Roni Sanchez v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: May 21, 2012
• Docket: A12A0928
• Status: Published

Opinion

FIRST DIVISION ELLINGTON, C. J., PHIPPS, P. J., and DILLARD, J.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. (Court of Appeals Rule 4 (b) and Rule 37 (b), February 21, 2008) http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/

May 21, 2012

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A12A0928. SANCHEZ v. THE STATE. JE-035C

E LLINGTON, Chief Judge.

A Gwinnett County jury found Roni Sanchez guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

of two counts of statutory rape, OCGA § 16-6-3 (a); and two counts of child

molestation, OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1). Following the denial of his motion for a new

trial, Sanchez appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient. For the reasons

explained below, we affirm.

On appeal from a criminal conviction, the appellate court

view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict[,] and an appellant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. [The appellate court] determines whether the evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. Any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence are for the jury to resolve. As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case, [the appellate court] must uphold the jury’s verdict.

(Citations omitted.) Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 (606 SE2d 269) (2004).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence shows the

following. In the fall of 2006, during a family cookout, the 14-year-old victim lay

down to nap and woke to find Sanchez, her 27-year-old cousin, touching her breasts.

Over the next two years, Sanchez, who frequently visited the victim’s home, molested

the victim by touching her breasts on many separate occasions. Beginning soon after

the first incident of molestation, Sanchez also had sexual intercourse with the victim

on several occasions.

In May 2009, the victim revealed Sanchez’s conduct first to a teacher and a

school counselor and then to her parents. A sexual assault examination showed a

healed tear to the victim’s hymen and other indicators consistent with the victim’s

report of sexual intercourse.

At an investigator’s request, the victim went to the police department and

placed a telephone call to Sanchez, which was recorded, transcribed, and translated

from Spanish into English. During that phone call, the victim told Sanchez that she

2 was pregnant. Acknowledging the sexual relationship going back to late 2006,

Sanchez offered to stand by the victim and to support her financially.

At trial, the victim testified as to each incident. The jury also viewed an

audiovisual recording of the forensic interview that took place after the victim’s

outcry and received the transcript of the telephone call between Sanchez and the

victim. Sanchez testified at trial and, although he denied all the other incidents of

molestation, admitted having sexual intercourse with the victim once when she was

16 years old.

1. Sanchez contends that the State failed to adduce any evidence to corroborate

the victim’s testimony as to the two counts of statutory rape, as required by OCGA §

16-6-3 (a). 1

[I]t is well settled[, however,] that it is not necessary that the child be corroborated as to every essential element of the crime, or that it establish the defendant’s guilt[.] . . . Moreover, the quantum of corroboration needed is not that which is in itself sufficient to convict the accused, but only that amount of independent evidence which tends to prove that the incident occurred as alleged. Slight circumstances may be sufficient corroboration, and ultimately the question of corroboration is one for the jury.

1 OCGA § 16-6-3 (a) (“[N]o conviction shall be had for [statutory rape] on the unsupported testimony of the victim.”).

3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Timmons v. State, 182 Ga. App. 556, 557 (356

SE2d 523) (1987). In this case, the victim’s testimony was corroborated, inter alia, by

the medical evidence, by Sanchez’s opportunity to commit the crimes as alleged, by

the statements Sanchez made when the victim told him that she was pregnant, and by

his testimony admitting one incident of sexual intercourse. See Worley v. State, 222

Ga. 319 (149 SE2d 682) (1966) (victim’s testimony corroborated by her pregnancy

and by the defendant’s opportunity to commit the crime as alleged); Hill v. State, 295

Ga. App. 360, 361-362 (1) (671 SE2d 853) (2008) (victim’s testimony corroborated

by her prior consistent statement to a friend and by the defendant’s admissions during

a recorded telephone call); Byars v. State, 198 Ga. App. 793 (1) (403 SE2d 82) (1991)

(victim’s testimony corroborated by her pregnancy, by her prior consistent statement

to her cousin, and by the defendant’s opportunity to commit the crime as alleged);

Runion v. State, 180 Ga. App. 440 (1) (349 SE2d 288) (1986) (victim’s testimony

corroborated by her prior consistent statement to a sexual assault examiner and by the

defendant’s admission of an act of molestation against the victim). Accordingly, the

evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Sanchez guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of statutory rape.

4 2. Sanchez contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction

on Count 3 of the indictment, which charged that, between June 1, 2007, and August

31, 2007, he molested the victim by rubbing her breasts. Specifically, Sanchez points

to the victim’s testimony regarding one incident that took place in his car. Regardless

whether the victim testified that Sanchez did not touch her breasts during that specific

incident, 2 there was evidence that he touched her breasts on many occasions, including

during the specified time period. Accordingly, this claim of error presents no basis for

reversal. Cook v. State, 276 Ga. App. 803, 804-805 (1) (625 SE2d 83) (2005); Wallace

v. State, 253 Ga. App. 220, 221 (1) (a) (558 SE2d 773) (2002).

Judgment affirmed. Phipps, P. J., and Dillard, J., concur.

2 In detail, the record shows that the victim described the incident as follows: en route to a video store with the victim, Sanchez parked in a secluded area, had the victim get out of the car, placed himself in the passenger seat, had the victim sit on his lap, attempted anal penetration, and stopped when the victim complained of the pain. The prosecutor asked, “[A]t that point, did he touch your breasts?” (Emphasis added.) The victim responded, “No.”