Rolfe & Kirstine Godfrey, & Robert Kornfeld, Apps. v. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates, Ltd Resp.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: December 27, 2018
• Docket: 46963-4
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two

December 27, 2018 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II ROLFE GODFREY and KIRSTINE No. 46963-4-II GODFREY, husband and wife and their marital community composed thereof,

Appellants,

v.

STE. MICHELLE WINE ESTATES LTD, dba UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHATEAU STE. MICHELE, a Washington corporation; and SAINT-GOBAIN CONTAINERS, INC.

Respondents,

and

ROBERT KORNFELD,

Additional Appellant.

LEE, A.C.J. — This case again comes before us on remand from our Supreme Court for

reconsideration in light of State v. Lile, 188 Wn.2d 766, 398 P.3d 1052 (2017). After considering

Lile, we hold that the trial court erred in rejecting an affidavit of prejudice because the stipulated

order extending witness disclosure deadlines was not a discretionary decision. Accordingly, we

reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

In 2010, Godfrey, while working as a server, was injured after a bottle of Ste. Michelle

wine shattered in his hand. In 2012, Godfrey filed a product liability suit against Ste. Michelle,

asserting manufacturing and design defects. No. 46963-4-II

On June 7, 2013, Judge Garold E. Johnson entered an order amending the case schedule.

The order included dates for the parties to disclose their witnesses and discovery deadlines. The

pretrial conference was set for the week of June 16, 2014. And the trial date was set for July 7,

2014.

On December 19, 2013, Godfrey’s case was reassigned to Judge Katherine M. Stoltz. On

January 6, 2014, Judge Stolz entered a stipulated order extending the deadline for the parties to

disclose witnesses to each other. The stipulated order did not change the pretrial conference date

or the trial date.

On March 3, Godfrey signed an affidavit of prejudice against Judge Stoltz. On March 7,

Godfrey moved to have Judge Stolz recused based on the affidavit of prejudice. Judge Stolz ruled

that Godfrey’s affidavit and motion were not timely because she had already signed a discretionary

order in the case. After the bench trial, the trial court dismissed Godfrey’s product liability claim

and entered judgment in favor of Ste. Michelle.

Godfrey appealed, arguing in relevant part that the trial court erred by rejecting Godfrey’s

affidavit of prejudice. Godfrey v. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates Ltd., noted at 195 Wn. App. 1007, 1-

2 (July 19, 2016). In a previous opinion, we held that the trial court’s signing of a stipulation and

order to extend the parties’ deadline for witness disclosures was not a discretionary decision. Id.

at 2-3. Because signing the stipulation and order was not a discretionary decision, the trial court

erred in rejecting the affidavit of prejudice, and we reversed. Id. at 3.

Our Supreme Court subsequently decided State v. Lile. In Lile, the Court held that the trial

court’s ruling on an agreed motion for trial continuance was a discretionary decision for purposes

of RCW 4.12.050. 188 Wn.2d at 778. The Court reasoned that continuances, regardless of the

2 No. 46963-4-II

parties’ agreement, “have a significant impact on the efficient operation of our courts and the rights

of the parties, particularly in criminal proceedings.” Id.. Following its decision in Lile, the

Supreme Court granted Ste. Michelle’s petition for review in this case, and remanded to this court

for reconsideration in light of Lile.

ANALYSIS

A. STATE V. LILE

In Lile, the parties orally requested that the trial court continue the trial date based on their

agreement. 188 Wn.2d at 771. The trial court orally granted the trial continuance. Id. The

defendant subsequently filed an affidavit of prejudice. Id. The trial court ruled that the affidavit

of prejudice was untimely because its ruling on the agreed continuance was discretionary. Id at

772.

The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s ruling on the parties’ agreed trial continuance

was a discretionary act for purposes of RCW 4.12.050. Id. at 778. The Court emphasized that in

determining whether a ruling involves discretion for purposes of RCW 4.12.050, the most relevant

consideration is the substance and impact of a request—not the form of the request. Id. Where

the request impacts the duties and functions of the trial court, a ruling on the request is discretionary

for purposes of RCW 4.12.050. Id. But a ruling on a stipulated agreement is nondiscretionary

where the agreement affects only the rights or convenience of the parties, and does not impact or

interfere with the duties and functions of the court. Id.

Continuances of trial dates, regardless of whether the parties agree, “have a significant

impact on the efficient operation of our courts and the rights of the parties, particularly in criminal

proceedings.” Id.. A ruling on an agreed trial continuance involves discretion because the court

3 No. 46963-4-II

must consider the request’s impact on “ ‘various factors, such as diligence, materiality, due

process, a need for an orderly procedure, and the possible impact of the result on the trial.’ ” Id.

at 776 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Recall of Lindquist, 172 Wn.2d 120, 130,

258 P.3d 9 (2011), as corrected (Sept. 7, 2011)). And because the motion for a continuance

impacted the duties and functions of the trial court, the trial court’s ruling on the motion to continue

the trial date involved discretion. Id. at 778.

B. STIPULATED ORDER EXTENDING WITNESS DISCLOSURE DEADLINES

The stipulated order extending witness disclosure deadlines changed only the dates the

parties had to make witness disclosures to each other; it did not change any court dates. Ste.

Michelle argues that “Lile holds that the inquiry for discretion under RCW 4.12.050 is whether the

parties had the right to the relief sought, or whether the court had discretion to grant or deny the

relief. Lile, 188 Wn.2d at 788.” Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 6. Ste. Michelle essentially argues that

the inquiry in determining whether a ruling was discretionary under RCW 4.12.050 is whether the

court had discretion. Ste. Michelle’s argument begs the question of how to determine whether a

ruling is discretionary for purposes of RCW 4.12.050.

Lile instructs us, however, on how to determine whether a ruling on a stipulated agreement

is discretionary for purposes of RCW 4.12.050. Lile expressly held that we determine whether a

ruling on a stipulated agreement is discretionary by considering the substance and impact of the

request. Lile, 188 Wn.2d at 778. If the request impacts the functions and duties of the courts and

the efficient operation of the courts, then the ruling is discretionary for purposes of RCW 4.12.050.

If the request impacts only the rights or convenience of the parties, and does not interfere with the

duties and function of the court, then the ruling is nondiscretionary. Id..

4 No. 46963-4-II

Here, the stipulated order extending the deadline for the parties to disclose witnesses to

each other impacted only the parties’ convenience. The stipulated order extending witness

disclosure deadlines did not impact the court’s calendar, the operation of the court, the parties’

rights, orderly procedure, or due process because it did not change any of the court dates set in the

case schedule. Unlike in Lile, the parties here did not request a trial continuance or otherwise seek

a change that would impact the court’s schedule.

Under the framework presented in Lile for determining whether a ruling on a stipulated

agreement is discretionary for purposes of RCW 4.12.050, Judge Stolz’s ruling was not

discretionary because the substance and impact of the stipulated order extending witness disclosure

deadlines did not impact the court’s functions or duties. Therefore, we again determine that the

trial court erred by finding that Godfrey’s affidavit of prejudice was untimely. Because the

affidavit of prejudice was timely, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

Lee, A.C.J. We concur:

Worswick, J.

Bjorgen, J.