UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
FRANCIS ROMEO,
Plaintiff, Case No. 2:24-cv-12589
v. Honorable Susan K. DeClercq United States District Judge ANNE LAMMERS et al.,
Defendants. ________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF No. 2) AND SUMMARILY DISMISSING COMPLAINT (ECF No. 1) FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Francis Romeo, proceeding pro se, sued attorneys for the City of Romulus and its FOIA clerk, alleging that they denied or ignored his requests under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) for records related to a property he owned. Romeo says that Defendants’ actions violated both the Michigan FOIA and the United States Constitution. Romeo also applied to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. Because his application supports his allegations of poverty, it will be granted. However, as explained below, Romeo’s claims must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. I. BACKGROUND Around 2020, Romeo had an ongoing civil suit in Wayne County Circuit Court
against the city of Romulus, Michigan, apparently relating to a property he owned. ECF No. 1 at PageID.4, 13. In connection with that suit, he “repeatedly requested FOIA information” from the City about himself and his property. Id. at PageID.4.
But according to Romeo, the City’s lawyers “ignored all of [his] FOIA Requests” and directed the City’s FOIA coordinator not to respond to his requests either. Id. Romeo says that this wrongdoing prevented him from proving his case, and as a result, his home was demolished, he was billed $16,000 for the demolition, and he
became homeless. Id. at PageID.6. Romeo therefore sued the City’s lawyers and its FOIA coordinator, alleging that they violated the “the FOIA Act” and the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at PageID.7–10. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Because Romeo proceeds in forma pauperis, his claims must be reviewed under the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (recognizing that courts “must still screen” non- prisoner complaints under § 1915(e)(2)). Under these standards, courts must dismiss
any claim that “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, whether plaintiffs proceed in
forma pauperis or not, courts must dismiss any action over which they lack subject- matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). Romeo also proceeds pro se, and so his pleadings are held to “less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and are liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Even so, Romeo is not immune from compliance with the Federal Civil Rules. His complaint must still set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), one that would “give the defendant fair notice” of what the claim is and the grounds on which it rests, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted).
Further, his complaint must still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (holding that the Civil Rule 12(b)(6) standard also applies to dismissals under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). III. DISCUSSION Here, Romeo’s claims must be dismissed because this Court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction over them. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). Subject-matter jurisdiction describes a court’s power to hear a case. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). Without subject-matter
jurisdiction, a court is powerless to act. Further, the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts—like this Court—is limited. Unlike state trial courts, federal courts may decide only those cases “that the Constitution and Congress have empowered
them to resolve.” Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 549 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2008). Specifically, federal courts have jurisdiction to hear claims that arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This is known as federal-question jurisdiction. Federal courts also have jurisdiction to hear
cases between citizens of different states when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This is known as diversity jurisdiction. If there is no federal-question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction, this Court may not hear the
case and must dismiss it. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). Here, there is neither federal-question jurisdiction nor diversity jurisdiction over Romeo’s claims. First, consider federal-question jurisdiction. Romeo sues for violations of “the
FOIA Act.” ECF No. 1 at PageID.9. He does not specify whether he means the federal FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq., or the Michigan FOIA, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.231 et seq. However, Romeo likely means the Michigan FOIA because he sought
records from a local governmental body—the City of Romulus—which is a “public body” covered by that Act. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.232(h)(iii). By contrast, the federal FOIA, which applies mostly to federal administrative agencies, does not
cover state and local governmental bodies. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1); Bright v. Bartlett, No. 4:19-cv-33, 2019 WL 5295190, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 18, 2019) (collecting cases). In effect, this means that there is no federal law at issue here, just state law.
Romeo also alleges that Defendants, by denying or ignoring his record requests, violated his First, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution. ECF No. 1 at PageID.7. The Supreme Court, however, “has repeatedly made clear that there is no constitutional right to obtain all the
information provided by FOIA laws.” McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 232 (2013); see also Williams v. Drug Enf’t Admin., No. 1:22-CV-00696, 2024 WL 5156917, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 18, 2024); Houser v. Church, 271 F. Supp. 3d 197
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
FRANCIS ROMEO,
Plaintiff, Case No. 2:24-cv-12589
v. Honorable Susan K. DeClercq United States District Judge ANNE LAMMERS et al.,
Defendants. ________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF No. 2) AND SUMMARILY DISMISSING COMPLAINT (ECF No. 1) FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Francis Romeo, proceeding pro se, sued attorneys for the City of Romulus and its FOIA clerk, alleging that they denied or ignored his requests under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) for records related to a property he owned. Romeo says that Defendants’ actions violated both the Michigan FOIA and the United States Constitution. Romeo also applied to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. Because his application supports his allegations of poverty, it will be granted. However, as explained below, Romeo’s claims must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. I. BACKGROUND Around 2020, Romeo had an ongoing civil suit in Wayne County Circuit Court
against the city of Romulus, Michigan, apparently relating to a property he owned. ECF No. 1 at PageID.4, 13. In connection with that suit, he “repeatedly requested FOIA information” from the City about himself and his property. Id. at PageID.4.
But according to Romeo, the City’s lawyers “ignored all of [his] FOIA Requests” and directed the City’s FOIA coordinator not to respond to his requests either. Id. Romeo says that this wrongdoing prevented him from proving his case, and as a result, his home was demolished, he was billed $16,000 for the demolition, and he
became homeless. Id. at PageID.6. Romeo therefore sued the City’s lawyers and its FOIA coordinator, alleging that they violated the “the FOIA Act” and the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at PageID.7–10. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Because Romeo proceeds in forma pauperis, his claims must be reviewed under the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (recognizing that courts “must still screen” non- prisoner complaints under § 1915(e)(2)). Under these standards, courts must dismiss
any claim that “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, whether plaintiffs proceed in
forma pauperis or not, courts must dismiss any action over which they lack subject- matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). Romeo also proceeds pro se, and so his pleadings are held to “less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and are liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Even so, Romeo is not immune from compliance with the Federal Civil Rules. His complaint must still set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), one that would “give the defendant fair notice” of what the claim is and the grounds on which it rests, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted).
Further, his complaint must still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (holding that the Civil Rule 12(b)(6) standard also applies to dismissals under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). III. DISCUSSION Here, Romeo’s claims must be dismissed because this Court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction over them. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). Subject-matter jurisdiction describes a court’s power to hear a case. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). Without subject-matter
jurisdiction, a court is powerless to act. Further, the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts—like this Court—is limited. Unlike state trial courts, federal courts may decide only those cases “that the Constitution and Congress have empowered
them to resolve.” Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 549 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2008). Specifically, federal courts have jurisdiction to hear claims that arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This is known as federal-question jurisdiction. Federal courts also have jurisdiction to hear
cases between citizens of different states when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This is known as diversity jurisdiction. If there is no federal-question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction, this Court may not hear the
case and must dismiss it. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). Here, there is neither federal-question jurisdiction nor diversity jurisdiction over Romeo’s claims. First, consider federal-question jurisdiction. Romeo sues for violations of “the
FOIA Act.” ECF No. 1 at PageID.9. He does not specify whether he means the federal FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq., or the Michigan FOIA, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.231 et seq. However, Romeo likely means the Michigan FOIA because he sought
records from a local governmental body—the City of Romulus—which is a “public body” covered by that Act. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.232(h)(iii). By contrast, the federal FOIA, which applies mostly to federal administrative agencies, does not
cover state and local governmental bodies. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1); Bright v. Bartlett, No. 4:19-cv-33, 2019 WL 5295190, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 18, 2019) (collecting cases). In effect, this means that there is no federal law at issue here, just state law.
Romeo also alleges that Defendants, by denying or ignoring his record requests, violated his First, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution. ECF No. 1 at PageID.7. The Supreme Court, however, “has repeatedly made clear that there is no constitutional right to obtain all the
information provided by FOIA laws.” McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 232 (2013); see also Williams v. Drug Enf’t Admin., No. 1:22-CV-00696, 2024 WL 5156917, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 18, 2024); Houser v. Church, 271 F. Supp. 3d 197, 204 (D.D.C.
2017) (“[T]he FOIA does not offer a remedy for alleged violations of constitutional rights arising from the handling of a FOIA request.”) (citation omitted). Michigan courts have echoed the same, albeit in the context of incarcerated plaintiffs (who are excluded altogether from the Michigan FOIA). Proctor v. White
Lake Twp. Police Dep’t, 639 N.W.2d 332, 338 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (“[P]laintiff’s exclusion from seeking public documents under the [Michigan] FOIA does not otherwise implicate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. We emphasize that the FOIA
provisions themselves are not of constitutional moment. They themselves do not invest plaintiff with a constitutional right to investigate government information.”). For this reason, Romeo’s constitutional claims do not establish federal-question
jurisdiction either. As for diversity jurisdiction, it also does not exist because Romeo and Defendants are all alleged to be Michigan citizens. ECF No. 1 at PageID.3.
As a result, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Romeo’s claims, and his case must therefore be dismissed. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED. Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Further, Plaintiff is DENIED permission to proceed in forma pauperis
on appeal because an appeal cannot be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). This is a final order and closes the above-captioned case.
/s/Susan K. DeClercq SUSAN K. DeCLERCQ United States District Judge Dated: February 13, 2025