Roneel Deo (A#079-261-235) v. Christopher Chestnut, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 3, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-02068
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RONEEL DEO (A#079-261-235), No. 1:26-cv-02068-DC-SCR 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee who filed this habeas corpus action pursuant 18 to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 20 I. Factual and Procedural History 21 Petitioner is a noncitizen who entered the United States on an unknown date. In 2005, he 22 became a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”). ECF No. 1 at 5. Petitioner was detained by 23 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers on December 19, 2023 and has been in 24 continuous custody for almost two and a half years. ECF No. 1 at 5. He has not received a bond 25 hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) during that time period. Id. He is currently detained 26 at the California City Detention Facility located within this judicial district. ECF No. 1 at 3. 27 In his § 2241 application, Petitioner contends that his prolonged detention without a 28 hearing violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. ECF No. 1 at 16. Petitioner asserts 1 that his detention is likely to continue in the foreseeable future as he pursues relief from removal, 2 a process for which he should not be punished. Id. at 13. Petitioner seeks immediate release or, 3 in the alternative, a bond hearing where the government has the burden of demonstrating by clear 4 and convincing evidence that petitioner is a flight risk or danger. ECF No. 1 at 17. 5 In their answer, Respondents assert that Petitioner is mandatorily detained pursuant to 8 6 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) based on a conviction for an aggravated felony under the Immigration and 7 Nationality Act (“INA”). ECF No. 7 at 2; see also ECF No. 7 at 28-34 (state court records for 8 conviction for Making Criminal Threats Resulting in Death or Great Bodily Injury in violation of 9 California Penal Code § 422). If Petitioner challenges the mandatory nature of his detention 10 based on this aggravated felony, Respondents contend that “[t]he Court should require Petitioner 11 to exhaust his Joseph hearing before any collateral challenge tohis mandatory detention[.]” ECF 12 No. 7 at 2. Regarding the prolonged detention claim, Respondents indicate that the mandatory 13 detention under § 1226(c) “has a definite termination point: the conclusion of removal 14 proceedings.” Id. 15 An IJ ordered Petitioner removed to Fiji on November 7, 2024, and the BIA dismissed his 16 appeal on April 11, 2025. ECF No. 7 at 49-52, 59-62. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the 17 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on April 18, 2025. ECF No. 7 at 64-69. The petitioner for review 18 remains pending. Respondents argue that Petitioner’s detention continues to serve a legitimate 19 purpose in ensuring his appearance for removal to Fiji and preventing him from committing 20 further crimes. Id. at 4. 21 By way of a counseled reply, Petitioner indicates that he is a native and citizen of Fiji who 22 was lawfully admitted to the United States as a minor child with his parents. ECF No. 10 at 3. 23 His parents, who are naturalized U.S. citizens, reside in Sacramento along with his siblings and 24 extended family who will provide him housing and access to mental health treatment. ECF No. 25 10 at 3-4. He suffers from bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, which he manages with 26 medication. Id. While in immigration detention, Petitioner has not consistently received his 27 psychiatric medication resulting in “recurrence of [his] symptoms including confusion and 28 1 auditory disturbances.” Id. at 3.1 An IJ granted Petitioner’s motion to reopen his removal 2 proceedings based on “the nexus between Mr. Deo’s mental health conditions and his criminal 3 conduct.” Id. at 4. According to Petitioner, this finding by the IJ “directly undermines any 4 contention that Mr. Deo poses an unmanageable danger when treated.” Id. Ultimately, the IJ did 5 order Petitioner removed based on a conviction for an aggravated felony and a particularly 6 serious crime, but his appeal is pending before the BIA. Id. According to Petitioner, “[t]here is 7 no indication of when a decision will issue.” Id. at 15. 8 Petitioner emphasizes the length of his detention of nearly two and one-half years without 9 any individualized assessment of whether he represents a flight risk or danger. ECF No. 10 at 2. 10 “Respondents’ primary contention is that 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) authorizes Mr. Deo’s indefinite 11 mandatory detention without any bond hearing whatsoever. This position is untenable” according 12 to Petitioner. Id. Based on the test announced in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), 13 Petitioner is entitled to relief in the form of an “individualized bond hearing before an 14 immigration judge within seven days, at which the government bears the burden of justifying 15 continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.” ECF No. 10 at 5-10. According to 16 Petitioner, the legal issue before the Court is not whether Petitioner is detained pursuant to 17 1226(c), but rather whether Petitioner’s criminal conviction alone can justify his indefinite civil 18 detention without any hearing as a matter of constitutional due process. Id. at 11. 19 Finally, Petitioner emphasizes that a Joseph hearing is not required for exhaustion 20 purposes because it does not constitute a bond hearing, nor can it serve as a substitute for a 21 constitutionally mandated individualized assessment of dangerousness and flight risk. Id. at 13. 22 Moreover, “If the government believed mandatory detention could lawfully continue indefinitely 23 without any hearing, it would have no need to propose even a Joseph hearing as an alternative 24 remedy. The government’s own recognition that some process is warranted confirms that the only 25 question is what process is due, and binding Ninth Circuit authority answers that question 26

27 1 Later in the reply, Petitioner emphasizes that “civil detention that fails to provide adequate mental health treatment becomes increasingly punitive in character.” Id. at 14 (citing Jones v. 28 Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004). 1 decisively.” Id. 2 II. Statutory Immigration Standards 3 According to Respondents, Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 4 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That provision states that the Attorney General “shall take into custody any 5 [noncitizen] who” falls into one of the enumerated categories involving criminal offenses, § 6 1226(c)(1)(A)-(E), which includes any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). It further 7 specifies that the Attorney General “may release” such a noncitizen “only if the Attorney General 8 decides” both that doing so is necessary for witness-protection purposes and that the noncitizen 9 will not pose a danger or flight risk, § 1226(c)(2). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 10 (2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2)) (emphasis in original). 11 Petitioner, who is represented by counsel, does not challenge the designation of his 12 criminal conviction as an aggravated felony. This issue is not disputed between the parties.2 As a 13 result, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 14 III. Due Process Analysis 15 The petition raises an as-applied, procedural due process challenge to the constitutionality 16 of petitioner’s mandatory detention. At this point, petitioner has been detained for almost one 17 year. During this time period, there is no record of any bond hearing before an IJ to determine 18 whether his detention is justified based on his dangerousness or flight risk. 19 The Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of mandatory detention under § 20 1226(c) in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). The Supreme Court did so with the

21 2 To the extent that Respondents’ suggest that Petitioner should be required to request a Joseph hearing in immigration court to challenge the mandatory nature of his detention, the undersigned 22 concludes that this is not necessary for Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. See 23 ECF No. 7 at 4. The remedy in a Joseph hearing is a finding that the noncitizen is not “subject to” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). See Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 804. But here Petitioner effectively 24 concedes he is subject to § 1226(c) and argues that due process entitles him to a bond hearing. In sum, a Joseph hearing would not provide Petitioner with the relief he seeks through his § 2241 25 petition. See Arnold v. Crawford, 554 F. Supp. 2d 987, 989 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“the Court finds that 26 exhaustion via a Joseph hearing is not required because Petitioner is not challenging whether he is subject to mandatory detention.”), order vacated on reconsideration on other grounds, No. CV 07- 27 170 PHX JAT(LOA), 2008 WL 4999211 (D. Ariz. Nov. 21, 2008). For this reason, the undersigned finds that prudential exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required in this 28 case. 1 understanding that § 1226(c) detention is relatively “brief” and “limited,” and “lasts roughly a 2 month and a half in the vast majority of cases” and “about five months in the minority of cases in 3 which the alien chooses to appeal.” Id. at 513, 529 n.12, 530. Justice Kennedy joined the opinion 4 in full, but wrote a concurring opinion recognizing the viability of as-applied challenges under the 5 majority’s framework: “[S]ince the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of 6 liberty, a lawful permanent resident [noncitizen] . . . could be entitled to an individualized 7 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became 8 unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Later, in 9 Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court recognized the right to bring such as- 10 applied challenges: “Our decision today on the meaning of that statutory provision [8 U.S.C. § 11 1226(c)] does not foreclose as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to 12 applications of the statute as we have now read it.” Preap, 586 U.S. at 420. 13 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has expressly declined to address “[w]hether due 14 process requires a bond hearing” in such situations. Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th 15 Cir. 2022), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). However, the Ninth Circuit 16 has expressed “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without 17 any process is constitutional.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018). Other 18 federal appellate courts have also concluded that Demore does not foreclose as-applied challenges 19 to prolonged detention under § 1226(c). Recently, the Second Circuit held that “[t]he 20 Constitution does not permit the Executive to detain a noncitizen for an unreasonably prolonged 21 period under section 1226(c) without a bond hearing; at some point, additional procedural 22 protections—like a bond hearing—become necessary.” Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 145 (2d 23 Cir. 2024). The undersigned finds this authority persuasive and agrees that Demore does not bar 24 an as-applied challenge to prolonged detention without a hearing to determine whether such 25 detention is justified. The next step is to determine the appropriate framework in which to 26 analyze petitioner’s procedural due process argument. 27 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life, 28 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has 1 concluded that “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, 2 including [non-citizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 3 permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). Courts examine procedural due 4 process claims in two steps: the first step is determining whether there exists a protected liberty 5 interest under the Due Process Clause. The second step examines the procedures necessary to 6 ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. See 7 Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 8 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains 9 what process is due.”). 10 The undersigned has considered the various tests developed by district courts within the 11 Ninth Circuit, and finds that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), provides the appropriate 12 test for due process challenges to prolonged detention under § 1226(c). The undersigned is 13 particularly persuaded by the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Black, 103 F.4th at 145-49, that the 14 Mathews test is flexible enough to account for the factors identified by federal courts when 15 deciding whether detention under § 1226(c) has become unreasonably prolonged. Under 16 Mathews, the court considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an 17 erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest involved including any 18 fiscal or administrative burden that additional procedures would include. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 19 335. 20 IV. Mathews Factors 21 A. Private Interest 22 An individual’s private interest in “freedom from prolonged detention” is “unquestionably 23 substantial.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts of Appeal have 24 generally declined to adopt a specific threshold for when detention under § 1226(c) becomes 25 prolonged. See German Santos v. Warden Pike Cty. Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d 26 Cir. 2020); Black, 103 F.4th at 150; Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7–9 (1st Cir. 2021). While the 27 Ninth Circuit has not addressed this question, it has previously referred to detentions longer than 28 six months as prolonged “in the context of detentions for which no individualized bond hearings 1 had taken place at all because the statutes on their faces did not allow for them.” Rodriguez Diaz, 2 53 F.4th at 1207 (citations omitted). The almost two and a half years of detention at issue in this 3 case certainly can be classified as prolonged detention as it far exceeds the “typical” length of 4 detention described in Demore. 5 Moreover, courts hearing as-applied challenges to § 1226(c) detention have also 6 considered the likely duration of future detention. See Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 880–81 (finding 7 petitioner’s administrative appeals and likely appeal to the Ninth Circuit weighed toward granting 8 request for bond hearing). There is no indication from either party as to when Petitioner’s BIA 9 appeal will be resolved. Even this decision is not the final step in removal proceedings. Either 10 party may choose to seek review by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Therefore, based on its 11 duration to date without bond and the likelihood of continued mandatory detention during all 12 these removal proceedings, the undersigned finds petitioner’s detention is sufficiently 13 “prolonged” and confers a substantial private interest. 14 B. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 15 The second Mathews factor is “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [petitioner’s] 16 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 17 procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. This factor firmly favors petitioner for 18 several reasons. “[T]he risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty in the absence of a hearing 19 before a neutral decisionmaker is substantial.” Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th 20 Cir. 2011) (abrogated on other grounds). “In the absence of any meaningful initial procedural 21 safeguards, it appears to us that almost any additional procedural safeguards at some point in the 22 detention would add value.” Black, 103 F.4th at 153 (emphasis in original); see also Jimenez v. 23 Wolf, No. 19-cv-7996 NC, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (finding “high” risk 24 of an erroneous deprivation where petitioner had not received any bond or custody 25 redetermination hearing during his one-year detention under § 1226(c)). The risk of an erroneous 26 deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty is also compounded by his mental illness. Accordingly, the 27 second Mathews factor also weighs strongly in favor of Petitioner. 28 //// 1 C. Government Interest 2 Under this factor, the Court weighs the government’s interest, “including the function 3 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute requirement 4 would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Higher courts have repeatedly recognized that, “[t]he 5 government has an obvious interest in ‘protecting the public from dangerous criminal 6 [noncitizens].’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 515). Courts 7 have also recognized that the detention of noncitizens during removal proceedings can also serve 8 the legitimate government purpose of preventing flight. Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1065 (citing 9 Demore, 538 U.S. at 528). Thus, in some general way, the government has an interest in the 10 detention of non-citizens held under § 1226(c). However, “the additional procedural safeguards 11 we would allow here under Mathews do nothing to undercut those interests. At any ordered bond 12 hearing, the IJ would assess on an individualized basis whether the noncitizen presents a flight 13 risk or a danger to the community, as IJs routinely do for other noncitizen detainees.” Black, 103 14 F.4th at 153–54; see also Jimenez, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (“Providing a bond hearing would not 15 undercut the government’s asserted interest in effecting removal. After all, the purpose of a bond 16 hearing is to inquire whether the alien represents a flight risk or danger to the community.”) 17 (citing In re Guerra, 24 I.&N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006)). In Petitioner’s case, the government’s 18 interest in further detaining him without a hearing to determine whether such detention is justified 19 is minimal. 20 Administrative burden is a legally cognizable interest under Mathews. But Respondents’ 21 interest is further diminished by the low fiscal and administrative burdens associated with a bond 22 hearing. See D. L.C., 2026 WL 25511, at *5 (“Custody hearings in immigration court are routine 23 and impose a ‘minimal’ cost on the government.” (quoting Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 24 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025)). 25 V. Remedy 26 For reasons explained above in the Mathews analysis, the undersigned finds that the 27 appropriate remedy in this case is a bond hearing where the government has the burden of 28 demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner presents a risk of flight or danger. 1 See Singh v. Albarran, No. 1:26-cv-0940 DC DMC (HC), 2026 WL 392169, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2 12, 2026) (collecting cases); Singh v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-00127 DC SCR (HC), 2026 WL 3 766567 (E.D. Cal. March 18, 2026) (adopting Findings and Recommendations and granting a 4 bond hearing); see also Black, 103 F.4th at 157 (“[O]nce detention under section 1226(c) has 5 become so prolonged that due process warrants a bond hearing . . . the government must justify 6 continued detention at such a hearing . . . by clear and convincing evidence.”). 7 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 8 1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED. 9 2. Respondents be ordered to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an 10 immigration judge at which the government shall bear the burden of justifying Petitioner's 11 continued detention by clear and convincing evidence, within seven (7) days from any order 12 resolving the § 2241 petition. 13 3. Respondents be further directed to file a notice certifying compliance with the above 14 provision within seven (7) days from the date of the bond hearing. 15 4. If Petitioner is granted release on bond, Respondents shall return all of Petitioner’s 16 documents and possessions at the time of release. 17 5. The final order in this case not address the circumstances in which Respondents may 18 detain Petitioner in the event Petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal 19 and Petitioner receives notice of that final order of removal. 20 6. Judgement be entered in Petitioner’s favor and this case be closed. 21 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 22 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within three days after 23 being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 24 the court and serve a copy on all parties. The undersigned finds that a shortened objection period 25 is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as well as the fact that the parties 26 have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written briefs. See United States v. 27 Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets 28 the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local Rule 304(b). The parties 1 | are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal 2 || the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 3 || DATED: June 2, 2026 4 ; .

6 SEAN C. RIORDAN 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10