Rogers v. Benewah County Sheriff's Office

• Court: District Court, D. Idaho
• Decided: March 12, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00578
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

RICHARD ELBERT ROGERS, JR., Case No. 2:23-cv-00578-AKB Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE

BENEWAH COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; UNDERSHERIFF TYLER MORRIS; SERGEANT DUSTIN PULLEY; and DEPUTY ANTHONY PETERSON,

Defendants.

The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Richard Elbert Rogers, Jr.’s Complaint as a result of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate. The Court now reviews the Complaint to determine whether it should be summarily dismissed in whole or in part under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Having reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully informed, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if he intends to proceed. 1. Pleading Standards and Screening Requirement A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under modern pleading standards, Rule 8 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Iqbal/Twombly “facial plausibility” standard is met when a complaint contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but a plaintiff must offer “more than . . . unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” or if there is an “obvious alternative explanation” that would not result in liability, the complaint has not stated a

plausible claim for relief. Id. at 678, 682 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bare allegations amounting to a mere restatement of the elements of a cause of action, without adequate factual support, are not enough. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)1 requires the Court to review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. The Court must dismiss any claims lacking adequate factual support or claims that are frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court also must dismiss claims that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted or claims seeking monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. These last two categories—together with claims falling outside a federal court’s narrow grant of jurisdiction—encompass those claims that might, or might not, have factual support but nevertheless are barred by a well-established legal rule. The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885

1 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq. F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that Rule 12(b)(6) authority to dismiss claims was expanded by the PLRA, giving courts power to dismiss deficient claims, sua sponte, before or after opportunity to amend). Moreover, even if a complaint meets the pleading requirements, dismissal under § 1915A is still appropriate

if an affirmative defense, such as untimeliness, is an “obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction. The events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred when he was not incarcerated. Plaintiff claims that, on August 26, 2021, Defendants Pulley and Peterson—deputies from the Benewah County Sheriff’s Office—deliberately pulled Plaintiff out of his car while he was sleeping, threw him to the ground, and “pull[ed] his hands up behind his back while grinding his face into rocks and dirt.” (Compl., Dkt. 1 at pp. 2-5). Plaintiff alleges he was not resisting and was not armed. (Id.). Plaintiff also

alleges that Defendant Undersheriff Tyler Morris committed perjury at Plaintiff’s state court criminal trial. (Id. at pp. 2-3). 3. Discussion Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however, grant him twenty-eight (28) days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take into consideration the following. A. Standards of Law Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Governmental officials generally are not liable for damages in their individual capacities under § 1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“[E]ach Government

official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”). Section 1983 does not allow for recovery against an employer or principal simply because an employee or agent committed misconduct. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. To bring a § 1983 claim against a local governmental entity, such as the Benewah County Sheriff’s Office, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains, as required by Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under Monell, the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against such an entity are the following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to

plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001). An unwritten policy or custom must be so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled” practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Although Plaintiff cites the Eighth Amendment as the legal basis for his excessive force claims, that amendment applies only to convicted prisoners. At the time of his arrest, Plaintiff was not incarcerated. Thus, his excessive force claims must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard requires “balancing the nature and

quality of the intrusion on a person’s liberty with the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the “quantum of force” must be assessed. Second, the governmental interests at stake must be analyzed in light of the following factors: (1) the severity of the crime for which the plaintiff was arrested; (2) whether the plaintiff posed a threat to the safety of the officers or others; (3) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee; and (4) the availability of alternative methods of subduing the plaintiff. Id. A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint. Instead, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a

causal link between each defendant and plaintiff’s injury or damage. Alleging “the mere possibility of misconduct” is not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. B. Plaintiff’s Claims Based on Defendants’ Alleged Perjury Are Likely Barred by Heck v. Humphrey Plaintiff’s claims based on Defendants’ alleged perjury at Plaintiff’s trial appear to be subject to dismissal pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that a civil rights claim “is not cognizable under § 1983” if the plaintiff’s success would “render a conviction or sentence invalid.” Id. at 486-87. Thus, if a favorable verdict in a civil rights action “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of the plaintiff’s conviction, the plaintiff must first show that “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 487. As the Supreme Court later clarified, “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if

success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). Further, the Supreme Court has made it clear that when a state prisoner seeks “a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from . . . imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Accordingly, release from incarceration is not an available remedy in a § 1983 action. The Court will grant Plaintiff twenty-eight (28) days to amend his Complaint to show that his perjury-based claims are not barred by Heck. He should set forth how the alleged constitutional violations relate to his current incarceration. If Plaintiff believes that his claims, if successful,

would not imply the invalidity of his conviction, he must set forth detailed allegations regarding that conviction and explain his position. C. Plaintiff’s Excessive Force Claims under Federal and State Law Appear Untimely Plaintiff’s remaining claims, those asserting excessive force under federal and state law, are likely barred by the statute of limitations. In Idaho, the statute of limitations period for personal injury claims, as well as for § 1983 claims, is two years. See Idaho Code § 5-219; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1985) (holding that the statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims is the statute of limitations period for personal injuries in the state where the claim arose), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004). Though state law governs the limitations period for filing a § 1983 claim, federal law governs when that claim accrues, or arises. Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1994). Under the “discovery rule,” a claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury” that is the basis of the claim. Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, the statute of limitations begins to run when

the plaintiff becomes aware of the actual injury—not “when the plaintiff suspects a legal wrong.” Id. at 1049. If a plaintiff cannot show that his claim accrued during the statute of limitations period, he still may file a lawsuit beyond the limitations deadline if he can show that the statute should have been tolled (or paused) for a certain period of time during the deadline period within which he should have filed the lawsuit. State tolling law applies to § 1983 actions unless important federal policy will be undermined. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1975). Idaho law allows for statutory tolling of the statute of limitations for a person’s juvenile

status or insanity. Idaho Code § 5-230. However, because the Idaho Supreme Court has determined that “[s]tatutes of limitation in Idaho are not tolled by judicial construction but rather by the expressed language of the statute,” equitable tolling is not available in Idaho. Wilhelm v. Frampton, 158 P.3d 310, 312 (Idaho 2007). The doctrine of equitable estoppel, as opposed to equitable tolling, is available in Idaho. While it “does not ‘extend’ a statute of limitation,” equitable estoppel works in a similar manner to prevent a party who has falsely represented or concealed a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth “from pleading and utilizing the statute of limitations as a bar, although the time limit of the statute may have already run.” J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int’l, Inc., 887 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Idaho 1994), abrogated in part on other grounds by Day as Tr. of Tr. B of Donald M. Day & Marjorie D. Day Fam. Tr. v. Transportation Dep’t, 166 Idaho 293, 301, 458 P.3d 162, 170 (Idaho 2020). Equitable estoppel requires a showing of four elements: “(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the

false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice.” Id. at 1041. The events giving rise to Plaintiff’s excessive force claims occurred on August 26, 2021, meaning that any challenge must have been filed no later than August 26, 2023. However, Plaintiff did not file his Complaint in this action until December 15, 2023, at the earliest2—nearly four months too late. Plaintiff alleges that he did not realize he had been beaten until December 6, 2021. (Id. at p. 7). However, even if the Court were to give Plaintiff the benefit of a December 6, 2021 accrual date, the Complaint still was filed more than a week late. Therefore, Plaintiff’s excessive

force claims appear to be barred by the two-year statute of limitations. In any amended complaint, Plaintiff must include allegations establishing that his claims are timely or that equitable estoppel applies to excuse the untimely filing. 4. Standards for Amended Complaint If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625

2 Error! Main Document Only.Prisoners are usually entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox rule,” which provides that a legal document is deemed filed on the date the prisoner delivers it to the prison authorities for filing by mail, rather than the date the clerk actually receives it. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270–71 (1988); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the mailbox rule to civil rights actions). F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each Defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Ivey

v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Rather, for each cause of action against each Defendant, Plaintiff must state the following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the Defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the Defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular constitutional or statutory provision Plaintiff alleges has been

violated; (6) facts alleging the elements of the violation are met; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each Defendant. In addition, Plaintiff must include facts showing that he can meet the Monell requirements, described above, with respect to his claims against Benewah County; that Plaintiff’s perjury claims are not barred by Heck; and that his remaining claims are timely. Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court

erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint). Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate, numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as an “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff’s name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.” If he does not amend within twenty-eight (28) days, or if the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738

F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”). ORDER IT IS ORDERED: 1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has twenty-eight (28) days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. If he does so, he must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. Alternatively, he may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if he no longer intends to pursue this case.° 2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order. 3. Because an amended complaint is required for Plaintiff to proceed, his request for appointment of counsel (contained in the Complaint) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew the request for counsel in an amended complaint.

Za DATED: March 12, 2024

\ Qnande FS. Brubeck AUD, ) Amanda K. Brailsford 7, = ae” U.S. District Court Judge

3 A voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is not a dismissal for frivolity, for maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, does not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 11