 6672 is thus to make the *584 responsible officers of the corporation, as well as the corporation itself, equally liable as co-debtors to the Government and the Government may proceed against either in the order best suited in its judgment to collect the unpaid tax.”)- Thus, while both Ronsberg and PMI’s liability arose out of the same tax obligation, Ronsberg's liability was not created until PMI failed to pay the tax in question.

Our system of taxation relies on voluntary reporting by the citizenry. To facilitate this process, Congress has enacted a tax code. This code provides guidance to the citizens in preparation of their tax returns and to the executive branch of the government in the collection of the tax. In this case the provisions of 26 I.R.C. § 3402 required PMI to withhold certain sums from its employees and voluntarily pay the withholding to the IRS. The corporation failed to do so. If a taxpayer fails to voluntarily comply, the code authorizes the IRS to assess an appropriate penalty. See 26 I.R.C. § 6201(a) (“The Secretary is authorized and required to make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes (including interest, additional amounts, additions to the tax, and assessable penalties) imposed by law, which have not been duly paid_”) (emphasis added).

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Bluebook (online)
798 F. Supp. 582, 72 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6029, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13356, 1992 WL 209665, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ronsberg-v-united-states-ndd-1992.