Roldan v. Minter

409 F. Supp. 663, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16323

• Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts
• Decided: March 4, 1976
• Docket: Civ. A. 73-3418-G
• Status: Published

Opinions

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT

GARRITY, District Judge.

This is a class action in which the plaintiffs Dominga Roldan and Mary Mercer sue Steven Minter, the State Welfare Commissioner, and others, challenging a Welfare Department Letter pursuant to which that department determines eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits. They claim that State Letter 314 is unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and that it is inconsistent with federal statute, § 406(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a). They seek declaratory and injunctive relief and recovery of benefits wrongfully withheld. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284. Hearing on the merits was advanced and consolidated with the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. After argument and consideration of the parties’ stipulations of facts and briefs, we have concluded that the complaint should be dismissed on condition that the defendants modify State Letter 314, as will be explained.

State Letter 314 requires documentary verification of the ages and relationship of children for eligibility for AFDC benefits. The plaintiffs, for different reasons, could not satisfy the requirements of that letter as they existed at the time of their applications. Plaintiff Roldan arrived in Massachusetts from Puerto Rico. Because any existing documentation of the age and relationship of her children was in Puerto Rico, she could not qualify. Plaintiff Mercer is a gypsy. Gypsies by custom keep no records or other documentation. She was similarly denied AFDC relief because she could not comply with the State Letter.¹ The plaintiffs, when they were denied assistance, attacked the regulation, alleging that State Letter 314 arbitrarily discriminated against equally qualified recipients solely on the basis of what documentation they possessed; that the State Letter established a conclusive presumption against qualified recipients in violation of procedural due process; and that the State Letter violated the Supremacy Clause by precluding relief to persons whom Congress had declared to be eligible. These claims raise substantial questions; and had the State Letter remained unchanged, judgment might well have been entered for the plaintiffs. See Vlandis v. Kline, 1973, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63, and Boucher v. Minter, D.Mass.1972, 349 F.Supp. 1240, as to preclusive presumptions and Townsend v. Swank, 1971, 404 U.S. 282, 92 S.Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed.2d 448, and Section 406(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) as to a preclusion of intended beneficiaries.

After commencement of this suit, the defendants made major revisions in State Letter 314 in an effort to settle the controversy. The letter originally required a birth record or, if that was unavailable, baptismal or school record. The defendants have now agreed to amend State Letter 314 to provide that the following documentation is acceptable:

(a) Birth certificate .

(b) Certificate of baptism

(c) Marriage license or certificate

(d) Family' Bible or genealogical records

(e) Passport indicating age and relationship of children

(f) Hospital birth record

(g) Affidavit of a third person, if it is based on personal knowledge of facts which would determine the probable age and relationship of the children and is not merely a statement of belief based on the applicant’s personal appearance; the affidavit shall contain statements of the circumstances upon which the applicant’s knowledge is based.

Or any of the following dated at least six months prior to the date of application which contains evidence of (a) the ages of the needy children and (b) the relationship of the needy children to the grantee-relative.

(h) United States census records

(i) School records

(j) OASDI records

(k) Immigration and naturalization records

(l) Poll tax records

(m) Court records (e. g., adoption, divorce or separate support)

(n) Insurance policies

(o) Employment records

(p) Newspaper records and local histories

(q) Indian agency records

(r) Other governmental or local records

The plaintiffs did not view these modifications as adequate and at the hearing for preliminary and final injunctive relief pressed their prayer for an injunction. The plaintiffs’ continuing objections were (1) under subsection (g) of the revised State Letter, oral testimony at the welfare field office was not acceptable — thus placing the burden and expense of the preparation of an affidavit upon the recipient, and (2) with respect to the type of documentation described in subsections (h) through (r), it must be at least six months old — a requirement which newly arrived eligible applicants such as the plaintiffs might find insurmountable.

At the conclusion of the hearing at the court’s request, the Assistant Attorney General said that he would endeavor to see what further modification the state officials might be willing to make to meet plaintiffs’ objections.² By letter from Assistant Attorney General Behar dated January 25, 1974, the defendants proposed a further modification of subsection (g), as follows:

To permit the transcribing in affidavit form of oral statements made by third person-affiants who appear at welfare service offices. If an affiant will sign and swear to the affidavit (which in some circumstances may require an oral reading by a Department employee or interpreter), the Department will consider such an affidavit with reference to the requirements of subsection (g)-

In our opinion this latest modification, which permits third persons to appear and have an affidavit prepared by state employees, is an adequate substitute for oral testimony.³ Also, the acceptability of this type of evidence of eligibility minimizes the significance of the six-month limitation found in subsections (h) through (r). Plaintiffs pointed out that a newly arrived eligible applicant might not know anyone in the area who could provide the third-party information. In such a situation, however, the applicant would be in no worse position than if oral testimony at a formal hearing were permissible. A third-party affidavit would have to be obtained from an out-of-town affiant, or one of the many other modes of proof resorted to.

Plaintiffs have argued, and persuaded one member of the court, that the uncorroborated affidavit of the applicant for AFDC should be an acceptable basis for eligibility, if believed. In our view this position conflicts with the undisputed premise that reasonable verification procedures are permitted by both the statute and constitution. The basic question is whether, in this context, the state may reasonably insist upon some form of corroboration. Under the modifications proposed by the defendants, corroboration may be oral as well as written; and it can be supplied by a witness who may appear at the welfare service office and verify the application, without cost to the applicant even for a notary public’s fee. If reasonable verification procedures permit the defendants to require corroboration, then the defendants’ amended list of acceptable forms is as comprehensive as could be. Plaintiffs’ further contention that the defendants’ proposed verification requirements would operate to deny relief to eligible children seems to beg the question. Applicants for benefits under the AFDC program whose eligibility cannot be shown by reasonable verification procedures cannot be presumed to be eligible.

Finally, the court is without juris-. diction to entertain plaintiffs’ claim for retroactive payments. Edelman v. Jordan, 1974, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662; Parent v. Minter, D.Mass. 1973, 362 F.Supp. 85, citing Rothstein v. Wyman, 2 Cir. 1972, 467 F.2d 226, and Westberry v. Fisher, D.Me.1970, 309 F.Supp. 12, 18-21.

It is therefore ordered that judgment be entered for the defendants on condition that they put the amended requirements into effect together with the proposed modification of subsection (g) of the amended State Letter 314 contained in the letter from Assistant Attorney General Behar to the court dated January 25, 1974.

1 . Plaintiff Roldan was subsequently able to comply with State Letter 314 when documentation was received from Puerto Rico. She is now receiving AFDC benefits. Assistant Attorney General Behar represented to the court that plaintiff Mercer would similarly begin to receive AFDC benefits on the basis of an affidavit by Steve Parker.

2 . The defendants at the hearing suggested that since both of the named plaintiffs were then receiving benefits the case was now moot and there was no longer a case or controversy. See Indiana Employment Division v. Burney, 1973, 409 U.S. 540, 93 S.Ct. 883, 35 L.Ed.2d 62; Golden v. Zwickler, 1969, 394 U.S. 103, 109-110, 89 S.Ct. 956, 960, 22 L.Ed.2d 113, 118. However, this is a class action and it was represented to the court that the problem of verification presented is not rare. This would bring the matter within the capability-of-repetition exception to the mootness doctrine. Moreover, the state should not be able to frustrate the rights of an entire class simply by making a settlement with named plaintiffs.

3 . When the only bar to the granting of relief is proof of a child’s age, a refusal under some circumstances probably could be so unreasonable as to be unconstitutional. For instance, children under ten years of age could not reasonably be generally suspected of being over eighteen years of age. But consideration of such a hypothesis is unnecessary to a decision of the instant case.