Roger Pierce v. Kenneth S. Apfel

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedApril 20, 1999
Docket98-2139
StatusPublished

This text of Roger Pierce v. Kenneth S. Apfel (Roger Pierce v. Kenneth S. Apfel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roger Pierce v. Kenneth S. Apfel, (8th Cir. 1999).

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ___________

No. 98-2139 ___________

Roger Pierce, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner, * Social Security Administration, * * Appellee. * ___________

Submitted: December 16, 1998

Filed: April 20, 1999 ___________

Before FAGG, HEANEY, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges. ___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Roger Pierce appeals from the district court’s1 judgment affirming the denial of his application for social security disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. For reversal, Pierce argues that the hypothetical

1 The Honorable Jerry Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was submitted by consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). question posed to the vocational expert failed to accurately describe his mental impairments. We affirm.

I.

Pierce, who was born on September 16, 1942, was 49 years of age when he applied for benefits. He has a seventh-grade education. His past relevant work history includes work as a farmer and as a packer of shock absorbers. Pierce filed an application for disability insurance benefits on May 13, 1991, alleging a disability onset date of July 15, 1989. He claimed that he was disabled because of stress, anxiety, a nervous stomach, bodily aches, depression, and a right ankle metal plate and screw.

The Social Security Administration denied Pierce’s application originally and again on reconsideration. Pierce appealed, and the district court reversed and remanded his case for further administrative proceedings. A supplemental hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on October 2, 1995, and on May 30, 1996, Pierce’s application was again denied.

The ALJ evaluated Pierce’s claim according to the five-step analysis prescribed by the Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (describing the five-step process). The ALJ concluded that Pierce’s impairments did not meet or equal an impairment listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. The ALJ also found that Pierce could not return to his past relevant work as a farmer or packer. After considering the response of a vocational expert to a hypothetical question, the ALJ found that Pierce was not disabled.

The Appeals Council denied Pierce’s request for further review, and the ALJ’s decision thereby became the final decision of the Commissioner. Pierce subsequently

-2- appealed to the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, finding that substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s decision to deny Pierce disability benefits.

II.

Our role on review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Clark v. Apfel, 141 F.3d 1253, 1255 (8th Cir. 1998). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion. See Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993). In determining whether the existing evidence is substantial, “we must consider evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] decision as well as evidence that supports it.” Id. We may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision merely because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome. See Smith v. Shalala, 987 F.2d 1371, 1374 (8th Cir. 1993).

The ALJ found that Pierce retained the ability to occasionally lift and carry up to 25 pounds; stand and walk for four hours in an eight-hour work period, one without interruption; and sit for six hours in an eight-hour work period, two without interruption. Further, the ALJ concluded that Pierce could on occasion climb, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, crawl, reach, handle, feel, and that he could push or pull with slight impairment. The ALJ also found that Pierce had no impairment involving his ability to see, hear, or speak. See Admin. Tr. at 278. In evaluating Pierce’s mental impairments, the ALJ concluded:

He is likewise evaluated with good ability to follow work rules; relate to co-workers; deal with the public; use judgement; interact with supervisors; function independently; maintain attention/concentration; understand, remember, [and] carry out complex job instructions; maintain personal appearance; behave [in an] emotionally stable

-3- manner; relate predictably in social situations; and good ability to demonstrate reliability.

Finally, the claimant is assessed with a fair ability to deal with stresses and a very good ability to understand, remember, carry out simple job instructions and understand, remember, and carry out detailed but not complex job instructions.

Admin. Tr. at 278.

The ALJ posed a hypothetical question to a vocational expert that recounted the foregoing findings regarding residual functional capacity. The vocational expert testified that a person with the described physical and mental limitations could perfom a variety of sedentary jobs, such as manufacturing, of which 20,000 were available.

“Testimony from a VE based on a properly-phrased hypothetical question constitutes substantial evidence.” Roe v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1996). A proper hypothetical question presents to the vocational expert a set of limitations that mirror those of the claimant. See id. at 676. “Questions posed to a vocational expert should precisely set out the claimant’s particular physical and mental impairments.” Totz v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 727, 730 (8th Cir. 1992). Pierce contends that the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert failed to state precisely the extent of his mental limitations. He asserts that the mental limitations outlined in the hypothetical question are inconsistent with the findings of Dr. Tom Heisler, the Commissioner’s consulting psychologist, who noted on a medical assessment checklist that Pierce retained only a fair ability to function independently, to maintain attention and concentration, and to demonstrate reliability.2 Pierce argues that the

2 The Medical Assessment of Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Mental) provides the following definitions:

-4- ALJ is bound by Dr. Heisler’s findings. In Bentley v. Shalala, 52 F.3d 784, 786-87 (8th Cir. 1995), however, we stated that the government does not have to “live with” an expert’s conclusions simply because the government hired the expert to evaluate the claimant.

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