Rogers v. Kee

137 N.W. 260, 171 Mich. 551, 1912 Mich. LEXIS 662
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 22, 1912
DocketDocket No. 40
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 137 N.W. 260 (Rogers v. Kee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rogers v. Kee, 137 N.W. 260, 171 Mich. 551, 1912 Mich. LEXIS 662 (Mich. 1912).

Opinion

Steers, J.

This action is brought to recover damages from defendant, a physician, for alleged malpractice in neglecting to properly diagnose a fracture of the neck of the left femur, when professionally called to attend plaintiff, and for unskillful and negligent treatment of the same. Plaintiff recovered a judgment for $1,000 on the verdict of a jury in the circuit court of Delta county, and the cause is brought here by defendant on writ of error.

There are 12 assignments of error, only 2 of which are relied upon and argued by defendant, each presenting practically the same question, being that the court erred in refusing to direct, a verdict for defendant at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, and again at the conclusion of the introduction of all testimony.

At the time of his injury, plaintiff was 55 years of age, [553]*553a saw filer by trade, working in the filing room on the second floor of the sawmill of the Northwestern Cooperage & Lumber. Company at Gladstone, Mich. In the forenoon of August 27, 1909, while lifting a circular saw weighing from 130 to 140 pounds from an arbor, and turning to carry it, he felt something give way in his hip, causing him to drop the saw. He soon resumed his work, continuing during the balance of the day, mostly in a sitting posture, and walked home at night on an earth path, a distance of about half a mile, by the aid of sticks used as canes. He continued at his usual work the next day, which was Saturday, and the following Monday, walking to and from the same with some difficulty, using canes, sometimes receiving assistance from others. On Monday evening, August 30th, his condition was such that he called defendant to attend him professionally. Defendant was a regular physician in said city retained by the mill company for which plaintiff worked to professionally care for its employes. Plaintiff.informed defendant of the circumstances and nature of his trouble, said he thought it was a bad sprain in the hip, answered whatever questions were asked him by defendant, and submitted his case to him.

The testimony is in conflict as to much of what is claimed to have occurred during this and subsequent visits. Defendant testified that he found no symptoms of a fracture of the femur; that, if there had been any fracture or dislocation of the hip, he made such an examination as would have disclosed it; that, from his examination and the history of the transaction communicated to him by the plaintiff and his wife, he diagnosed the case as sciatica, and prescribed therefor the application of a mustard plaster; that he did not think plaintiff’s condition was caused by what occurred at the mill; that, upon visiting the patient the following day, defendant reached the conclusion from his statement that he then had no pain, that the trouble was not sciatica, but more probably paralysis ; that he ordered plaintiff to rub the muscles, but [554]*554gave him no further treatment at that time because there was nothing further to do except to wait for developments; that he continued his visits for nearly a month, and was still uncertain what ailed plaintiff, but thought he had some spinal trouble and suggestions of locomotor ataxia; that the plaintiff was able to be up and around and walk, though with some difficulty; that he furnished him crutches on which he later visited defendant at his office.

The testimony of plaintiff and his wife was a distinct denial of many of the facts and circumstances related by defendant, their version being that, when first called, defendant, without making any physical examination, at once declared, the trouble was sciatica; that plaintiff was lying on the bed at the time, and told defendant of the severe lameness in his hip and the incident in the mill when he first felt the pain; that defendant then indicated on the hip where a mustard plaster should be applied, and left, having remained only about five minutes; that on the following day he made no examination whatever of the hip or leg, and on the fourth day, when he called, finding plaintiff sitting up, asked him to walk, and was informed that he was unable to do so, though with the aid of a chair he crawled to the bed to submit to an examination, when defendant felt of the parts, but made no movement of the limb nor measurements, and said everything was all right; that the hip was then swollen, and defendant gave instructions to massage and rub it with a certain liniment which he prescribed; that this was regularly done by plaintiff’s wife, according to instructions, and was very painful; that it hurt to move the limb and defendant was so informed; that the leg became shortened, and plaintiff called defendant’s attention to it, who pronounced it simply a temporary contraction of the sciatic cord, and, when asked in regard to consulting a specialist, said it would be useless and throwing money away; that on the eleventh day, without making any further tests, measurements, or diagnoses of any kind, he put plaintiff on [555]*555crutches, and directed him to exercise the limb; that he had plaintiff swing his leg back and forth as much as he could to see what action could be produced; that after September 29th he entirely ceased to call or pay further attention to the case; that since the occurrence at the mill on August 27, 1909, plaintiff has sustained no fall or stroke upon his hip, or accident of any kind, to which his injury could be attributed; that since that time he has been a cripple, walking with crutches, getting around with difficulty and unable to'follow his trade; that he has tried to do so and was employed in a mill for about two months at one time, but had to sit at his work and have a man in attendance to carry the saws to him.

After defendant ceased his visits, plaintiff, on October 25, 1909, consulted Dr. Laing, a physician of Rapid River, Mich., who diagnosed the case and found him suffering from fracture of the neck of the left femur, and dislocation which had not been reduced, and which had existed for some time, a fibrous union having developed. The limb was shortened over two inches, and could be projected backward and forward, but not sidewise. He testifies:

“A fibrous union is a growth practically of flesh between the two joints, the two bones that are separated; that is, preventing the bony matter from uniting. This fibrouB union is likely to intervene if you do not get the bones in apposition, or a successful reduction of the fracture. By absorption of bone, or ligamentous union, or fibrous tissue forming between, I would say that very little can be done in a case of a hip joint, especially after 10 or 15 days. This fibrous growth is likely to intervene between the ends of the bones if you do not get a reduction before that time. Of course, it is very important to deter-. mine the fact at the earliest possible moment. That is generally recognized among practitioners.”

The various physicians who subsequently examined plaintiff and testified as experts in this ease confirmed Dr. Laing’s diagnosis and statement as to the importance of prompt attention to such cases, and the hopelessness of successful treatment after the lapse of any considerable length of time.

[556]*556While it is claimed by defendant that plaintiff was not suffering from a fracture of the neck of the femur at the time he first visited him professionally, there was an abundance of- testimony to justify the court in leaving that question to the jury.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
137 N.W. 260, 171 Mich. 551, 1912 Mich. LEXIS 662, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rogers-v-kee-mich-1912.