Rogers v. Commonwealth

410 S.E.2d 621, 242 Va. 307, 8 Va. Law Rep. 1229, 1991 Va. LEXIS 158
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedNovember 8, 1991
DocketRecord 910479 and 910480
StatusPublished
Cited by41 cases

This text of 410 S.E.2d 621 (Rogers v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rogers v. Commonwealth, 410 S.E.2d 621, 242 Va. 307, 8 Va. Law Rep. 1229, 1991 Va. LEXIS 158 (Va. 1991).

Opinion

JUSTICE COMPTON

delivered the opinion of the Court.

*309 On January 9, 1990, Dorothy H. Balsey, a 74-year-old widow, was brutally attacked in her home in the City of Covington. The victim died the next day from stab wounds to her chest and back combined with “blunt force” injuries to her head sustained during the attack.

Within a month, appellant Rocky Dale Rogers, age 24, was arrested. Subsequently, he was indicted for the following crimes arising from the attack: statutory burglary, Code § 18.2-90; robbery, Code § 18.2-58; and rape, Code § 18.2-61. In addition, the defendant was indicted for capital murder. The grand jury charged defendant with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of the victim while in the commission of robbery when armed with a deadly weapon, or while in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape. Code § 18.2-31(4)(5).

Following several pretrial hearings, including a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress certain statements made to the police, he was tried on all the charges by a single jury in November 1990. The jury fixed the following punishments for the noncapital offenses: life imprisonment for rape; 50 years imprisonment for robbery; and 20 years imprisonment for statutory burglary. The jury also found defendant guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment. During the second phase of the bifurcated capital proceeding, the jury fixed defendant’s punishment at death based upon the vileness and future dangerousness predicates of the capital murder sentencing statute. Code § 19.2-264.4. Subsequently, the trial court considered a probation officer’s report and, after a hearing in December 1990, sentenced defendant to death for the capital murder.

The death sentence is before us for automatic review under Code § 17-110.1(A), see Rule 5:22, and we have consolidated this review with defendant’s appeal of the capital murder conviction. Code § 17-110.1(F). In addition, by order entered in March 1991, we have certified the appeals of the noncapital convictions from the Court of Appeals; the effect of the certification is to transfer jurisdiction over the noncapital appeals to this Court for all purposes. Code § 17-116.06(A). We have consolidated those appeals (Record No. 910480) with the capital murder appeal (Record No. 910479).

The defendant did not brief or argue orally the assignments of error attacking the noncapital convictions. Additionally, the defendant on brief does not request us to reverse those convictions. *310 Therefore, we will make no further specific reference to the validity of those convictions, and they will be affirmed.

The dispositive question in the capital murder appeal is whether the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that the defendant was the actual perpetrator of the crime. In summarizing the evidence, we will follow established principles and view the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 42, 393 S.E.2d 599, 608 (1990).

On the day of the attack, about 2:00 p.m., Lucille Byrd visited the victim at the victim’s home, 314 East Prospect Street, to deliver a belated Christmas present. Byrd stayed with the victim until about 4:00 p.m. and left the present, a card with a $20 bill enclosed.

About 5:15 p.m. on that day, Robbie Balsey Entsminger, the victim’s daughter, visited her mother, who lived alone, to “check up” on her because the victim had suffered a “stroke” about 18 months earlier. She was “on her way to recovery” from the stroke and could speak but not write. The daughter left the home about 6:15 p.m.

Between 6:30 p.m. and 6:45 p.m. on that day, Robert Edward Bolden observed the defendant in the 300 block of East Prospect Street when the witness was about “a house away” from the victim’s residence. Bolden left a house in that block and, when he entered his automobile parked at the curb, found his left turn signal was inoperable. As Bolden “got out of the car and started messing with a bulb in the front, [he] looked down the street and [defendant] was in front of [the victim’s] house and was walking towards” the witness, with a “medium stride” not walking “real fast.” Defendant was coming “up” the sidewalk toward the witness and, when the two were six feet apart, Bolden recognized the defendant because the witness’ nephew previously “had some trouble” with defendant. Bolden noticed that Rogers was not clean shaven and was missing front teeth. Bolden returned momentarily to the home he had just left. When he returned to his car, defendant had “disappeared.” Bolden “pulled out” of the parking space at 6:50 p.m.

About 6:40 p.m. on the day in question, Mrs. Garnet Bryan was watching a news program on television in her residence at 316 East Prospect Street. She and the victim lived in the same two-story duplex house. The respective residences were separated by a *311 party wall. At that time, the witness heard the victim “hit the floor.” The sound came from the victim’s dining room, according to the witness. Assuming the victim had fallen, as was often the case immediately after the victim experienced the stroke, Bryan went to the front door of the victim’s residence to render assistance. She had a key to the door but was unable to enter because an outside storm door was locked. The witness said, “I pounded on the door to let her know I knew she had fallen.”

Bryan returned to her home and called the victim on the telephone, allowing it to ring three times. Receiving no answer, Bryan called the Selman residence at 312 East Prospect Street, “on the other side” of the victim’s home. Mr. Selman was not at home but Mrs. Selman offered to go with Bryan to assist the victim.

Bryan and Selman met on the sidewalk and proceeded beside the victim’s house to her back porch, which was on the Selman side of the home, to gain entry. As they entered the screened porch, the exterior door was standing open. They “went on up on the porch and the kitchen door was open, and went on in, the light was on in the kitchen and [they] knew there was something wrong then,” because the night “was awful cold.”

As Bryan entered the kitchen, followed closely by Selman, Bryan was struck on the shoulder by an individual that both women later identified as the defendant. Defendant was coming from the victim’s dining room “fastening up his jacket as he was coming out.” According to Bryan, defendant said, “you just step right on out of here. She’s been taken care of, and she’s going to be all right, and she don’t need you.” According to Bryan, she replied, “Well, I’ll just see for myself’ and she “pushed past” the defendant. Then, she said, “he took out and ran off the back porch and was gone.”

The women found the victim lying face down in the dining room “perfectly nude” with her clothing beside her “full of blood.” Her shirt had been “pushed up on her body” and there was a “knife sticking out of her back.” The knife was one of a set of steak knives with white plastic handles from the victim’s kitchen drawer.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
410 S.E.2d 621, 242 Va. 307, 8 Va. Law Rep. 1229, 1991 Va. LEXIS 158, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rogers-v-commonwealth-va-1991.