COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Frank and Kelsey Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
RONALD WRIGHT MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0224-02-1 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY NOVEMBER 19, 2002 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS Robert W. Curran, Judge
Charles E. Haden for appellant.
John H. McLees, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
The appellant, Ronald Wright, claims the trial court erred
by not suppressing evidence found during a search incident to
his arrest. The arrest, Wright argues, took place within the
curtilage of his home without the benefit of a search warrant.
Finding Wright's complaint meritless as a matter of law, we
affirm the trial court's denial of the suppression motion.
I.
On appeal from a denial of a suppression motion, we review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
giving it the benefit of any reasonable inferences. Bass v.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413(A), this opinion is not designated for publication. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000); Sabo
v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 63, 69, 561 S.E.2d 761, 764 (2002).
On November 30, 2000, the police received a report that
Ronald Wright stabbed his live-in girlfriend and assaulted her
daughter. Police arrived at the scene of the attacks that
evening but did not make any arrests because Wright had already
left. The girlfriend and daughter went to a local hospital for
treatment. Arrest warrants were issued charging Wright with
malicious wounding, use of a knife in the commission of a
stabbing, assault and battery, grand larceny auto, and driving
without a license.
The following evening, Officer Perry A. Bartels of the
Newport News Police Department visited Wright's neighborhood to
continue the investigation. While questioning neighbors about
the incident, Bartels noticed lights on in Wright's home.
Knowing that Wright's girlfriend and her daughter —— two of the
home's three occupants —— were not staying at the house at that
time, Bartels suspected that Wright might have returned to the
home. Bartels approached Wright's house, positioned himself in
the yard where he could view the front and side doors, called
for backup, and drew his weapon.
A few minutes later, the lights in the house turned off and
Wright emerged from the side door. Pointing his gun at Wright,
Bartels identified himself as a police officer and ordered
Wright to drop a bag he was carrying and place his hands in the
- 2 - air. Wright cooperated. Bartels held Wright at gunpoint until
the other officers arrived and then placed him under arrest.
After handcuffing Wright, Bartels turned his attention to the
bag that Wright had been carrying. Intending to search the bag,
Bartels asked Wright whether the bag contained anything that
would concern him. Without further prompting, Wright responded,
"Yeah, there's a gun in the bag." Bartels then reached into the
bag and discovered a loaded, semi-automatic handgun.
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Wright, a
convicted felon, with illegal possession of a firearm. Shortly
before trial, Wright filed a motion to suppress all evidence
obtained by Bartels, claiming that his entry onto Wright's
private property invalidated the arrest. In his opening remarks
to the trial judge, Wright's trial counsel conceded: "There
were I guess warrants out for malicious wounding, assault and
battery, things of that nature which is why he was arrested."
The trial court heard testimony from Officer Bartels, who
confirmed that he had arrest warrants charging Wright with these
offenses, but did not have any search warrants.
In his closing argument, Wright's counsel argued that the
absence of a "search warrant" rendered illegal Bartel's entry
onto Wright's property. The prosecutor disagreed, pointing out
that the "arrest warrant" entitled Bartels to arrest Wright
"wherever he decided to secrete himself." In reply, Wright's
counsel again insisted that Bartels "did not have a search
- 3 - warrant to enter the dwelling area. Based on that, Your Honor,
we would submit it." The trial judge overruled the motion,
holding that the "arrest warrant . . . takes care of it." A
jury later found Wright guilty of possession of a firearm by a
felon, resulting in the imposition of a five-year prison
sentence. The trial judge appointed an attorney, who was not
Wright's trial counsel, to handle Wright's appeal. 1
1 Appellant's opening brief did not mention the existence of the outstanding arrest warrants or that the trial judge specifically denied the suppression motion because of these warrants. During oral argument before this Court, Wright's appellate counsel suggested the omission was inadvertent and that he did not become aware of these facts until reading the Commonwealth's brief of appellee. Before Wright's counsel ever saw the Commonwealth's brief of appellee, however, he received and presumably reviewed:
(i) the trial transcript included in the joint appendix, which clearly mentioned these facts;
(ii) the Commonwealth's brief in opposition to the petition for appeal, which repeatedly mentioned these facts and argued that they were dispositive of this appeal; and
(iii) this Court's order of May 7, 2002, granting in part and denying in part the petition for appeal, which likewise made clear that "Bartels arrested appellant pursuant to arrest warrants for malicious wounding, use of a knife in the commission of a stabbing, grand larceny, assault and battery, and driving without a license."
Rule 5A:20(d) requires an appellant to provide a "clear and concise statement of the facts that relate to the questions presented" by the appeal. The ethical duty of candor, implicit in Rule 5A:20(d), requires the disclosure of any obviously material fact —— particularly one identified by the trial judge as the basis for his ruling being challenged on appeal.
- 4 - II.
Though the ultimate question whether the officers violated
the Fourth Amendment triggers de novo scrutiny on appeal, the
trial court's findings of "historical fact" bind us due to the
weight we give "to the inferences drawn from those facts by
resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Davis v.
Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 421, 429, 559 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2002)
(citing Neal v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 233, 237, 498 S.E.2d
422, 424 (1998)). We examine the trial court's factual findings
only to determine if they are plainly wrong or devoid of
supporting evidence. See Mier v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 827,
828, 407 S.E.2d 342, 343 (1991). If reasonable jurists could
disagree about the probative force of the facts, we have no
authority to substitute our views for those of the trial judge.
In addition, the appellant must shoulder the burden of
showing that the trial court's decision "constituted reversible
error." McGee v.
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Frank and Kelsey Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
RONALD WRIGHT MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0224-02-1 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY NOVEMBER 19, 2002 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS Robert W. Curran, Judge
Charles E. Haden for appellant.
John H. McLees, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
The appellant, Ronald Wright, claims the trial court erred
by not suppressing evidence found during a search incident to
his arrest. The arrest, Wright argues, took place within the
curtilage of his home without the benefit of a search warrant.
Finding Wright's complaint meritless as a matter of law, we
affirm the trial court's denial of the suppression motion.
I.
On appeal from a denial of a suppression motion, we review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
giving it the benefit of any reasonable inferences. Bass v.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413(A), this opinion is not designated for publication. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000); Sabo
v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 63, 69, 561 S.E.2d 761, 764 (2002).
On November 30, 2000, the police received a report that
Ronald Wright stabbed his live-in girlfriend and assaulted her
daughter. Police arrived at the scene of the attacks that
evening but did not make any arrests because Wright had already
left. The girlfriend and daughter went to a local hospital for
treatment. Arrest warrants were issued charging Wright with
malicious wounding, use of a knife in the commission of a
stabbing, assault and battery, grand larceny auto, and driving
without a license.
The following evening, Officer Perry A. Bartels of the
Newport News Police Department visited Wright's neighborhood to
continue the investigation. While questioning neighbors about
the incident, Bartels noticed lights on in Wright's home.
Knowing that Wright's girlfriend and her daughter —— two of the
home's three occupants —— were not staying at the house at that
time, Bartels suspected that Wright might have returned to the
home. Bartels approached Wright's house, positioned himself in
the yard where he could view the front and side doors, called
for backup, and drew his weapon.
A few minutes later, the lights in the house turned off and
Wright emerged from the side door. Pointing his gun at Wright,
Bartels identified himself as a police officer and ordered
Wright to drop a bag he was carrying and place his hands in the
- 2 - air. Wright cooperated. Bartels held Wright at gunpoint until
the other officers arrived and then placed him under arrest.
After handcuffing Wright, Bartels turned his attention to the
bag that Wright had been carrying. Intending to search the bag,
Bartels asked Wright whether the bag contained anything that
would concern him. Without further prompting, Wright responded,
"Yeah, there's a gun in the bag." Bartels then reached into the
bag and discovered a loaded, semi-automatic handgun.
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Wright, a
convicted felon, with illegal possession of a firearm. Shortly
before trial, Wright filed a motion to suppress all evidence
obtained by Bartels, claiming that his entry onto Wright's
private property invalidated the arrest. In his opening remarks
to the trial judge, Wright's trial counsel conceded: "There
were I guess warrants out for malicious wounding, assault and
battery, things of that nature which is why he was arrested."
The trial court heard testimony from Officer Bartels, who
confirmed that he had arrest warrants charging Wright with these
offenses, but did not have any search warrants.
In his closing argument, Wright's counsel argued that the
absence of a "search warrant" rendered illegal Bartel's entry
onto Wright's property. The prosecutor disagreed, pointing out
that the "arrest warrant" entitled Bartels to arrest Wright
"wherever he decided to secrete himself." In reply, Wright's
counsel again insisted that Bartels "did not have a search
- 3 - warrant to enter the dwelling area. Based on that, Your Honor,
we would submit it." The trial judge overruled the motion,
holding that the "arrest warrant . . . takes care of it." A
jury later found Wright guilty of possession of a firearm by a
felon, resulting in the imposition of a five-year prison
sentence. The trial judge appointed an attorney, who was not
Wright's trial counsel, to handle Wright's appeal. 1
1 Appellant's opening brief did not mention the existence of the outstanding arrest warrants or that the trial judge specifically denied the suppression motion because of these warrants. During oral argument before this Court, Wright's appellate counsel suggested the omission was inadvertent and that he did not become aware of these facts until reading the Commonwealth's brief of appellee. Before Wright's counsel ever saw the Commonwealth's brief of appellee, however, he received and presumably reviewed:
(i) the trial transcript included in the joint appendix, which clearly mentioned these facts;
(ii) the Commonwealth's brief in opposition to the petition for appeal, which repeatedly mentioned these facts and argued that they were dispositive of this appeal; and
(iii) this Court's order of May 7, 2002, granting in part and denying in part the petition for appeal, which likewise made clear that "Bartels arrested appellant pursuant to arrest warrants for malicious wounding, use of a knife in the commission of a stabbing, grand larceny, assault and battery, and driving without a license."
Rule 5A:20(d) requires an appellant to provide a "clear and concise statement of the facts that relate to the questions presented" by the appeal. The ethical duty of candor, implicit in Rule 5A:20(d), requires the disclosure of any obviously material fact —— particularly one identified by the trial judge as the basis for his ruling being challenged on appeal.
- 4 - II.
Though the ultimate question whether the officers violated
the Fourth Amendment triggers de novo scrutiny on appeal, the
trial court's findings of "historical fact" bind us due to the
weight we give "to the inferences drawn from those facts by
resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Davis v.
Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 421, 429, 559 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2002)
(citing Neal v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 233, 237, 498 S.E.2d
422, 424 (1998)). We examine the trial court's factual findings
only to determine if they are plainly wrong or devoid of
supporting evidence. See Mier v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 827,
828, 407 S.E.2d 342, 343 (1991). If reasonable jurists could
disagree about the probative force of the facts, we have no
authority to substitute our views for those of the trial judge.
In addition, the appellant must shoulder the burden of
showing that the trial court's decision "constituted reversible
error." McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197, 487 S.E.2d
259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (citations omitted); see also Davis,
37 Va. App. at 429-30, 559 S.E.2d at 378. "Absent clear
evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial
court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was
correctly applied to the facts." Yarborough v. Commonwealth,
217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977); Oliver v.
Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 286, 297, 544 S.E.2d 870, 875 (2001)
("The trial court's judgment is presumed to be correct."); Dunn
- 5 - v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 217, 219, 456 S.E.2d 135, 136
(1995).
III.
Wright argues that Officer Bartels needed a search warrant
to justify his entry onto Wright's property to effect his
arrest. This contention fails as a matter of law. It is true
that, absent exigent circumstances or consent, the Fourth
Amendment will invalidate any warrantless police entry into a
suspect's home, whether the officer intends to conduct a search
or to arrest someone within. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 586 (1980); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 479, 484,
524 S.E.2d 171, 173 (2000); Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 27
Va. App. 1, 16, 497 S.E.2d 474, 481 (1998). It is entirely
untrue, however, that the warrant must be a search warrant.
An officer may lawfully enter a suspect's home if the
officer has an arrest warrant for the suspect. See Payton, 445
U.S. at 602-03. "If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen's
participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that
his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to
require him to open his doors to the officers of the law." Id.
A properly issued arrest warrant, therefore, provides "limited
authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when
there is reason to believe the suspect is within." Id.; see
also Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 135, 360 S.E.2d 196,
200 (1987) (police can arrest suspect residing in another's
- 6 - apartment without need for search warrant); Archer v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 9-10, 492 S.E.2d 826, 830-31
(1997); cf. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 219 (1981)
(subject of an arrest warrant cannot complain of absence of
search warrant when arrested in home of another, but residents
of home not named in warrant have Fourth Amendment protection
from search for anything other than subject of warrant). Once
inside, however, the Fourth Amendment limits the scope of the
officer's authority —— he can search only for the suspect and,
upon finding him, perform the arrest and an incidental search.
Archer, 26 Va. App. at 9-10, 492 S.E.2d at 830.
These principles apply to the curtilage of the home as well
as to the home itself. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against warrantless searches of one's home stretches beyond the
walls of the house and embraces the home's curtilage.
Jefferson, 27 Va. App. at 16, 497 S.E.2d at 481 (citing Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). Encompassing both
land and structures, the curtilage comprises the area
"immediately surrounding" the home, Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180,
that is so "intimately linked" both "physically and
psychologically" to the home as to be its functional equivalent.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986).
Upon making a lawful arrest, a police officer can conduct
an incidental search of the suspect to gather weapons and search
for contraband. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224
- 7 - (1973) ("It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful
arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment."); Commonwealth v. Brunson, 248 Va. 347,
357, 448 S.E.2d 393, 399 (1994); Clarke v. Commonwealth, 32
Va. App. 286, 296, 527 S.E.2d 484, 489 (2000).
For these reasons, the arrest warrants provided Officer
Bartels with authority to arrest Wright within the curtilage of
his residence. To be sure, had Bartels decided to do so, he
could have entered Wright's home and taken him into custody
there. Bartels had a reasonable basis to believe that Wright
was present in the home and was the person who came out the side
door. Nothing in the record, moreover, suggests that Bartels
exceeded the scope of his authority by searching Wright incident
to his arrest.
IV.
Settled Fourth Amendment principles govern this appeal and
legitimate the legality of Wright's arrest. Wright provides
neither legal authority nor persuasive argument for invalidating
his arrest because of the absence of a search warrant
authorizing entry onto his property. We thus affirm the trial
court's denial of Wright's motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
- 8 -