Farrell v. Haze

122 N.W. 197, 157 Mich. 374, 1909 Mich. LEXIS 1013
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 6, 1909
DocketDocket No. 27
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 122 N.W. 197 (Farrell v. Haze) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Farrell v. Haze, 122 N.W. 197, 157 Mich. 374, 1909 Mich. LEXIS 1013 (Mich. 1909).

Opinion

Ostrander, J.

Plaintiff, on April 2, 1907, at about 10 o’clock a. m., sustained an injury to his right foot, ankle, and leg. It was what is known as a “Potts fracture.” He fell from a wagon to and upon the pavement. There is some testimony tending to prove that the wagon seat fell upon and across the foot or ankle. The foot was turned outward to a position at right angles to the leg, and perhaps it formed with the leg a more acute angle. The skin was not broken. In a fracture so described the fibula is broken. In this case the tibia was also broken. The extent to which the surrounding tissues were injured, and whether or not the artery or arteries nourishing the particular portion of the anatomy was or were ruptured or otherwise injured, cannot be accurately determined in such a case except by the consequences. He employed the defendant, a physician and surgeon, to treat the injury. Defendant attended him until April 14th, when he was discharged and another surgeon was employed. The foot was opened by still other surgeons on July 23d, at Detroit, and some dead bone was removed. Later, it was found to be necessary to amputate the leg, and the operation was performed August 21,1907. After reducing the fracture with the assistance of another surgeon, the defendant put the injured member in a plaster [376]*376of paris cast. It is the theory of the plaintiff that the swelling of the limb and foot which immediately ensued, accompanied by pain and by discoloration of the tissue, indicated, and ordinary professional skill and knowledge, demanded, an early cutting of this cast. It is alleged that it was kept in place so that the leg, ankle, and foot had no opportunity to swell, and that the circulation of blood in the limb was cut off and stopped until Sunday, April 7th, at which time the leg, foot, and ankle had become dead and black, spoiled and ruined. Later operations, including the amputation of the limb, are consequences attributed to the strangulation caused by the cast. It is the theory of defendant that the cast was cut —opened—on Wednesday, April 3d, and was thereafter for some time used as a cradle for the injured member, into which, after daily dressing, it was returned; that in any event the diseased condition of the limb, present at the time it was amputated, was due — or was not shown not to be due — to the original injury, aided, perhaps, by the treatment of the surgeon who immediately succeeded the defendant. These theories present the issues which the pleadings and the testimony presented to the court and jury. If defendant cut — opened—the cast on Wednesday, he is admittedly without fault. If he did not cut it until Sunday, and if the foot and leg were then in the condition described by plaintiff and his witnesses, he did not exercise ordinary professional skill and judgment, and for the resulting injury he is liable. What the resulting injury was, is matter of serious dispute. Defendant did not neglect his patient. The qpat was applied about noon on Tuesday. He visited plaintiff at his house three times that afternoon and evening, and after that twice each day until he was discharged.

There is no material difference in the views of the surgeons who gave testimony in this case upon certain propositions. The use of the cast was proper. The longer it was left in place, if no complications developed, the better. The danger to be apprehended was strangulation. [377]*377To aid observation, the toes were not covered by the cast. Some inflammation of the foot and ankle as a result of the injury was to be expected; how much there would be, could not be known. Whether the cast should be opened, and when it should be opened, depended upon the presence or absence of various symptoms, among them the amount of swelling and the discoloration of the foot. The temperature of the body, the pain experienced, affect the judgment of the surgeon in this behalf. Different surgeons will act differently in cases presenting the same symptoms. There' is great danger, in case of an injury such as was suffered by the plaintiff, that troublesome complications will result from the tearing or lacerating of tissue, the breaking of bones, and injuries to arteries. Necrosis often results from traumatic injuries —from the bruising of the bone. In view of the unanimity of opinion of experts upon these subjects, and the frankness with which defendant admitted that, if he left the cast in position until Sunday and until the limb was in the condition described by plaintiff and his witnesses, he had not exercised skill, we find it unnecessary to discuss many of the errors assigned and relied upon by counsel for appellant. Those which we regard as demanding attention may be disposed of under two general heads. They are: First, those relating to the time when the cast was removed; second, those relating to the injuries consequent upon appellant’s failure, if he did fail, to earlier cut the cast.

First. Defendant testified that he cut the cast on Wed-, nesday, the next day after the injury. He kept books and employed a bookkeeper. It was his practice to make a memorandum of visits to patients upon prescription blanks, and to hand the memorandums to his bookkeeper for entry by her into a daybook. She also kept a ledger. The slips, daybook, and ledger were produced in court, and were offered and received in evidence over the objection that they were all immaterial, incompetent, and self-serving. The purpose in offering them was not to [378]*378show the state of an account with plaintiff, but to corroborate defendant’s testimony concerning the date of cutting the cast by a memorandum made by him at the time. The particular memorandum, upon the particular slip, was "4-3,” meaning fourth month, third day, “Tom Farrell vt,” meaning visit, “p. m. and cutting cast $1.50.” Various memorandums made under dates from the 5th to the 13th, inclusive, contain charges for redressing the leg. These are supposed to corroborate defendant’s testimony that the cast had been cut, since it is claimed there could be no redressing of the limb if it was not cut. In the argument to the jury, it was claimed on the part of plaintiff that a comparison of the slips, the books, and certain testimony of defendant would and did show that the entry of the charge made for cutting the cast on the day stated was spurious. Much time was devoted in argument to the memorandum slips and the books. They appear to have been exhibited and handed to the jury, or to some of the jurymen. Counsel for the plaintiff in his argument to the jury said that so far as he was concerned the books and slips might be taken to the jury room. One of defendant’s counsel said, “Do we understand it is agreed that the jury may have the books?” and the reply was, “I will say, so far as I am concerned, I don’t think there was any question about my statement. * * * ” Counsel for defendant •said, “All right.” The jury having been instructed and having retired, the court inquired if it was agreed that the books and slips should be taken to the jury room. The attorney of record for plaintiff declined to consent. Upon the claim being made that it had been agreed to, the court said he did not understand there had been any such agreement, and that unless there was such an agreement he should decline to give the books to the jury. Later, the jury, through the officer in charge of them, requested that the exhibits, the daybook and ledger, be sent to them. This the court refused to do. Counsel for defendant thereupon requested that the jury be recalled and be per[379]*379mitted to examine the slips and books in the jury box. This was refused.

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Bluebook (online)
122 N.W. 197, 157 Mich. 374, 1909 Mich. LEXIS 1013, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/farrell-v-haze-mich-1909.