Rodylaidi Martinez Rodriguez v. Warden, Central Valley Annex, et al

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RODYLAIDI MARTINEZ RODRIGUEZ No. 1:26-cv-3681 DC CSK (A-208-165-222), 12 Petitioner, 13 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS v. 14 WARDEN, CENTRAL VALLEY 15 ANNEX, et al, 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Rodylaidi Martinez Rodriguez (A-208-165-222), an immigration detainee 19 proceeding without counsel, filed a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 20 § 2241. As discussed below, this Court recommends that his habeas petition be dismissed. 21 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 22 Petitioner is a 31 year old citizen and native of Cuba. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) In 2024, 23 petitioner entered the United States and was processed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 24 (Id.) On May 1, 2024, petitioner was paroled into the United States pending adjustment of status 25 for a period of two years. (ECF No. 6-1 at 2 (Form I-213).) 26 1 Petitioner filed a verified habeas petition. (ECF No. 1 at 10.) A court “may treat the 27 allegations of a verified . . . petition [for writ of habeas corpus] as an affidavit.” L. v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 28 1987)). Petitioner also submitted a separate declaration. (ECF No. 1 at 11-15.) 1 Petitioner claims he has not been convicted of any crime. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) On June 11, 2 2025, a complaint/arrest affidavit was issued against petitioner, charging him with felony false or 3 fraudulent insurance claims, second degree, in violation of Florida Statute § 817.234(1), and 4 felony grand theft, third degree, in violation of Florida Statute § 812.014(2)(c). (ECF No. 6-1 at 5 12; 6-2 at 1.) Respondents do not deny that petitioner has no criminal convictions, but contend 6 the grand theft charge is still pending.2 7 On June 12, 2025, an immigration detainer was issued for petitioner stating he is subject 8 to detention under the Laken Riley Act. (ECF No. 6-1 at 6 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(3)).) On 9 June 12, 2025, an immigration warrant for petitioner’s arrest was signed, but not served on 10 petitioner until March 26, 2026. (Id. at 5.) On March 26, 2026, petitioner was detained by the 11 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). (ECF No. 1 at 1.) 12 Petitioner was not provided a pre-detention hearing, and has not been provided a post- 13 deprivation individualized hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 2, 6.) Petitioner has been in continuous 14 detention since March 26, 2026. (Id. at 1.) 15 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 16 On May 13, 2026, petitioner filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion for 17 temporary restraining order. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On May 15, 2026, respondents timely filed an 18 opposition to the motion for temporary restraining order, and to the habeas petition. (ECF No. 6.) 19 On June 1, 2026, petitioner filed a reply. (ECF No. 7.) On June 5, 2026, the district court denied 20 the motion for temporary restraining order, holding that petitioner “has not demonstrated a 21 likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that his immigration detention violates his 22 statutory or constitutional rights.” (ECF No. 8.) The district court referred the habeas petition to 23

24 2 Respondents state that petitioner was accepted into a pretrial diversion program, and the case was taken off calendar shortly thereafter, referring to their exhibit 2 at 16-17. (ECF No. 6 at 2.) 25 However, respondents’ exhibit 2, which is an unofficial copy of the June 2025 complaint/arrest affidavit, only has 15 pages. (ECF No. 6-2.) Respondents’ exhibit 1 at 16-17 is a copy of the 26 May 2024 Notice to Appear. (ECF No. 6-1 at 16-17.) On the other hand, petitioner 27 acknowledges he “was accused of insurance-related fraud connected to a claim for medical or payment purposes” (ECF No. 1 at 11-12), but he did not address the status of this criminal case in 28 either his petition or his reply (ECF Nos. 1, 7, passim). 1 the undersigned. (ECF No. 11.) Briefing is complete. 2 III. LEGAL STANDARD 3 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 4 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 5 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 6 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 7 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 8 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 9 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 10 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 11 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s 12 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 13 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 14 IV. DISCUSSION 15 Petitioner challenges his continued and prolonged detention based on violation of the 16 following: (1) the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”); (2) the Fifth Amendment 17 procedural due process clause; and (3) the Eighth Amendment right to medical care and humane 18 treatment. (ECF No. 1 at 8-9.) Respondents argue that petitioner is detained pursuant to the 19 mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) because the pending grand theft 20 charge under Florida Statute 812.014(2)(c) renders him inadmissible and removable. (ECF No. 6 21 at 2-3.) Respondents further argue that this Court should find that because petitioner failed to 22 seek a Joseph hearing in immigration court, petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative 23 remedies and petitioner’s claim challenging his mandatory detention should be dismissed. (Id. at 24 3 (citing Matter of Joseph, 22 I & N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999).) Finally, respondents argue that 25 petitioner’s detention is not prolonged because at the time of their filing, petitioner had been 26 detained less than two months. (Id. at 4.) 27 A. Statutory Claim (Claim One) 28 In analyzing petitioner’s challenge to his detention, the court “must first identify the 1 statutory provision that purports to confer” authority for his detention. Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 2 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) “carves out a statutory category of 3 [noncitizens] who may not be released under § 1226(a),” mandating detention for an alien 4 apprehended under § 1226 “who falls into one of several enumerated categories involving 5 criminal offenses.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis in original). In 6 January 2025, the Laken Riley Act amended § 1226(c) to add a new category of noncitizens 7 ineligible for release under § 1226(a), including noncitizens deemed “inadmissible” for being 8 “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,” who are “charged with, is 9 arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing acts which 10 constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law 11 enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to another 12 person[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i), (ii). For purposes of these findings and 13 recommendations, this Court assumes that petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) 14 based on his June 11, 2025 arrest for felony grand theft.3 Pursuant to § 1226(c), “detention is 15 mandatory, and a noncitizen of the United States . . . therefore is not statutorily entitled to a bond 16 hearing.” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 529 (9th Cir. 2023); see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1); 17 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. 18 Respondents also argue that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to this 19 claim. (ECF No. 6 at 3.) 20 Section 2241 “does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before 21 filing petitions for habeas corpus.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004). 22 However, “[a]s a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available 23 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678 24 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Because exhaustion is not required by statute, it is not 25

26 3 As previously noted, the record does not reflect the outcome of petitioner’s June 11, 2025 arrest for grand theft, but petitioner does not rebut respondents’ claim that the charge remains pending. 27 Nevertheless, it is the arrest that triggers petitioner’s mandatory detention under the Laken Riley Act. 28 1 jurisdictional. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by 2 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995) (citing Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. CHG Int’l, Inc., 3 811 F.2d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir. 1987)). If a petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the 4 district court, in its discretion, may “determine whether to excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach 5 the merits or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in 6 court.” Id. “Courts may require prudential exhaustion if (1) agency expertise makes agency 7 consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of 8 the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and 9 (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude 10 the need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal 11 citation and quotation marks omitted). 12 Under the circumstances of this case, this Court finds that petitioner should not be excused 13 from exhausting administrative remedies. See Buckley v. Chestnut, 2026 WL 1030931, at *2-4 14 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2026) (court declined to waive the prudential exhaustion requirements 15 because petitioner’s appeal of his Matter of Jospeh hearing was pending). At a Joseph hearing, 16 petitioner “may avoid mandatory detention by demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not 17 convicted of the predicate crime, or that the INS is otherwise substantially unlikely to establish 18 that he is in fact subject to mandatory detention.” See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3 19 (2003) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(h)(2)(ii) (2002)). The Joseph hearing process enables petitioner to 20 challenge his mandatory detention under § 1226(c), and the immigration court has the expertise 21 necessary to develop the record and reach a proper decision. Relaxing the exhaustion 22 requirement under these circumstances would encourage others to bypass the administrative 23 exhaustion process. Finally, in this case administrative review is likely to allow the agency to 24 correct its own mistakes and thus avoid the need for judicial review. 25 “If a petitioner fails to exhaust prudentially required administrative remedies, then ‘a 26 district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the 27 proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies,’” unless exhaustion is excused. 28 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011)). Petitioner has provided no argument as to why exhaustion should be 2 excused under the circumstances of his case. (See ECF No. 7.) Therefore, this Court finds that 3 petitioner’s statutory claim challenging his mandatory detention should be dismissed without 4 prejudice based on petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 5 B. Prolonged Detention 6 For purposes of analyzing petitioner’s prolonged detention claim, this Court assumes that 7 petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1226(c). While the Supreme Court has rejected a facial 8 challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), an as 9 applied challenge is not foreclosed and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Demore 10 specifically noted that “since the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a 11 lawful permanent resident alien such as [Kim] could be entitled to an individualized 12 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became 13 unreasonable or unjustified.” Id. at 532. In addition, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has yet to take a 14 position on whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. 15 § 1226(c).” Loba L.M. v. Andrews, et al., 2025 WL 2939178, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025), 16 report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3187577 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025); see Avilez, 17 69 F.4th at 538 (declining to determine whether due process requires a bond hearing for 18 noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(c)). “Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to take a 19 position on whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. 20 § 1226(c), the First, Second, and Third Circuits have found that ‘the Due Process Clause imposes 21 some form of ‘reasonableness’ limitation upon the duration of detention . . . under [section 22 1226(c)].’” Loba L.M., 2025 WL 2939178, at *5 (quoting Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7 (1st 23 Cir. 2021); citing Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2024) (“conclud[ing] that a 24 noncitizen’s constitutional right to due process precludes his unreasonably prolonged detention 25 under section 1226(c) without a bond hearing”); German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. 26 Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that after Demore and Jennings, petitioners 27 detained pursuant to § 1226(c) can still bring as-applied challenges to their detention and that due 28 process affords them a bond hearing once detention becomes unreasonable)). “[E]ssentially all 1 district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending 2 removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, ‘will—at some point—violate the right to due 3 process.’” Martinez v. Clark, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019), report and 4 recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5962685 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019) (citation omitted); see 5 also Loba L.M., 2025 WL 2939178, at *5. This Court joins other courts that have found that 6 unreasonably prolonged detention pursuant to § 1226(c) without a bond hearing can violate due 7 process. See Keo v. Chestnut, et al., 2026 WL 747117, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2026); Loba 8 L.M., 2025 WL 2939178, at *5. 9 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life, 10 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is clear that 11 commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due 12 process protection.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). “[T]he Due Process Clause 13 applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is 14 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. “The Due Process 15 clause applies to noncitizens in this country in connection with removal proceedings, even if their 16 presence is unlawful or temporary.” Tinoco v. Noem, 2025 WL 3567862, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17 14, 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). 18 The court analyzes petitioner’s due process claim “in two steps: the first asks whether 19 there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines 20 the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with 21 the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing 22 Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). At the time petitioner 23 filed his petition, petitioner had been detained less than two months. In addition, at the time these 24 findings and recommendations are filed, petitioner has been detained for approximately three 25 months. 26 Because petitioner has been detained less than six months, this Court finds that petitioner 27 does not yet have a protected liberty interest in freedom from detention. Courts finding protected 28 liberty interests in freedom from detention have based their findings on detention longer than six 1 months. See Pacheco v. Warden, 2026 WL 1067486, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026), findings 2 and recommendations adopted, 2026 WL 1169236 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2026) (finding petitioner 3 detained for over one year pursuant to §1226(c) had protected liberty interest); Lopez v. Warden, 4 2026 WL 834573, at * 3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2026) (finding petitioner detained for over ten 5 months pursuant to § 1226(c) had protected liberty interest); Palencia v. Warden, 2026 WL 6 818580, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2026), findings and recommendations adopted, 2026 WL 7 939469 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2026) (finding petitioner detained for over eight months pursuant to 8 § 1226(c) had protected liberty interest); Keo, 2026 WL 747117, at *2 (concluding clear liberty 9 interest in freedom from detention where petitioner was detained pursuant to § 1226(c) for over 10 37 months). Because petitioner has not demonstrated a liberty interest based on his detention, the 11 petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed. See Rakeshkumar H.P. v. Warden, 2026 12 WL 1146201, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2026) (finding no liberty interest where petitioner 13 detained for a little over two months pursuant to § 1226(c)). 14 C. Petitioner’s Other Claim for Relief (Claim Three) 15 Because petitioner has not exhausted his remedies as to his statutory claim, and is not 16 entitled to relief on his due process claim, the Court does not address petitioner’s third claim. 17 V. CONCLUSION 18 Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 19 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT 20 PREJUDICE. 21 2. The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case and enter judgment for 22 respondents. 23 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 24 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 25 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 26 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 27 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 28 objections shall be filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties 1 | are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal 2 | the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 3 4 Dated: June 29, 2026 ry Ch Spo 5 CHI SOO KIM 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE /1/mart3681.FTE.2241.imm 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28