Ron Rogers v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 San Francisco Division 11 RON ROGERS, Case No. 25-cv-05227-LB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND 13 v. Re: ECF No. 41 14 MCDONALD’S USA, LLC, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 18 Plaintiff Ron Rogers sued his former employer, McDonald’s USA, for disability 19 discrimination and related claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) 20 and the Labor Code, all arising from his employment, medical leaves following a 2023 traumatic 21 brain injury, and his 2025 separation from employment. The operative complaint pleads nine 22 claims against McDonald’s only. The issue is whether the plaintiff can amend his complaint. The 23 court set April 15, 2026, as the pleadings cutoff and warned that amendment after that date would 24 fall under Rule 16(b). The plaintiff filed his amended complaint that day, without obtaining 25 McDonald’s written consent or the court’s leave, as Rule 15(a)(2) requires.1 Twelve days later, the 26 plaintiff moved for leave to amend, attaching a proposed complaint adding a tenth claim for age 27 1 1 discrimination, a new theory of disability based on a “perceived disability”/cranial-deformity 2 theory, and two individual defendants.2 McDonald’s opposed amendment for failure to show good 3 cause under Rule 16(b) and because the Rule 15(a) factors did not favor amendment.3 In his reply, 4 the plaintiff withdrew the proposed individual defendants and submitted a proposed amended 5 complaint naming only McDonald’s.4 6 The complaint filed on April 15 has no legal effect because it was filed without leave of the 7 court or stipulation of the parties, as the plaintiff acknowledges.5 The court grants the motion to file 8 the proposed amended complaint attached to the plaintiff’s reply, which names McDonald’s only. 9 The plaintiff must file it as a standalone document within seven days. McDonald’s futility and 10 prejudice arguments directed at the two proposed individual defendants are moot because the 11 plaintiff has withdrawn them. The defendants may conduct the additional discovery it proposes: ten 12 additional interrogatories and an additional five-hour deposition of the plaintiff.6 13 15 The plaintiff alleges that he was employed by McDonald’s beginning in approximately 16 October 2014 and advanced to Field Marketing Officer, overseeing a multi-state region.7 In March 17 2023, while on a work trip in Portland, Oregon, he was assaulted and sustained a traumatic brain 18 injury requiring emergency surgery and extended leave. He alleges he was medically cleared to 19 return in October 2023 with temporary accommodations, was not reinstated to his prior role 20 (which was filled by Connor Mara), was reassigned to a temporary position, received a mid-year 21 “off-track” performance designation, took a second leave from approximately August 2024 to 22 23

24 2 Mot. – ECF No. 41. 25 3 Opp’n – ECF No. 46. 26 4 Reply – ECF No. 48; Proposed Am. Compl., Ex. A to Louderback Decl. – ECF No. 48-1. 5 Mot. – ECF No. 41. 27 6 Opp’n – ECF No. 46 at 21. 1 February 2025 following a further cranial surgery, and was separated in 2025.8 McDonald’s 2 disputes this account and contends the plaintiff’s position was eliminated when its supporting 3 initiative sunsetted and that the plaintiff never complained of discrimination during employment.9 4 The following is the procedural chronology of the case. 5 • May 15, 2025: lawsuit filed in state court with nine claims against McDonald’s only.10 6 • June 2025: McDonald’s answers and removes the case.11 7 • September 25, 2025: the plaintiff represents in the initial case-management statement that he “does not anticipate adding or dismissing any claims.” The scheduling order sets no 8 deadline to amend.12 9 • Fall 2025–Spring 2026: discovery, including documents, third-party discovery, and depositions of plaintiff, Connor Mara, Brian deKowzan, and Alma Anguiano.13 10 • February 6, 2026: plaintiff’s counsel emails that he “intends to amend the complaint to add 11 cause of action for Age Discrimination, Failure to Accommodate and Failure to Engage in a Good faith Interactive Process,” “will send” a stipulation and order, and asks 12 McDonald’s not to require a motion.14 13 • February 18, 2026: mediation before the Hon. James Warren (Ret.).15 14 • February 27, 2026: McDonald’s counsel responds that to consider a stipulation, the plaintiff “will need to send us a proposed Stipulation and proposed Amended Complaint 15 (redlined as required by Judge Beeler’s Standing Order).”16 16 • March 5, 2026: case-management statement reflects the plaintiff’s intent to amend and McDonald’s statement that it had “requested a copy of the proposed Amended Complaint 17 … to consider whether, and on what terms,” it would stipulate, and had received none.17 18 19 20 21 8 Id. at 4–8 (¶¶ 8–33); Proposed Am. Compl., Ex. A to Louderback Decl. – ECF No. 48-1 at 7–15 (¶¶ 8–61). 22 9 Opp’n – ECF No. 46 at 7–8. 23 10 Notice of Removal – ECF No. 1 at 2 (¶ 1). 11 Id. at 2 (¶ 3), 3 (¶ 8). 24 12 Case-Mgmt. Statement – ECF No. 26 at 6; Order – ECF No. 29. 25 13 Curry Decl. – ECF No. 47 at 4 (¶ 10). 26 14 Id. at 2 (¶ 4) & Ex. 1. 15 Case-Mgmt. Statement – ECF No. 35 at 4. 27 16 Curry Decl. – ECF No. 47 at 2–3 (¶ 5(a)) & Ex. 2. • March 16, 2026: scheduling order requires the plaintiff to propose, by April 2, 2026, a 1 “firm deadline to amend the pleadings,” and states that the date would “serve as a pleadings cutoff, which puts amendment thereafter into Rule 16(b) territory.”18 2 • April 2–3, 2026: the plaintiff proposes April 15, 2026, as the firm deadline; the court sets 3 that date.19 No proposed amendment or stipulation is sent to McDonald’s.20 4 • April 15, 2026, 9:30 p.m.: the plaintiff files the amended complaint without McDonald’s written consent and without the Court’s leave.21 5 • April 20, 2026: McDonald’s demands withdrawal, citing Rule 15(a)(2) and the Standing 6 Order’s blackline requirement.22 7 • April 27, 2026: the plaintiff moves for leave to amend, attaching a proposed pleading that adds an age-discrimination claim, a perceived-disability/cranial-deformity theory, and two 8 individual defendants (Brian deKowzan and Courtney Cusimano Adams).23 9 • May 11, 2026: McDonald’s opposes the motion to amend.24 10 • May 18, 2026: the plaintiff replies, withdraws the individual defendants, and submits a corrected proposed amended complaint naming only McDonald’s.25 11 The court has diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The parties consented to magistrate- 12 judge jurisdiction.26 Id. § 636(c)(1). The court held a hearing on June 4, 2026. 13

14 GOVERNING LAW 15 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend “shall be freely given when 16 justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Sonoma Cnty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma 17 County, 708 F.3d 1109, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2013). Because “Rule 15 favors a liberal policy towards 18 amendment, the nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating why leave to amend should 19 not be granted.” Genentech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab’ys, 127 F.R.D. 529, 530–31 (N.D. Cal. 1989) 20 21

22 18 Order – ECF No. 37. 23 19 Case-Mgmt. Statement – ECF No. 38 at 2; Clerk’s Notice – ECF No. 39. 20 Curry Decl. – ECF No. 47 at 4 (¶ 8). 24 21 Am. Compl. – ECF No. 40; Mot. – ECF No. 41 at 1; Curry Decl. – ECF No. 47 at 4 (¶ 8). 25 22 Curry Decl. – ECF No. 47 at 4 (¶ 9) & Ex. 3. 26 23 Mot. – ECF No. 41. 24 Opp’n – ECF No. 46. 27 25 Reply – ECF No. 48; Proposed Am. Compl., Ex. A to Louderback Decl. – ECF No. 48-1. 1 (cleaned up). Courts generally consider five factors when assessing the propriety of a motion for 2 leave to amend: undue delay, bad faith, futility of amendment, prejudice to the opposing party, and 3 whether the party has previously amended the pleadings. Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 4 555 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009). 5 Where a party seeks leave to amend after the date specified in a scheduling order, Rule 16(b) 6 also applies. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). Under 7 Rule 16(b), “[a] schedule shall not be modified except by leave of the district court upon a 8 showing of good cause.” Id. (cleaned up); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). If the party seeking 9 amendment shows good cause, then the party must demonstrate that the amendment is proper 10 under Rule 15. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608. To determine whether good cause exists to modify the 11 scheduling order, courts focus on the reasonable diligence of the moving party. Noyes v. Kelly 12 Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1174 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (“carelessness 13 is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief” under Rule 14 16(b); “the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply 15 additional reasons to deny a motion, [but] the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s 16 reasons for seeking modification”). “If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” 17 Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 19 The plaintiff does not dispute that the complaint filed on April 15, 2026, without leave of the 20 court or consent of the defendant, is not operative.27 A party may amend “only with the opposing 21 party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The issue then is whether 22 leave should be granted to file the proposed amended complaint attached to the plaintiff’s reply. 23 Leave is granted. 24 Under Rule 16(b), the plaintiff’s diligence is imperfect, but good cause is established for three 25 reasons. First, the plaintiff attempted to amend by the operative deadline. The defect was the 26 absence of formal leave, not the plaintiff’s inaction or untimeliness. He moved to cure the issue 27 1 within twelve days of McDonald’s objection. Second, the substance of the proposed amendments 2 was disclosed months in advance and aired in successive case-management statements, so this is 3 not a case of a theory sprung at the last moment. Third, and most important, the court set this 4 deadline as a case-management device, anticipating that the parties would confer and stipulate to 5 the amendment to avoid motion practice. The procedural breakdown reflects a failure of that 6 cooperative process as much as the plaintiff’s neglect. A deadline structured to channel a 7 stipulation should not be wielded to foreclose the very amendment it was meant to facilitate. 8 The court does not condone the plaintiff’s failure to circulate a draft pleading or to file the 9 required blackline. The issue dragged on for some months, rendering somewhat weak the plaintiff’s 10 argument that amendment was discovery-driven. But given that the case-management schedule 11 contemplated amendment, the issue is resolved in favor of reaching the merits, consistent with the 12 strong policy favoring amendment. Also, there is plenty of room within the existing trial schedule, 13 including a distant trial date and the ability to conduct discovery within the existing case deadlines. 14 The court thus proceeds to Rule 15(a)(2) and the five factors of undue delay, bad faith, futility 15 of amendment, prejudice to the opposing party, and whether the party has previously amended the 16 pleadings. Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1055. 17 Delay is measured by “whether the moving party knew or should have known the facts and 18 theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist 19 W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2006). Late amendments asserting theories known “since the 20 inception of the cause of action” are disfavored. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sw. Marine, 194 F.3d 21 1009, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 1999). The need to conduct discovery, as stated above, is a somewhat weak 22 argument: the parties knew the core facts early. Delay like the delay here can weigh modestly 23 against amendment. But the court manages cases toward mediation first (after discovery illuminates 24 the case issues), preferably reserving motions practice until after the mediation. Delay thus is not 25 undue. The short delay in filing a motion for leave to amend does not change that conclusion. 26 There is no bad faith: the delay in filing the motion was inadvertent. 27 There is curable prejudice: discovery may not have been focused on the new claims, and 1 case into a new one: they rest on the same employment history, decisionmakers, and adverse 2 actions. The trial date is roughly nine months out with discovery ongoing. Prejudice of this kind is 3 properly addressed by conditioning leave on additional discovery rather than by denying 4 amendment outright. 5 The claims against individuals would not survive and thus would be futile. Under FEHA, 6 nonemployer individuals are generally not liable for discrimination, retaliation, failure to prevent, or 7 failure to accommodate. Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 644–45 (1998); Jones v. Lodge at Torrey 8 Pines P’ship, 42 Cal. 4th 1158, 1163 (2008); Alejandro v. ST Micro Elecs., Inc., 129 F. Supp. 3d 9 898, 910, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 likewise does not impose individual 10 liability. United States ex rel. Lupo v. Quality Assurance Servs., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1030 11 (S.D. Cal. 2017).28 The plaintiff’s withdrawal of the individual defendants moots the issue. The 12 proposed amended complaint names only McDonald’s. 13 Leave to amend is granted. 14 The court grants McDonald’s request for additional discovery.29 District courts have “wide 15 discretion in controlling discovery” and may condition leave to amend to neutralize prejudice. Little 16 v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988). McDonald’s may have up to ten additional 17 interrogatories and an additional deposition of the plaintiff for up to five hours. 18 The court denies McDonald’s request for reimbursement of the cost of the February 18, 2026, 19 mediation.30 The mediation predated both the pleadings-amendment deadline and the motion to 20 amend, and it addressed the same employment dispute that remains at the core of the case. The 21 amendment does not render that effort valueless. McDonald’s invokes the court’s inherent 22 sanctions authority, Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001), but that authority requires 23 bad faith or conduct tantamount to it. The court has found carelessness rather than bad faith. The 24 25 26 28 Opp’n – ECF No. 46 at 19–20 (making this argument). 27 29 Id. at 21. ] targeted discovery authorized above is the appropriate and sufficient means of addressing any 2 || prejudice from the amendment. 4 Leave to amend is granted, and the additional discovery is ordered. The request for 5 || reimbursement of the mediation expenses is denied. The plaintiff must file a standalone complaint 6 || within seven days. 7 This resolves ECF No. 41. 9 Dated: June 4, 2026 LAE 10 LAUREL BEELER United States Magistrate Judge as 12

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