Rodriguez v. Noriega

CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJanuary 12, 2024
Docket0:23-cv-03911
StatusUnknown

This text of Rodriguez v. Noriega (Rodriguez v. Noriega) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rodriguez v. Noriega, (mnd 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Jesus Rafael Roman Rodriguez, File No. 23-cv-3911 (ECT/JFD)

Petitioner,

v. OPINION AND ORDER

Maria Luisa Sanchez Noriega,

Respondent.

Michael Boulette and Laura Elaine Kvasnicka of Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner Jesus Rafael Roman Rodriguez. ________________________________________________________________________ Petitioner Jesus Rafael Roman Rodriguez (“Father”) filed a verified Petition for Return of Child against Respondent Maria Luisa Sanchez Noriega (“Mother”), alleging that Mother removed their shared child from Mexico in violation of Father’s custody rights. ECF No. 1. Father alleges Mother and child are currently residing in Saint Paul, Minnesota. Father seeks a temporary restraining order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) that would, among other things, enjoin Mother from removing the child from Minnesota pending expedited proceedings on the Petition for Return. The motion will be granted because (1) Father has shown there is a significant risk that giving Mother notice of the motion would prompt her to remove the child from Minnesota and attempt to conceal their whereabouts, and (2) Father has shown that the Dataphase factors favor issuance of the requested temporary restraining order. I Father and Mother are the parents of minor child, R.R.S. Pet. [ECF No. 1] ¶ 4.

R.R.S. was born in Mexico in 2018 and resided there until her removal in 2021. Id. ¶¶ 4, 9, 17; Exs. A–B [ECF No. 1-1]. Father alleges that in May 2021, Mother removed R.R.S. from Mexico and brought her to the United States. Pet. ¶ 17. Mother and R.R.S. lived initially in Texas. Id. ¶ 24. Upon learning Mother and R.R.S. were in Texas, Father attempted to retain counsel in Texas who could represent him in seeking the child’s return. Id. Mother moved the child from Texas before Father was able to bring suit there. Id. In

June or July 2022, Father learned via Facebook that Mother and R.R.S. were residing in Saint Paul, Minnesota. Id. ¶ 25. Based on video calls with R.R.S., Father believes R.R.S. is enrolled in daycare in Saint Paul, and that Mother and R.R.S. continue to reside there. Id. ¶¶ 3, 16. Except for weekly video calls, Father has not seen R.R.S. since May 8, 2021. Id. ¶ 26. Mother has threatened that if Father continues to request or seek information

regarding her and R.R.S.’s location, Mother will cut off communication between Father and R.R.S. Id. ¶ 23. On December 29, 2023, Father filed a verified petition for return of R.R.S. pursuant to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague

Convention” or “Convention”),1 Oct. 25, 1980, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–11, and the Minnesota Uniform Child Custody

1 The United States and Mexico are signatories to the Convention. Status Table, Hague Conference on Private International Law, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table (last visited Jan. 11, 2024). and Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Minn. Stat. § 518D.101 et seq. Pet. ¶¶ 1, 31. That same day, Father filed an ex parte motion for an accelerated hearing and a request for a temporary restraining order. ECF No. 3. The motion for a temporary

restraining order primarily seeks to enjoin Mother from removing R.R.S. from Minnesota pending expedited proceedings on the Petition. On January 11, 2024, an ex parte hearing was held regarding the request for temporary restraining order. ECF No. 9. II Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) authorizes a district court to grant injunctive

relief in the form of a temporary restraining order. The Eighth Circuit’s familiar Dataphase decision describes the list of considerations applied to decide whether to grant this relief. Brooks v. Roy, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1049 n.6 (D. Minn. 2012) (“Courts in the Eighth Circuit apply the same standards to a request for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.”) (citing S.B. McLaughlin & Co. v. Tudor Oaks Condo. Project, 877 F.2d

707, 708 (8th Cir. 1989)). Dataphase requires consideration of: “(1) the likelihood of the movant’s success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant in the absence of relief; (3) the balance between that harm and the harm that the relief would cause to the other litigants; and (4) the public interest.” Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. Supp. 2d 950, 956 (D. Minn. 1999) (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109,

112–14 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)). “The burden of establishing the four factors lies with the party seeking injunctive relief.” CPI Card Grp., Inc. v. Dwyer, 294 F. Supp. 3d 791, 807 (D. Minn. 2018). Under Rule 65(b), a district court may issue a temporary restraining order without notice to the adverse party if:

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). Absent good cause for extension, a temporary restraining order issued without notice to the adverse party must expire within fourteen days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2). (A) The first Dataphase factor is likelihood of success on the merits. “While no single factor is determinative, the probability of success factor is the most significant.” Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As the petitioner, Father bears the initial burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the Convention. 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1)(A). The Convention provides that a child’s removal or retention is wrongful if “it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person . . ., either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention,” and if the petitioner was “actually exercis[ing]” those rights at the time. Barzilay v. Barzilay,

536 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Convention, art. 3). To establish a prima facie case for return under the Convention, Father must show three things: “First, he must show [Mexico] was [R.R.S.]’s habitual residence prior to removal . . . . Second, he must show the removal of [R.R.S.] violated his custody rights under [Mexican] law. Third, he must show he was exercising his parental rights before [R.R.S.] was removed.” Tsuruta v. Tsuruta,

Related

Barzilay v. Barzilay
600 F.3d 912 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Abbott v. Abbott
560 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 2010)
Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc.
640 F.2d 109 (Eighth Circuit, 1981)
Home Instead, Inc. v. David Florance
721 F.3d 494 (Eighth Circuit, 2013)
Barzilay v. Barzilay
536 F.3d 844 (Eighth Circuit, 2008)
Lexis-Nexis v. Beer
41 F. Supp. 2d 950 (D. Minnesota, 1999)
Brooks v. Roy
881 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (D. Minnesota, 2012)
Naoteru Tsuruta v. Sarah Tsuruta
76 F.4th 1107 (Eighth Circuit, 2023)

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