Ronald E. Jones v. Sherman Campbell, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJune 23, 2026
Docket5:24-cv-11028
StatusUnknown

This text of Ronald E. Jones v. Sherman Campbell, et al. (Ronald E. Jones v. Sherman Campbell, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ronald E. Jones v. Sherman Campbell, et al., (E.D. Mich. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Ronald E. Jones,

Plaintiff, Case No. 24-11028

v. Judith E. Levy United States District Judge Sherman Campbell, et al., Mag. Judge Anthony P. Patti Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER DECLINING TO ADOPT THE R&R [22] AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [17]

On March 4, 2026, Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the Court grant Defendant Sherman Campbell and Jeremy Bush’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion. (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff Ronald E. Jones filed objections to the R&R. (ECF No. 26.) Defendants did not file a response to the objections, and the deadline for a response has passed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court declines to adopt the R&R and denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. I. Background

At all relevant times in his complaint, Plaintiff was housed at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility (“ARF”) in Adrian, Michigan. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) He alleges that, in January 2024, the zipper on his

state-issued winter coat broke and he requested a new coat. (Id. at PageID.3.) Plaintiff was given a new coat, but it was inadequate for the winter weather. He argues that the inadequate coat exposed him to harm

and violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.) Defendants are ARF Warden Sherman Campbell, and Michigan

Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) Deputy Director Jeremy Bush. (Id.) The more detailed factual background set forth in the R&R is fully adopted as though set forth in this Opinion and Order. (See ECF No. 22,

PageID.147–149.) II. Legal Standard A. Objections to an R&R

A party may object to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation on dispositive motions, and a district judge must resolve proper objections under a de novo standard of review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)–(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)–(3). “For an objection to be

proper, Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 72.1(d)(1) requires parties to ‘specify the part of the order, proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which [the party] objects’ and to ‘state the

basis for the objection.’” Pearce v. Chrysler Group LLC Pension Plan, 893 F.3d 339, 346 (6th Cir. 2018). Objections that restate arguments already presented to the magistrate judge are improper, Coleman-Bey v.

Bouchard, 287 F. App’x 420, 422 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Brumley v. Wingard, 269 F.3d 629, 647 (6th Cir. 2001)), as are those that are vague and dispute the general correctness of the report and recommendation.

Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). Moreover, objections must be clear so that the district court can “discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Id. (citing

Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985) (explaining that objections must go to “factual and legal” issues “at the heart of the

parties’ dispute”). In sum, the objections must be clear and specific enough to permit the Court to squarely address them on the merits. See Pearce, 893 F.3d at 346. B. Summary Judgment Standard

Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion. (ECF No. 17.) Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court may not grant summary judgment if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court “views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 95 F. App’x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2002)).

III. Analysis The R&R recommends granting the motion to summary judgment due to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. (ECF

No. 22.) As set forth in the R&R, the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners to first exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing an action “with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C.]

section 1983 . . . or any other Federal law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); (ECF No. 22, PageID.151.) “The Supreme Court has held that ‘failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA.” (Id. (quoting Jones

v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007)).) “[D]efendants bear the burden of proof on exhaustion.” (Id. at PageID.151–152 (quoting Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 2012)).) A defendant may raise the plaintiff’s

failure to exhaust in a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Id. at PageID.152 (citing Anderson v. Jutzy, 175 F. Supp. 3d 781, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2016)).)

It is undisputed that Plaintiff submitted a grievance related to winter coats, which was received at Step I on February 14, 2024, and identified as “ARF-24-02-0163-28i” (henceforth, “ARF-163”).1 (ECF No.

17-3, PageID.87.) In ARF-163, Plaintiff states that his grievance is brought against “CFA Deputy Director J. Bush” “for inadequacy of the new state coat issued by MSI.” (Id.) The grievance claims “that the state

1 As noted in the R&R, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment has several typographical errors where they reference Plaintiff’s other grievance, ARF-164, when they clearly intended to reference ARF-163. (See ECF No. 22, PageID.154 n.1.) issued coats are inadequate for the severe Michigan winters, which

caused pain to Grievant.” (Id.; see also id. (“The MSI state coats do not provide protection from the rain, cold temperatures, and the wind.”).) It further states that Bush is aware that the coats are deficient and thus

has violated Plaintiff’s “right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as an incarcerated person” under the Eighth Amendment. (Id.) The “Remedy Requested” by ARF-163 is “to replace the new state

issued MSP coats with adequate material to endure the Michigan winter weather.” (Id.) This grievance was rejected with the response, “Warden Forum issue.” (Id.)

It is also undisputed that Plaintiff appealed ARF-163 to Step II and III. (Id.

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Related

Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Miller v. Currie
50 F.3d 373 (Sixth Circuit, 1995)
Willie Brumley v. Curtis Wingard
269 F.3d 629 (Sixth Circuit, 2001)
Orbain Owens v. George Keeling
461 F.3d 763 (Sixth Circuit, 2006)
Surles v. Andison
678 F.3d 452 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)
Coleman-Bey v. Bouchard
287 F. App'x 420 (Sixth Circuit, 2008)
Randy Pearce v. Chrysler Grp. LLC Pension Plan
893 F.3d 339 (Sixth Circuit, 2018)
Anderson v. Jutzy
175 F. Supp. 3d 781 (E.D. Michigan, 2016)
Figel v. Bouchard
89 F. App'x 970 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)
Pure Tech Systems, Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Insurance
95 F. App'x 132 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)

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