NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2948-23
RONALD GOLDSTEIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PROLONG PHARMACEUTICALS, LLC, AVTAR ENTERPRISE, LLC, AVTAR INVESTMENTS, LLC, and CHIRAG PATEL,
Defendants-Respondents.
Argued March 5, 2025 – Decided May 16, 2025
Before Judges Marczyk and Torregrossa-O'Connor.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-5606-19.
Ronald Goldstein, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
Stephen C. Matthews argued the cause for respondents (DLA Piper LLP (US), attorneys; Stephen C. Matthews and Patrick R. Dwyer, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Plaintiff Ronald Goldstein appeals from the trial court's April 12, 2024
order denying his motion to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement that
was placed on the record on December 19, 2023. Plaintiff also appeals from the
trial court's April 12, 2024 order granting defendants Prolong Pharmaceuticals,
LLC, Avtar Enterprise, LLC, Avtar Investments, LLC, and Chirag Patel's cross-
motion to enforce the settlement in accordance with their February 14, 2024
written settlement agreement.
The primary issue before us is whether the execution of a release was an
essential term of the parties' settlement. We conclude the trial court correctly
determined the parties agreed to execute a release to memorialize the settlement
agreement. We further address whether the court properly allowed for the
inclusion of a non-disparagement agreement in the release and whether it
correctly denied plaintiff's request for a reciprocal release. We determine the
court erred insofar as it enforced the settlement agreement which included a non-
negotiated, non-disparagement clause,1 but correctly denied plaintiff's request
for a reciprocal release. We also conclude the court erred in enforcing other
1 The parties did not initially agree to a confidentiality agreement, but plaintiff subsequently consented to the confidentiality provision in the release, which was confirmed to us at oral argument. Accordingly, we do not address plaintiff's arguments regarding the confidentiality clause. A-2948-23 2 aspects of defendants' proposed settlement agreement. Accordingly, we affirm
in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I.
In July 2019, plaintiff, an intellectual property attorney, filed a complaint
against defendants asserting claims concerning unpaid invoices for legal
services rendered to Prolong pursuant to a consulting contract. On December
19, 2023, after negotiations mediated by the trial court, the parties agreed to
resolve the case and placed the following agreed-upon terms on the record: "In
exchange for a release of all claims in favor of [defendants] . . . , [defendants]
will pay . . . [plaintiff] $240,000 in full and final settlement of his fee claims.
Payment to be made within [thirty] days of execution of the release." In
addition, defense counsel confirmed that all four defendants would be "jointly
and severally" responsible for this settlement amount.
Following the in-court settlement, the parties exchanged various drafts of
proposed releases. On December 28, defendants provided plaintiff with an
initial draft requiring plaintiff to forever release all claims in favor of defendants
and "past, present, and future" parties associated with defendants, "including but
not limited to claims" arising out of the services agreement between plaintiff
and Prolong. Defendants further included a confidentiality and non-
A-2948-23 3 disparagement clause prohibiting the parties from disclosing the terms of the
settlement agreement and from making disparaging statements.
On December 29, plaintiff responded with a revised draft of defendants'
release. He informed defendants that their document was unacceptable because
it changed the terms placed on the record, created "an overreaching, one -sided
[r]elease well beyond the scope of the litigation," and "impos[ed] unfair, after-
the-fact settlement terms." In pertinent part, plaintiff's revised release
incorporated "a reciprocal release" requiring defendants to forever release all
claims in favor of plaintiff and limited the scope of the release to claims arising
out of plaintiff's "performance of legal services for Prolong." He also removed
the confidentiality and non-disparagement clause.
On January 12, 2024, defendants accepted a few of the changes proposed
by plaintiff but retained the original language in the release and the
confidentiality and non-disparagement clause from their December 28
document. Notably, defendants' January 12 draft settlement agreement changed
the payment provision to state that plaintiff would receive payment "within
[thirty] days of the execution of the [s]ettlement [a]greement."
That same day, plaintiff advised defendants that certain terms in the
proposal made the "document fatally defective." He asserted the terms of the
A-2948-23 4 December 19 settlement were that "the case would be dismissed and that
$240,000 would be paid to [plaintiff] within [thirty] days (i.e., by January 18,
2024) . . . ." He also contended defendants' January 12 settlement agreement
"incorrectly re-set[] the payment date to 'within [thirty] days of the execution of
the [s]ettlement [a]greement.'" He claimed defendants improperly attempted to
change the payment date and make the payment an uncertain event contingent
on "the execution of an ancillary agreement."
Additionally, plaintiff provided defendants with a "Release of Claims"
document that he drafted and signed, which stated:
WHEREAS, [plaintiff] maintains that he has claims against Prolong . . . arising out of the Confidential Disclosure and Contracted Services Agreement as set forth in Ronald Goldstein v. Prolong Pharmaceuticals, LLC, et al., Docket No. MID-L-005606-19 (the "Action");
....
NOW, THEREFORE, [plaintiff] hereby fully and forever releases, acquits, and forever discharges [d]efendants from [plaintiff]'s [c]laims.
Plaintiff informed defendants that he understood payment would "be made
within [thirty] days of [his] execution of the release." Thus, he claimed his
executed "Release of Claims" document satisfied his obligation under the
A-2948-23 5 December 19 settlement terms and that "payment [would] be due within [thirty]
days from [January 12, 2024]; i.e., no later than February 11, 2024."
On January 17, defendants advised plaintiff they could not accept his
proposed release document but instead requested plaintiff execute the January
12 settlement agreement. In response, plaintiff contended defendants' proposed
settlement agreement "goes far beyond what is necessary or fair" and "has led
to an unreasonable delay of the payment." According to plaintiff, defendants
improperly attempted to condition payment on "overreaching, after-the-fact-
terms." However, plaintiff advised he was willing to agree to additional terms
provided they were fair and appropriate. Accordingly, the parties continued to
negotiate the form of the release.
In late January, the parties requested a case management conference,
which occurred on February 7. Thereafter, the parties continued to propose
varying drafts of the settlement agreement but never agreed on the finalized
terms. Notably, the parties could not resolve the scope of the release, whether
it should be reciprocal or solely in favor of defendants, the definition of a
"disparaging statement," and the effective date for the thirty-day payment
period.
A-2948-23 6 On February 28, the parties held a meet and confer to resolve the
remaining issues pertaining to this settlement. That same day, plaintiff
forwarded defendants his draft of the settlement agreement, which was based on
defendants' February 14 settlement agreement, and explained his reasons for the
proposed changes. Plaintiff incorporated a reciprocal release into his draft
settlement agreement. He indicated that based on the holding in Hagrish v.
Olson,2 he "no longer believe[d]" a release in favor of defendants was
appropriate, "especially in view of the broad scope of the unilateral release being
sought by . . . defendants." Plaintiff also omitted the phrase "including but not
limited to" in defendants' proposed release because it would have required him
to release claims "well outside the scope of this matter."
He further removed defendants' effective date provision, which stated the
settlement agreement would become effective and payment would be made "on
the date on which the last [p]arty executes this [a]greement." Instead, plaintiff
provided an effective date of March 1, 2024, in the preamble, believing the
parties "need[ed] a date certain" to start the thirty-day "clock" for payment. He
also proposed the parties would agree "not to make any factually incorrect,
disparaging statements regarding each other."
2 254 N.J. Super. 133 (App. Div. 1992). A-2948-23 7 On March 2, defendants rejected plaintiff's draft release. Specifically,
defendants refused to accept the proposed changes to the confidentiality and
non-disparagement clause and maintained the parties only agreed "there would
be a unilateral release." Defendants also indicated they could "[ ]not accept the
effective date language."
On March 20, plaintiff moved to enforce the settlement terms placed on
the December 19 record. In April, defendants cross-moved to enforce their
February 14 draft of the settlement agreement and sought attorney's fees, costs,
and sanctions. The parties' respective settlement terms differed with respect to
the scope of the release, the definition of a disparaging statement, and the
effective date. Defendants defined the "[e]ffective [d]ate" as "the date on which
the last [p]arty executes this [a]greement." In contrast, plaintiff removed the
"[e]ffective [d]ate" provision and included in the preamble that "[t]his
[s]ettlement [a]greement . . . is effective this 6th day of March, 2024 (the
'[e]ffective [d]ate') . . . ."
Furthermore, defendants' release included the following language:
[Plaintiff], for himself and his successors, heirs, assigns, affiliates, estate, and all other persons with an interest in [plaintiff]'s [c]laims, hereby fully and forever releases, acquits, and forever discharges [d]efendants, and their past, present, and future agents, representatives, shareholders, principals, members,
A-2948-23 8 officers, directors, attorneys, predecessors, successors, and affiliates, from any and all legal, equitable, or other claims, counterclaims, demands, setoffs, or suits from the beginning of the world to the [e]ffective [d]ate, whether known or unknown, including but not limited to claims that arise out of, that may, can, or shall arise out of, or that have, ever had, or could have arisen out of [plaintiff]'s [c]laims and the [s]ervices [a]greement.
[(Emphasis added).]
Plaintiff, on the other hand, offered the following release:
[Plaintiff], for himself and his successors, heirs, assigns, affiliates, estate, and all other persons with an interest in [plaintiff]'s [c]laims, hereby fully and forever releases, acquits, and forever discharges [d]efendants from any and all legal, equitable, or other claims, counterclaims, demands, setoffs, or suits in relation to this matter.
On April 12, the court held oral argument on both motions. The court
stated:
Hagrish does not stand for the principle that any release is secondary and is not an essential term of a settlement. Hagrish stands for the principle [that] you have to look at the settlement that was reached and determine what was essential and what is not essential to the term.
The court noted the parties placed the following settlement terms on the
December 19 record: "[i]n exchange for a release of all claims in favor of
Prolong and the related parties[,] Prolong will pay . . . [plaintiff] $240,000 in
full and final settlement of his fee claims[;] payment to be made within [thirty]
A-2948-23 9 days of the execution of the release." Relying on Hagrish, the court stated "those
are the essential terms" of this settlement.
The court indicated plaintiff was "wrong" to expect "payment [within
thirty] days from the date by which counsel placed the settlement on the record"
because he confirmed his understanding of the settlement terms on December
19. Instead, the court explained "the payment doesn't happen until [thirty] days
[from] the execution of the release," and "Hagrish supports that resolution"
because the release "is an essential term of the settlement." The court also
rejected plaintiff's "insistence" on defendants' executing a reciprocal release
based on their prior threats of filing counterclaims because defendants never
filed a counterclaim, and the essential terms placed on the record did not require
"defendant[s] to sign a release."
The court further determined defendants' proposed release and
confidentiality and non-disparagement clause contained "standard language."
The court noted plaintiff is an attorney who owes duties of confidentiality to his
former client under RPCs 1.6 and 1.9, and the release provision contemplated
these circumstances. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff's motion to enforce
settlement "because it is not supported by Hagrish."
A-2948-23 10 Moreover, the court granted defendants' cross-motion to enforce their
February 14 settlement agreement, finding it included the essential settlement
terms placed on the December 19 record and contained "standard release
language." It stated plaintiff understood the terms of the parties' oral settlement
and must "sign th[e] release" if he wishes to receive the $240,000 payment. The
court informed plaintiff that "upon the execution of the release that was
forwarded to [him] on or about February 14 . . . 2024[,] payment would be due
to [him] within [thirty] days." The court denied defendants' motion for
attorney's fees, costs, and sanctions.
II.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the court erred in: denying his motion to
enforce settlement based on a misreading of Hagrish; granting defendants' cross-
motion, which compelled him to sign a settlement agreement containing
unnecessary, unfair, and after-the-fact terms; and not awarding him statutory
interest.
A.
Plaintiff argues Hagrish is directly on point, and the trial court
misinterpreted the case. He claims defendants should be required to make the
$240,000 settlement payment because, unlike the Hagrish plaintiffs who refused
A-2948-23 11 to sign a release, he provided defendants with his own unilaterally signed release
document, satisfying the terms of the December 19 in-court settlement. Plaintiff
further argues a release is a mere formality and "as a matter of law, a written
release or settlement agreement is not an essential element of settlement."
Defendants, in turn, counter that plaintiff mischaracterizes Hagrish
because the execution of a release in that case was not a "required element" of
the settlement. They maintain the court correctly found Hagrish was not
"substantively identical" to the facts in this matter and the settlement reached
here. They also argue that, like Hagrish, the trial court properly determined the
settlement included two essential terms: (1) plaintiff's release of claims in favor
of defendants, and (2) defendants' paying plaintiff $240,000 within thirty days
of the execution of the release.
"Interpretation and construction of a contract is a matter of law for the
court subject to de novo review." Fastenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 309
N.J. Super. 415, 420 (App. Div. 1998). "Accordingly, we pay no special
deference to the trial court's interpretation and look at the contract with fresh
eyes." Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011). A court's task is not to
"torture the language of [a contract] to create ambiguity." Schor v. FMS Fin.
Corp., 357 N.J. Super. 185, 191 (App. Div. 2002) (alteration in original)
A-2948-23 12 (quoting Nester v. O'Donnell, 301 N.J. Super. 198, 210 (App. Div. 1997)).
Rather, courts look to the plain terms of the contract and declare the meaning of
what is already written, not what, in hindsight, may have been written. See
Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 595 (2001) (explaining a court's task
is not to rewrite a contract for the parties better than or different from the one
they wrote for themselves).
We are further guided by the well-established legal principles governing
settlements. There is a strong public policy in favor of enforcing settlement
agreements, which is "based upon 'the notion that the parties to a dispute are in
the best position to determine how to resolve a contested matter in a way which
is least disadvantageous to everyone.'" Brundage v. Est. of Carambio, 195 N.J.
575, 601 (2008) (quoting Peskin v. Peskin, 271 N.J. Super. 261, 275 (App. Div.
1994)).
Generally, settlements are enforced "absent compelling circumstances."
Ibid. (quoting Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990)). "Consequently,
courts 'strain to give effect to the terms of a settlement wherever possible.'"
Jennings v. Reed, 381 N.J. Super. 217, 227 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Dep't of
Pub. Advoc. v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 206 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div.
1985)).
A-2948-23 13 Essentially, a settlement agreement is a contract. Nolan, 120 N.J. at 472
(citing Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124 (App. Div. 1983)). "An
agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract which, like all contracts, may be freely
entered into and which a court, absent a demonstration of 'fraud or other
compelling circumstances,' should honor and enforce as it does other contracts."
Pascarella, 190 N.J. Super. at 124-25 (quoting Honeywell v. Bubb, 130 N.J.
Super. 130, 136 (App. Div. 1974)). Therefore, a settlement agreement is
governed by principles of contract law. Brundage, 195 N.J. at 600-01 (citing
Thompson v. City of Atl. City, 190 N.J. 359, 379 (2007)).
Essential terms are those that go to the "heart of the alleged agreement."
Satellite Ent. Ctr., Inc. v. Keaton, 347 N.J. Super. 268, 277 (App. Div. 2002).
Alternatively, if the parties do not agree to one or more essential terms, their
contract is ordinarily unenforceable. See ibid. Where parties have agreed to the
essential terms of a settlement, "second thoughts are entitled to absolutely no
weight as against our policy in favor of settlement." Dep't of Pub. Advoc., 206
N.J. Super. at 530. Ordinarily, "[w]here the parties agree upon the essential
terms of a settlement, so that the mechanics can be 'fleshed out' in a writing to
be thereafter executed, the settlement will be enforced notwithstanding the fact
that the writing does not materialize . . . ." Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J.
A-2948-23 14 Super. 39, 46 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting Lahue v. Pio Costa, 263 N.J. Super.
575, 596 (App. Div. 1993)). Thus, "[i]f the parties intend to be bound by their
preliminary agreement and view the later written contract as merely a
memorialization of their agreement, they are bound by the preliminary
agreement." Morales v. Santiago, 217 N.J. Super. 496, 501-02 (App. Div. 1987).
Determining whether a release is an essential term of this settlement turns
on an application of the principles delineated in Hagrish. There, after a jury
found in the plaintiffs' favor, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). 254 N.J. Super. at 135-36.
Before the plaintiff filed an appeal, the parties negotiated a settlement and "[t]he
terms were simple: [the] defendants would pay [the] plaintiffs $7,000; in return,
[the] plaintiffs would abandon the appeal." Id. at 136.
Thereafter, the defendants' counsel informed the plaintiffs' attorney that
the defendants required the plaintiffs to execute a release in their favor, and it
would then forward the plaintiffs a draft settlement and disburse the funds. Id.
at 136-37. In response, the plaintiffs' counsel requested that the defendants
prepare a reciprocal release, but defense counsel declined to do so because such
a release was never contemplated. Id. at 137. After the plaintiffs' time to appeal
from the JNOV expired, they moved to enforce the settlement. Ibid.
A-2948-23 15 This court disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that a binding
settlement did not exist. Ibid. Instead, we noted "[t]he parties had reached a
settlement agreement with certain and specific terms:" the defendants would
pay the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs would refrain from appealing the JNOV.
Ibid. We stated the case would conclude once the parties completed those
"simple conditions." Ibid. Notably, this court found the "[p]laintiffs' failure to
execute release documents did not void the original agreement, nor did it render
it deficient from the outset." Id. at 138. We noted the execution of a release
under the facts in that case "was a mere formality, not essential to formation of
the contract of settlement." Id. at 138. Accordingly, we concluded there was
no need for an exchange of releases and reversed and remanded for the trial court
to enter an order requiring the defendants to make the settlement payment,
thereby ending the case. Id. at 139.
Here, plaintiff contends the terms of this settlement are "substantively
identical" to those in Hagrish and believes Hagrish broadly stands for the
proposition that a written release is not an essential term of a settlement.
Plaintiff's narrow reading of Hagrish is misguided. Unlike the facts before us,
the release in Hagrish was not an essential term of the settlement but a mere
A-2948-23 16 formality because those parties never contemplated the execution of a release
under the original settlement terms. Hagrish, 254 N.J. Super. at 138.
The trial court in this matter properly interpreted Hagrish in finding
plaintiff's execution of a release in favor of defendants was an essential term of
the settlement placed on the record. The terms of the parties' December 19
settlement were simple: "In exchange for a release of all claims in favor of
Prolong and the related parties, Prolong will pay to [plaintiff] $240,000 in full
and final settlement of his fee claims. Payment to be made within [thirty] days
of execution of the release."
The essential terms of the parties' settlement included plaintiff's dismissal
of the claim, plaintiff's execution of a release, and defendants' payment of
$240,000 within thirty days of the execution of the release. The parties
understood and agreed to these specific terms that were set forth on the record.
Thus, plaintiff's execution of a written release was not a mere formality but
rather was a central component of this settlement.
In short, a fully executed release was contemplated by the parties. That
is, the written release was not an incidental or tangential formality, but rather an
essential, required element of the contract. The execution of the release itself
A-2948-23 17 was a specific agreed-upon term. Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb
the trial court's finding that plaintiff was required to execute a release.
B.
Plaintiff next argues the trial court erred in granting defendants' cross-
motion to enforce the settlement agreement, as it determined the release
contained "standard" provisions found in ordinary releases. Specifically,
plaintiff contends the settlement agreement terms are not standard, and the court
lacked any basis to impose such terms on him because "[n]o additional legal
terms [were] needed to effectuate this settlement."
Plaintiff further maintains the scope of defendants' proposed release
language is "excessively broad." He argues the language in the release—
"including but not limited to"— encompasses claims unrelated to this matter and
the phrase—"from the beginning of the world to the [e]ffective [d]ate"—
improperly includes an indefinite duration, not limited to the relevant time
period of this case. Plaintiff also notes defendants refused to grant him a
reciprocal release.
In contrast, defendants argue the trial court properly granted their motion
to enforce the settlement, and the release contained standard and reasonable
terms that are contained in "all" settlement agreements.
A-2948-23 18 Initially, we observe plaintiff is not entitled to a reciprocal release
according to the agreed-upon terms placed on the record. As stated, one of the
essential terms of this settlement agreement was the execution of a written
release in favor of defendants. There was no reference to a reciprocal release.
Therefore, defendants had no obligation to grant plaintiff's request for a
Plaintiff avers the court should not have enforced the non-disparagement
clause because it was not a necessary term of this settlement, and the parties
disagreed on its language. Plaintiff asserts he could not accept the vague non -
disparagement language "because he would have . . . no idea exactly whom he'd
be agreeing not to disparage" or what would constitute a "disparaging
statement."
Where a party seeks new terms not previously agreed upon during
settlement, such terms are generally not considered essentials of the settlement
but rather are an "afterthought." Bistricer v. Bistricer, 231 N.J. Super. 143, 145,
148-50 (Ch. Div. 1987). "So long as the basic essentials are sufficiently definite,
any gaps left by the parties should not frustrate their intention to be bound."
Berg Agency v. Sleepworld-Willingboro, Inc., 136 N.J. Super. 369, 377 (App.
Div. 1975).
A-2948-23 19 We conclude the trial court erred in enforcing the non-disparagement
clause because the parties never expressed an intention on the record to include
that term as part of the settlement. Rather, it was an additional, non-negotiated
term. Indeed, Hagrish supports this conclusion. There, the essential terms of
that settlement required the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in exchange for the
plaintiffs not to pursue an appeal. Hagrish, 254 N.J. Super. at 135, 137. We
only enforced those two terms despite the parties' subsequent requests for
releases and the plaintiff's failure to execute one. Id. at 139. Notably, like the
releases in Hagrish, the agreement set forth on the record here did not
contemplate inclusion of a non-disparagement clause in the release.
We next address plaintiff's argument that defendants' proposed language
in the release exceeded the scope of the parties' agreement regarding the nature
of the claims released and the time period for the release. As stated, the release
is limited to the essential terms placed on the record. Defendants' proposed
release is overly broad to the extent it included a release not only from the claims
advanced in this case but also from other unknown and unidentified claims. The
release should be limited to plaintiff's claims and should be further confined to
the relevant time period when the dispute arose and the case was litigated.
A-2948-23 20 Moreover, the parties' agreement on the record—that "[i]n exchange for
[plaintiff's] release of all claims in favor of Prolong and the related parties"
defendants would make payment within thirty days of the "execution of the
release"—suggests only plaintiff's signature was required in order for him to be
paid by defendants and does not necessitate defendants' signatures prior to the
payment. Accordingly, the payment should be made within thirty days of
plaintiff's executing the release—not from the date on which the last defendant
signs the agreement. Therefore, the court erred in enforcing the effective date
for payment as defined in defendants' written settlement agreement.
Consistent with Hagrish, "[t]here is no need for further extended
proceedings." Id. at 139. The court's April 12, 2024 orders are vacated, and the
matter is remanded. The parties shall promptly exchange a release consistent
with the essential and limited terms set forth on the record on December 19,
2023. The release shall not include a reciprocal release for plaintiff, or any non-
disparagement clause or any other provision not specifically agreed to. The
parties may include a confidentiality clause consistent with the representations
made during oral argument before this court. Defendants must pay plaintiff
$240,000 within thirty days of plaintiff's execution of the release.
A-2948-23 21 C.
Finally, plaintiff argues the court erred by not awarding him statutory
interest. He asserts the court failed to address his claim for statutory interest
based on the delay in payment because it mistakenly concluded he was not
entitled to payment unless he executed defendants' settlement agreement.
Plaintiff relies on Hagrish for the proposition that he was entitled to statutory
interest because there was no need for him to sign a release, and therefore,
defendants' payment was due on January 18, 2024, or at the latest by February
11, 2024, when he signed his own form of release.
We reject plaintiff's argument that a release was not an essential term of
the settlement agreement for the reasons set forth above. Plaintiff is not entitled
to statutory interest because he has not executed a release to satisfy his
obligation under the settlement, as the execution of a release was a prerequisite
to plaintiff's right to payment. The court correctly noted plaintiff was mistaken
to expect payment within thirty days of the in-court settlement because
"payment doesn't happen until [thirty] days of the execution of the release."
Therefore, the court did not err in failing to address plaintiff's claim for statutory
A-2948-23 22 To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of plaintiff's
remaining arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:l l-3(e)(l)(E).
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
A-2948-23 23