Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction

Opinion

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LUIS M. RODRIGUEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 48342)

Elgo, Seeley and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree, appealed following the granting of his petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court’s judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his criminal trial counsel, E, rendered ineffective assistance by, inter alia, failing to advise him to accept a plea offer from the state that called for three and one-half years of incarceration when he was exposed to a maximum of sixty years of incarceration had he been convicted after trial. Held:

The habeas court properly denied the petitioner’s habeas petition, as the court’s factual finding that the petitioner was not prejudiced by E’s advice regarding the state’s plea offers was not clearly erroneous in that it was based on the court’s rejection of the petitioner’s self-serving testimony and its decision to credit E’s testimony that he had advised the petitioner about the plea offers and the amount of prison time he could face if convicted, and the court’s finding that the petitioner had always maintained his innocence, did not want to accept a plea offer and was adamant on taking his case to trial was supported by E’s testimony and the transcripts of the petitioner’s plea proceedings.

Argued April 20—officially released September 1, 2026

Procedural History

Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Wagner, J.; thereafter, the petition was withdrawn in part; judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.

David B. Bachman, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner). Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, with whom were Jessica Dellaratta, certified legal intern, and, on the brief, Christian M. Watson, state’s attorney, and Silvina Bejleri, deputy assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. On the granting of his petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner, Luis M. Rodriguez, who had been convicted, following a jury trial, of various charges in connection with a sexual assault and sentenced to thirty years of incarceration, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged that his criminal trial counsel, Attorney Christopher Eddy, provided ineffective assistance. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly determined that (1) the advice provided by Attorney Eddy with respect to two plea offers presented to the petitioner was adequate and satisfied the constitutional requirement for effective assistance of counsel, (2) Attorney Eddy’s failure to advise the petitioner to accept a plea offer of three and one-half years of incarceration, when the petitioner was exposed to a maximum of sixty years of incarceration, constituted effective assistance of counsel, and (3) the petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice resulting from either alleged deficiency of Attorney Eddy. We agree with the habeas court’s determination that the petitioner did not prove that he was prejudiced by any ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

Our Supreme Court set forth the following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history of the petitioner’s underlying criminal trial in his direct appeal.1 “In the early morning, the victim2 was walking from her residence on Martin Luther King 1 The petitioner initially filed his direct appeal with this court, and the appeal subsequently was transferred to our Supreme Court.

2 “In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual assault, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.” State v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 178 n.1, 252 A.3d 811 (2020).

Drive in New Britain to a nearby convenience store. Near Lafayette and Beaver Streets, a gold, four door sedan with two male occupants stopped and asked the victim if she knew where they could buy cocaine. The victim told the men that she did not know, and they drove away. Less than five minutes later, the men returned, and one of them pulled the victim into the backseat with him. After driving for between ten and fifteen minutes, the vehicle stopped at an abandoned housing complex. The driver got into the backseat, and the victim sat between the two men. The victim testified that both men were Hispanic, one man ‘was kind of thin and the other one was kind of heavy,’ and both spoke Spanish to each other during the attack.

“After the men removed, or had the victim remove, her clothing, ‘[t]hey started putting their fingers . . . [i]nto [her] vagina’ against her will. The thin man engaged in forcible penile-vaginal intercourse with the victim, made her perform oral sex on him, and ‘was pretty much done with [her] within probably about five minutes . . . .’ The heavier man could not maintain an erection, and he forced the victim to perform oral sex and forcibly digitally penetrated her vagina. Thereafter, the heavier man pulled the victim out of the car by her hair and ejaculated while ‘rubbing his penis up against the inside of [the victim’s] thigh.’

“After the assault, the two men drove away, and the victim ‘walked quite a ways’ and came upon a house. The occupant of the house, Juanita Isaacs, testified that the victim banged on her door and asked Isaacs for help, telling her that she had been raped. Isaacs called the police, Officer Alan Vincent Raynis, Jr., of the New Britain Police Department responded, and the victim told him what happened. Raynis took the victim back to the scene of the crime, where he took several photographs and seized a pair of jeans, a sports brassiere, and panties.

“The victim was transported to New Britain General Hospital, where she was examined, and a sexual assault evidence kit was processed. The examining nurse swabbed the victim’s vaginal and oral cavities, the exterior surface of her genitalia, and her inner thigh to collect any biological material that could be used to identify the perpetrators. Raynis collected the kit and submitted it to the state forensic laboratory [laboratory] for analysis. Thereafter, the victim provided the police with a sworn, written statement regarding the incident.

“The laboratory staff found sperm in the vaginal smear and genital swabs. The staff did not find sperm on the oral sample, but other tests revealed the presence of human seminal fluid protein. The laboratory staff extracted DNA from the evidentiary materials and searched it against DNA contained in the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).3 No matching profiles were found.

“Approximately ten years later, the [petitioner] became a person of interest in the sexual assault based on a CODIS match between the evidentiary DNA sample that had been extracted from the victim’s sexual assault evidence kit and a sample of the [petitioner’s] DNA that had been placed into CODIS at some point after the victim’s assault. In August, 2016, a detective from the New Britain Police Department interviewed the [petitioner]. The detective informed the [petitioner] that he was a suspect in a sexual assault involving two men and a woman. The [petitioner] denied having had sex in a threesome, which he described as disgusting, and said he did not allow women in his car. The [petitioner] also described to the police vehicles that he previously owned, which did not include a gold, four door sedan, and informed the police that he currently did not have any car registered in his name. The [petitioner] then consented to the taking of a buccal swab, which the police submitted to the laboratory for analysis. 3 “CODIS contains DNA profiles from unsolved crimes and compares them to known samples from convicted felons that are periodically added to the database. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 128 Conn. App. 846, 852–53 n.3, 19 A.3d 678, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 907, 32 A.3d 961 (2011).” State v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 180 n.2, 252 A.3d 811 (2020).

“Several months later, the laboratory reported a match between the DNA from the [petitioner’s] buccal swab and that taken from the victim’s sexual assault evidence kit. In December, 2016, the police again spoke with the [petitioner]. The detective informed the [petitioner] that his DNA was found in the vaginal sample from the victim. Contrary to his previous statement to the police, the [petitioner] admitted that he did have a threesome on two occasions in hotels in Plainville and on the Berlin Turnpike. He stated that one incident involved a ‘skinny, Puerto Rican’ girl and occurred when he picked up a man and a woman near an AutoZone store and dropped them off at a store on Broad Street in New Britain. The detective also informed the [petitioner] that, in addition to the assault, the victim complained of being robbed of several hundred dollars, and the [petitioner] replied with words to the effect of: ‘That’s not me. It’s the other guy.’ ” (Footnotes in original.) State v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 178–81, 252 A.3d 811 (2020).

The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The petitioner was arrested on February 6, 2017, and charged in an information dated February 7, 2017, with one count of sexual assault in the first degree, to which he entered a plea of not guilty. In a pretrial proceeding before the court, Keegan, J., on August 1, 2017, Attorney Eddy indicated that there had been pretrial discussions pertaining to the case that morning and that he had discussed plea offers with the petitioner, and he requested a continuance for the petitioner to have time to consider the offers. The matter was continued to August 29, 2017, at which time Attorney Eddy indicated to the court that the petitioner was rejecting the plea offers, and the court canvassed the petitioner, who maintained his innocence.4 4 Specifically, the following discussion took place on the record before the court, Keegan, J.: “[Attorney Eddy]: Your Honor, [the petitioner] would like to reject the state’s offer and place the case on the firm jury list. “The Court: Okay, can we just go over what the offer is and [what’s] being rejected? “[The Prosecutor]: The offer contemplated, Your Honor, a plea to sexual

Subsequent to the August 29, 2017 pretrial proceeding and prior to trial, the state amended the information (operative information) to charge the petitioner with three counts: in counts one and two, the petitioner was charged with sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1), and, in count three, assault in the first degree under subsection (a) (1), three and [one-half] years to serve, followed by seven years of special parole. It was Judge Alexander’s offer. That offer did not contemplate a two year minimum/ mandatory based on the age of the alleged victim. He would face a twenty year maximum with the same two year minimum/mandatory.

“The Court: Okay, [petitioner] I understand that you’re rejecting the offer today that Judge Alexander made. I just want to go over with you what that offer was and to make sure you understand at trial what you potentially face as a maximum penalty, okay?

“[The Petitioner]: Yup. “The Court: All right, so, you’re charged with sexual assault in the first degree, and the state . . . rather, Judge Alexander, made an offer of three and [one-half] years to serve, which includes a two year mandatory minimum followed by seven years of special parole. Are you familiar with special parole?

“[The Petitioner]: No. . . . “Attorney Eddy: Well, Your Honor, I did discuss the parameters of the agreement. My notes also reflect there was an alternative offer of twelve years suspended after three and [one-half] followed by ten years of probation, but our position is he is factually innocent of this crime.

“The Court: Okay, so, you understand now that the charge of sexual assault in the first degree under [§] 53a-70 (a) (1), which is the actual statute number that you’re charged with, carries a potential of twenty years’ incarceration, two years of which is a mandatory minimum, and it carries a potential maximum of thirty-five years of probation. Okay?

“[The Petitioner]: All right. “The Court: So, I understand that you’re telling me you’re pursuing that you are factually innocent of [the charge], but I have a duty to inform you about the risks of conviction after trial, okay?

“[The Petitioner]: Yup. “The Court: Have you discussed those with [Attorney] Eddy? “[The Petitioner]: Yes. “The Court: And, even after discussing those, you still wish to pursue your trial right?

“[The Petitioner]: Yes. “The Court: All right, you wish me to inquire any further? “[The Prosecutor]: No, Your Honor, thank you. “The Court: All right, I will place this matter then on the firm jury list, and we won’t see you back here in court on a date until we get to that trial, okay? . . .

“[The Petitioner]: Yes . . . .”

he was charged with attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-70 (a) (1). Specifically, count one charged that the petitioner had compelled sexual intercourse with the victim by the use of force by “using his superior physical strength to engage in non-consensual digital penetration of her vagina”; count two charged that the petitioner had compelled sexual intercourse with the victim by the use of force by “using his superior physical strength to force her to perform fellatio to get him aroused”; and count three charged that he had acted “with the intent to commit [s]exual [a]ssault in the first degree” by “forcibly rubbing his flaccid penis against [the victim’s] vagina while trying to penetrate her, until he ejaculated . . . .”

On March 5, 2018, counsel and the petitioner appeared before the court, Alexander, J., at which time Attorney Eddy stated: “We’re scheduled for jury selection tomorrow , and he would still like to have his trial.” Thereafter, the following discussion took place:

“The Court: Okay. So, [petitioner], your charge was on the sole count of sexual assault in the first degree, and the person was not a minor. Is that correct?

“[The Prosecutor]: That is correct. [The victim was] an adult, Your Honor.

“The Court: So, the sentencing range if you’re convicted after trial is not less than two years, up to twenty years to serve. Do you understand that’s the sentencing range?

“[The Petitioner]: Yes. “The Court: Your plea agreement was alternative offers. You could have three and [one-half] years to serve, with that two year mandatory minimum, followed by seven years of special parole, or twelve years, suspended after three and [one-half] years, with a ten year period of probation. Was that your understanding of the offers?

“[The Petitioner]: Yes. “The Court: Do you want to take either one of those offers?

“[The Petitioner]: No. “The Court: You want to have your trial. “[The Petitioner]: Yes. “The Court: Okay. So . . . [y]ou’ll start picking a jury tomorrow. . . .

“[The Prosecutor]: Judge, I do want the court’s canvass to be clear. The state has charged three counts of sexual assault in the first degree in its long form information for trial. They were separate and distinct acts that were alleged as part of the whole package, so his total exposure at the maximum end would actually be sixty years if he were convicted on all three.

“The Court: Okay. Because the state has alleged distinct conduct, our law recognizes the different manners in which a sexual assault can happen, even if it arises out of a single incident. And, with respect to it, as the state has now corrected, if you’re convicted of all counts after trial, your maximum penalty is sixty years with six years being mandatory minimum. Are you clear on that?

“[The Petitioner]: I have to talk to my attorney. “The Court: Do you want a second? “[The Petitioner]: Yeah. . . . “The Court: Okay. . . . Here, [the state has] three counts, and your maximum penalty would be up to sixty years to serve and six year mandatory minimum, and that would be if the court imposed the maximum on each and added each count to each other, so that’s how you get to the maximum penalty. You let me know what you want to do, okay?

“[The Petitioner]: All right.”

At that time, the court passed on the petitioner’s case, which provided the petitioner with an opportunity to discuss the amended charges and maximum penalties for those charges with Attorney Eddy. When the matter was recalled by the court, the court stated: “We passed the matter because the state did indicate today that it was charging three distinct forms of sexual assault in the first degree, so, the court had to advise [the petitioner] that if he is convicted after trial, a court could impose up to sixty years.” The court then asked if the petitioner had “enough time to talk to Attorney Eddy,” to which the petitioner replied, “[y]es, I did.” The court asked if the petitioner understood that he was facing sixty years if convicted, and the petitioner stated, “[y]es, I understand.” Finally, the court asked the petitioner if he wanted a plea agreement or a trial, and the petitioner responded that he wanted a trial. Jury selection began the next day, and the trial commenced on March 14, 2018.

At trial, through the testimony of Angela Przech, a forensic science examiner with the laboratory, the state introduced a laboratory report dated December 16, 2016, which indicated that vaginal swabs taken from the victim “had been separated into sperm-rich and epithelial-rich fractions. The report concluded that the sperm-rich fraction of the vaginal swabs was a mixture, and the [petitioner] ‘is included as a potential contributor to the DNA profile . . . .’ [That report also] . . . concluded that the ‘expected frequency of individuals who could be a contributor to the DNA profile . . . from [the sperm-rich fraction of the vaginal swabs] is . . . approximately 1 in 230,000 in the Hispanic population.’ The report was . . . signed by Przech, as the analyst, and a technical reviewer.

“At trial, Przech testified regarding the procedures used to test the DNA evidence and the results contained in her three reports. . . . Przech further testified that, in 2016, the New Britain Police Department submitted a known buccal swab of a suspect in the case to the laboratory for comparison with the evidentiary DNA that had been extracted in 2007. She explained that, rather than having an analyst physically process the [petitioner’s] buccal swab, the laboratory processed it via ‘an automated procedure’ in which ‘a robot’ extracts and processes DNA from the known buccal sample. Przech compared the [petitioner’s] DNA profile to the profiles that had been extracted from the evidentiary swabs in 2007 and concluded that the [petitioner] was a ‘potential contributor’ to the DNA mixture that had been extracted from the sperm-rich fraction of the vaginal swabs.

“Przech testified that the December, 2016 report set forth her conclusions regarding the comparison of the [petitioner’s] buccal swab and the DNA taken from the sexual assault evidence kit. . . . Following the trial, the jury found the [petitioner] guilty on all counts. The [petitioner] was sentenced to a total effective sentence of thirty years [of] incarceration.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Rodriguez, supra, 337 Conn. 182–84.

On October 28, 2020, the petitioner, in a self-represented capacity, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus . Subsequently, in May 2023, with the assistance of counsel, he filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus (operative petition). In his operative petition, the petitioner alleged the denial of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. In particular, he alleged that Attorney Eddy had rendered ineffective assistance in failing, inter alia, (1) to meaningfully convey to the petitioner a plea offer of three and one- half years, followed by seven years of special parole, and an alternative plea offer of twelve years, execution suspended after three and one-half years, followed by ten years of probation, (2) to adequately explain to the petitioner the relative strengths and weaknesses of the state’s case and of the theories of defense pursued at trial, the maximum exposure on each charge, the probability of success at trial, the nature and strength of the forensic evidence, the likely witnesses for the state and their probable testimony, and the significant probability of a far greater sentence resulting from a conviction following a trial, and (3) to provide the petitioner with affirmative advice regarding whether the petitioner should accept one of the plea offers.5 A habeas trial was held on June 17, 2024, at which the court heard testimony from Przech; Eric Carita, a forensic consultant; Attorney Eddy; and the petitioner. The court also admitted into evidence a number of exhibits offered by the petitioner, including his criminal court file, DNA reports, a statement from the victim, a police report and transcripts from the underlying criminal trial. The testimony before the habeas court can be summarized as follows. Przech testified consistently with her testimony at the petitioner’s criminal trial. She also testified that, in her final report dated December 16, 2016, the petitioner “was included as a potential contributor to the DNA profile” generated from the sample taken from the vaginal swabs of the victim, which was designated as sample 1CB. Przech testified further that she had met with Attorney Eddy on February 26, 2018, during which time they discussed statistics, details of the DNA profiles, the amount of DNA present in sample 1CB, and the fact that she had to process that sample further in 2016 in accordance with new procedures and auditing guidelines so that she could “interpret the data in a proper manner” and “get a more thorough profile.” Carita testified that he did not find any issues with the protocols that were used in the DNA testing in this case and that the results of the DNA testing were reliable. 5 The petitioner also alleged in the operative petition that Attorney Eddy had rendered deficient performance in failing to employ a Spanishspeaking interpreter, “to employ the assistance of a mental health professional to ensure that the petitioner could understand and retain the information and advice provided by counsel,” to utilize a DNA expert, and to investigate and “advise the petitioner concerning the possibility of presenting evidence [pertaining to the victim’s] sexual history at trial . . . .” The petitioner’s counsel withdrew the allegation regarding the mental health professional during his closing argument at the habeas trial. The habeas court denied the operative petition as to the remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the petitioner does not challenge the court’s decision as to those claims. Accordingly, they are not at issue in this appeal.

In his testimony, Attorney Eddy confirmed that he had engaged in pretrial discussions about the plea offers concerning the petitioner. He recalled the petitioner having been given alternative offers from the trial court, both of which involved a period of incarceration and would have required sex offender treatment and lifetime registration as a sex offender. When asked if the court, during the pretrial discussions, had expressed an indication that it would accept either disposition, he responded, “I believe so.” He stated his belief that “the state and the court made those offers as a way of inducing [the petitioner] to plead guilty to eliminate the need for [the victim] to have to testify.” According to Attorney Eddy, he “communicated [the offers] to [the petitioner] on more than one occasion and did so in person with [his] investigator present . . . .”6 At the time he did so, Attorney Eddy “displayed the audio/video interview or interviews that [the petitioner had] provided to New Britain police. And then, in addition . . . [he] met with [the petitioner] with Attorney Joe Lopez, who speaks Spanish . . . .” Attorney Eddy clarified that the offers, which were originally made and rejected in August 2017, were held open and that the petitioner could have pleaded guilty after that time if he had wanted to do so. He qualified that statement, however, noting that, “through [his] meetings with the petitioner as well as the statements [the petitioner had] provided to the New Britain Police Department, [the petitioner] always denied his involvement in this incident.” Attorney Eddy also stated that, at times, he did utilize the services of an interpreter but that the petitioner was bilingual and spoke English and Spanish, and that he never had difficulties communicating with the petitioner. He testified, however, that the petitioner had a poor memory and later was evaluated and determined to be “of borderline intelligence.” When asked whether it seemed that the petitioner understood “the gravity of 6 Specifically, Attorney Eddy testified that he “would have met with [the petitioner] on each and every court date that he attended,” and that he also had “evidence of at least two professional visits that would have taken place” at either the courthouse or the correctional institution in which the petitioner was incarcerated at that time.

the situation that he was in,” Attorney Eddy responded: “Well, thinking back now, I don’t think he did. At the time, nothing stuck out to me.”

Attorney Eddy testified that he had reviewed the evidence with the petitioner, including the victim’s statement , that he had explained to the petitioner his opinion that her allegations supported multiple charges of sexual assault, and that he went over the amended charges against the petitioner with him. When asked what, if anything, he related to the petitioner about the DNA evidence in this case prior to proceeding to trial, Attorney Eddy stated: “I would have indicated that his DNA was a mixture in the vaginal swab[s] and that he was eliminated from being the [contributor] of the sperm that was located on the inner thigh . . . .” Attorney Eddy testified that the petitioner had “never indicated a willingness to plead guilty. I mean, I’m not going to force someone to go to trial, but, you know, I can’t make him plead guilty either.” Attorney Eddy stated further: “[T]he nature of our [pretrial] discussions focused primarily on the DNA because there was no evidence other than the DNA to establish identity. And, maybe I evaluated this wrongly, but there was DNA that excluded [the petitioner]. So, I believe the jury disregarded that argument because there was evidence in terms of DNA that would have eliminated [the petitioner] from doing what [the victim] said he did. . . . So, [the victim] claims to have been sexually assaulted by two males, one thin male, one heavyset male. The state was very specific in [its] charging that [the petitioner] . . . was the heavyset male. . . . And, the heavyset male was alleged to have deposited semen where the sperm is located on her inner thigh. . . . That testing was done on that sample from the inner thigh, and [the petitioner] was eliminated. So, it was a single source profile from that semen stain, and [the petitioner] was eliminated.” With respect to the statements made by the petitioner during his police interviews, Attorney Eddy testified that he had advised the petitioner that those statements could be or would be introduced into evidence against him at trial.

Attorney Eddy testified that he had told the petitioner that, “if he was found guilty, he would get north of the three [and] one-half [years],” and he provided a ballpark of “something in the teens.” Attorney Eddy confirmed that, in their discussions, the petitioner was not amenable to pleading guilty and that the petitioner’s “perspective was that he was innocent.” Attorney Eddy also was asked what, if anything, he had advised the petitioner about his assessment of the strength of the state’s case, to which he replied: “Well, again, hindsight is 20/20, but I thought the fact that he was eliminated from depositing the DNA where she maintains he would have—[where] his DNA would have been found—okay. So, the scientific evidence would have indicated that some other heavyset Hispanic male ejaculated on her inner thigh. He was eliminated from that person.” When asked whether he had “provide[d] the petitioner with any advice” concerning the advisability of proceeding to trial, Attorney Eddy stated: “I left the decision up to him.” He also testified that he could not recall having a discussion with the petitioner regarding his chances of success at a trial, in terms of percentages.

On cross-examination, Attorney Eddy was questioned regarding the plea offers and his discussions with the petitioner relating to those offers, and he indicated that he had communicated the offers to the petitioner multiple times, that he went over the pros and cons of taking an offer versus going to trial, that he explained the evidence against the petitioner that the state would be offering, including the videos of the petitioner’s police interviews, the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s DNA evidence, the witnesses against him, the state’s burden of proof, the maximum exposure for each charge against the petitioner, and the petitioner’s probability of success at trial. Attorney Eddy also gave the petitioner time to think about the offers, but, ultimately, the petitioner did not want to plead guilty. As a result, the petitioner decided to proceed to trial and maintained his innocence throughout. In fact, Attorney Eddy met with the petitioner on the eve of trial and confirmed, again, that the petitioner still wanted to go to trial. On redirect examination, Attorney Eddy could not recall whether he had had any discussion with the petitioner concerning the statistic in the December 2016 DNA report that “the ‘expected frequency of individuals who could be a contributor to the DNA profile . . . from [the sperm-rich fraction of the vaginal swabs] [to which the petitioner was found to be a contributor was] . . . approximately 1 in 230,000 in the Hispanic population.’ ”

In his testimony, the petitioner stated that he did not understand the plea offers. When asked if he had any discussions with Attorney Eddy regarding the plea offers, the petitioner testified: “What he told me was to choose the jury because it was possible that he could win the case, for me to not worry. What I was able to understand was that I would not be guilty; it was possible for him to win the case.” The petitioner acknowledged that Attorney Eddy had discussed the accusations with him, as well as the DNA evidence and potential defenses, and that Attorney Eddy had advised him that there was “a great possibility” of the petitioner succeeding at trial. When asked, however, what advice, if any, Attorney Eddy had given him regarding the likely sentence he would receive if he lost at trial, the petitioner stated, “[n]o advice at all.” The petitioner responded, “[y]es,” when asked whether it would have changed his decision about going to trial if he had been advised that the state could bring additional charges against him. The petitioner also testified that Attorney Eddy did not discuss with him the maximum amount of prison time that he could receive if he were convicted of the charges, stating that Attorney Eddy “was focused on winning the case . . . .” He testified further that, when he returned to court in March 2018 and rejected the plea offers, he did not know that the state had brought additional charges against him and did not find out about those charges until “[a]fter he lost the jury.” According to the petitioner, Attorney Eddy never discussed the additional charges with him and, if he had, it would have impacted the petitioner’s decision to go to trial. He testified: “I wouldn’t have gone to trial because I know I would have lost . . . [b]ecause it’s more charges.” The petitioner testified further that Attorney Eddy never gave him advice about what plea offer he should take or whether he should go to trial, and that if Attorney Eddy had advised him to consider taking the three and one-half year offer, he would have taken it.

On cross-examination, the petitioner testified that he had told Attorney Eddy that he was innocent all throughout the trial. The petitioner acknowledged that he had lied to the police when, in his first statement, he stated that he did not take part in threesomes. When the petitioner was asked, “[d]id you tell your attorney that it was you,” he replied: “What I told the attorney was that I didn’t remember who the lady was. I didn’t say to the attorney that it was not me.” The prosecutor then asked, “[s]o, it could have been you,” and the petitioner replied, “[y]es,” but that he didn’t remember and that “[m]aybe [he] was drunk . . . .” When the prosecutor asked the petitioner whether Attorney Eddy had told him “that the judge made an offer of three and one-half years,” the petitioner replied, “[y]es,” but that he did not want to take the offer and wanted to go to trial in light of Attorney Eddy’s advice about the “high chance” of winning at trial.

In its memorandum of decision filed October 1, 2024, the habeas court denied the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding that the petitioner had failed to sustain his burden of establishing either deficient performance or prejudice. Specifically, the court found “that the petitioner failed to prove that Attorney Eddy’s performance in advising the petitioner as to the plea offers was deficient. Attorney Eddy testified credibly that he advised the petitioner regarding the parameters of the plea offers in addition to the state’s evidence against him, the charges and the exposure the petitioner faced, and the probability of the petitioner’s success at trial so that the petitioner could make his own informed decision. The record also reveals that the petitioner was granted ample time to consider the plea offers, and the trial court fully canvassed the petitioner on his decision to reject them. This court does not credit the petitioner’s testimony that he did not understand the plea offers but failed to ask for further explanation. Under the facts of this case, the court cannot find Attorney Eddy’s performance to be deficient. “Moreover, the petitioner failed to prove prejudice by demonstrating that a reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would have accepted one of the plea offers had Attorney Eddy explained the offers further. The credible evidence indicates that the petitioner maintained his innocence and was adamant on taking his case to trial. The petitioner’s testimony indicates that, with the benefit of hindsight, he regrets not accepting a plea offer because he would now be close to finishing his sentence. Such evidence fails to sustain the petitioner’s burden of proving prejudice. As a result, these claims must also be denied.” Subsequently, the court granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal, and this appeal followed.

Before we address the merits of the claims raised by the petitioner on appeal, we set forth relevant legal principles that guide our analysis and the applicable standard of review. “ ‘Under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 1, 29, 188 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1068, 139 S. Ct. 788, 202 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2019). ‘Given the centrality of plea bargaining to the efficient administration of the criminal justice system, defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the [s]ixth [a]mendment [to the United States constitution ] requires in the criminal process at critical stages. Because ours is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials . . . it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process. . . . In today’s criminal justice system, therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant.’ . . . Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, 338 Conn. 330, 339–40, 258 A.3d 40 (2021). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)] by ‘demonstrating that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense because there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had it not been for the deficient performance.’ ” Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, 343 Conn. 347, 354–55, 273 A.3d 680 (2022).

“[T]o satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test when the ineffective advice of counsel has led a defendant to reject a plea offer, the habeas petitioner must show [1] that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), [2] that the court would have accepted its terms, and [3] that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed. . . . These factors focus on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process . . . and the ultimate conviction or sentence imposed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vivo v. Commissioner of Correction, 233 Conn. App. 54, 60–61, 337 A.3d 1203, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 907, 343 A.3d 503 (2025); see also Bonds v. Commissioner of Correction, 223 Conn. App. 645, 654, 309 A.3d 411 (for petitioner to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s performance during plea negotiations, petitioner must establish that “there was a reasonably probability that— but for the deficient performance—the petitioner would have accepted the plea offer, and that the trial court would have assented to the plea offer” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 956, 310 A.3d 380 (2024).

“Furthermore . . . the specific underlying question of whether there was a reasonable probability that a habeas petitioner would have accepted a plea offer but for the deficient performance of counsel is one of fact, which will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Martinez v. Commissioner of Correction, [221 Conn. App. 852, 865–66, 303 A.3d 1196 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 939, 307 A.3d 273 (2024)]; see Bonds v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 223 Conn. App. 655–56 (explaining that clearly erroneous standard of review applies to factual question of whether there was reasonable probability that petitioner would have accepted plea offer in absence of deficient performance of counsel); see also Ebron v. Commissioner of Correction, 307 Conn. 342, 351, 53 A.3d 983 (2012) ([t]he habeas court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous . . .), cert. denied sub nom. Arnone v. Ebron, 569 U.S. 913, 133 S. Ct. 1726, 185 L. Ed. 2d 802 (2013).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 228 Conn. App. 701, 712–13, 324 A.3d 837, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 929, 326 A.3d 250 (2024); see also Grant v. Commissioner of Correction, 354 Conn. 30, 40, 348 A.3d 463 (2026) (“[t]he habeas court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 343 Conn. 357–58

(“Because it is the [habeas] court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine whether the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the [habeas] court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

“It is well settled that [a] reviewing court can find against a petitioner on either [prong of Strickland], whichever is easier.” (Internal quotation marks omitted .) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 228 Conn. App. 713; see also Maia v. Commissioner of Correction, 347 Conn. 449, 460 n.4, 298 A.3d 588 (2023). In the present case, the court denied the habeas petition on the ground that the petitioner had failed to show both deficient performance and prejudice. Because we conclude that the petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by Attorney Eddy’s allegedly deficient performance, we need not reach the question of whether Attorney Eddy’s performance was, in fact, deficient.7 See Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 7 Although we need not address the petitioner’s various claims of deficient performance by Attorney Eddy, we note, nonetheless, that the record belies the petitioner’s contention concerning one of the claimed deficiencies by Attorney Eddy, namely, that Attorney Eddy had never informed him “of the possible disparity between the [three and one-half] year sentence (plus special parole or probation) [in the plea offer] and the sentence he could expect if he lost at trial.” Attorney Eddy testified that he had advised the petitioner of the maximum exposure he would have if he lost at trial, and the court specifically credited that testimony. See Martinez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 221 Conn. App. 868 (“As an appellate court, we do not reevaluate the credibility of testimony, nor will we do so in this case. The habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. . . . [W]e must defer to the [trier of fact’s] assessment of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Moreover, the transcript from the March 5, 2018 pretrial proceeding and the trial court’s canvass of the petitioner establish that, when the court informed the petitioner that he could receive up to sixty years of incarceration, six of which was a mandatory minimum, if he were to be convicted after a trial, the supra, 713–14; see also Dixon v. Commissioner of Correction , 233 Conn. App. 851, 858, 342 A.3d 260, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 918, 345 A.3d 808 (2025).

“In assessing whether a petitioner has met his burden, a habeas court, as the finder of fact, must assess whether to believe all, none, or some of the testimony presented. See, e.g., Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, [supra, 343 Conn. 367]. The habeas court ‘is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible.’ . . . Echeverria v. Commissioner of Correction , 193 Conn. App. 1, 15 n.6, 218 A.3d 1116, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 947, 219 A.3d 376 (2019); see also Bowens v. Commissioner of Correction, 333 Conn. 502, 523, 217 A.3d 609 (2019).

“An appellate court ‘does not retry the case or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, [the reviewing court] must defer to the [habeas court’s] assessment of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude.’ . . . Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 631, 643, 153 A.3d 1264 (2017); accord Sanchez v. Commissioner of Correction, 314 Conn. 585, 604, 103 A.3d 954 (2014). A habeas court’s pure credibility determination is unassailable, and we will not disturb it on appeal. See Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 325 Conn. 640, 694, 159 A.3d 1112 (2017); Orcutt v. Commissioner of Correction, 284 Conn. 724, 741, 937 A.2d 656 (2007). ‘Because it is the [habeas] court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine whether the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the [habeas] court’s ruling .’ . . . Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, court provided the petitioner with an opportunity to discuss that with Attorney Eddy. The petitioner subsequently informed the court on the record that he had been given adequate time to discuss the matter with his attorney, that he understood the maximum penalty to which he was subjected, and that he, nevertheless, wanted to proceed to trial.

343 Conn. 357–58. Thus, the habeas judge’s credibility determinations and findings are entitled to deference from this court and cannot be disregarded unless they are clearly erroneous.” Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction , 354 Conn. 825, 835–36, 358 A.3d 983 (2026).

In the present case, Attorney Eddy testified that, “through [his] meetings with the petitioner as well as the statements [the petitioner had] provided to the New Britain Police Department, [the petitioner had] always denied his involvement in this incident,” that the petitioner had “never indicated a willingness to plead guilty,” that the petitioner was not amenable to pleading guilty, and that the petitioner’s “perspective was that he was innocent.” The habeas court, in finding that “[t]he credible evidence indicates that the petitioner maintained his innocence and was adamant on taking his case to trial,” necessarily credited that testimony and rejected the petitioner’s contrary testimony that he would have accepted a plea offer if he had been advised properly by Attorney Eddy, which was the only evidence offered by the petitioner in support of his claim of prejudice.

Because the habeas court’s factual finding of no prejudice was made on the basis of its credibility determination , to which this court must defer, we cannot conclude that the habeas court’s finding that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by Attorney Eddy’s allegedly deficient performance is clearly erroneous .8 The court’s finding is supported by the testimony of Attorney Eddy, which it specifically credited, and “it was within the purview of the habeas court to disbelieve 8 The petitioner maintains that certain other allegedly clearly erroneous findings of the habeas court—that Attorney Eddy had reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s evidence with the petitioner and the probability of success at trial, and had informed the petitioner of the sentence he could expect if he lost at trial—cast doubt on its finding that he “was not prejudiced by any ineffective assistance because he ‘maintained his innocence and was adamant on taking his case to trial.’ ” The petitioner asserts that, “[w]hile there is evidence on the record to support this finding, the court never considered the effect [on the petitioner] of Attorney Eddy’s optimism with respect to [the petitioner’s] chances at trial . . . . Of course [the petitioner] was the petitioner’s self-serving testimony.” Lane v. Commissioner of Correction, 129 Conn. App. 593, 599, 20 A.3d 1265 (2011).

Our conclusion is supported by recent decisions from this court in Vivo v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 233 Conn. App. 64, and Dixon v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 233 Conn. App. 861, both of which involved circumstances similar to the present case. In Vivo, the petitioner claimed on appeal that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance “by failing to adequately advise him regarding certain plea offers” and, citing Maia v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347 Conn. 472–73, that “trial counsel had an affirmative obligation to advise [the petitioner] to accept the plea offers.” Vivo v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 58. The petitioner asserted similar claims with respect to his prior habeas counsel. Id. The habeas court in Vivo dismissed the claims pertaining to trial counsel; id., 58 n.3; and denied the habeas petition as to the claims involving prior habeas counsel. Id., 58. On appeal, this court concluded “that the petitioner failed to establish that the habeas court improperly determined that the petitioner had not proven prejudice . . . .” Id., 62. This court explained: “The testimony of [trial counsel] and [prior habeas counsel] supports a factual determination by the habeas court that the petitioner had insisted he was innocent, that he was adamant about not pleading guilty to a murder charge, that the state was not willing to offer a deal that did not ‘adamant on taking his case to trial.’ His lawyer assured him he would win a trial.” We are not persuaded.

In asserting this claim, the petitioner acknowledges that the habeas court’s findings are supported by the record. The essence of his claim, therefore, is not that the findings are clearly erroneous; rather, the petitioner appears to be raising a claim concerning the reasonableness of any such advice provided by Attorney Eddy, which relates to counsel’s performance. Moreover, the only testimony at the habeas trial to support the assertion that Attorney Eddy had “assured” the petitioner that “he would win a[t] trial” was the petitioner’s testimony, which the court did not credit, and, as we have indicated, the transcript of the March 5, 2018 trial proceeding undermines any claim that the petitioner was not made aware of the sentence he could receive if convicted following a trial. See footnote 7 of this opinion.

require him to plead guilty to the charge of murder and, therefore, that the petitioner was not willing to accept the plea offers made by the state under any circumstances. These findings are immutable regardless of whether his trial counsel had recommended that he accept the plea offer.” Id., 64.

Likewise, in Dixon v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 233 Conn. App. 861, this court upheld the habeas court’s determination that the petitioner had not met his burden of establishing prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance during the plea bargaining process, stating: “At the habeas trial, [the petitioner’s trial counsel] testified that the petitioner was unwilling to accept a plea offer that involved a twenty- five year term of incarceration. The court credited that testimony, as was its exclusive prerogative as [the] arbiter of credibility. It is well established that the appellate courts of this state cannot ‘evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, we must defer to the [trier of fact’s] assessment of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude. . . . The habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.’ . . . The court’s decision to credit [trial counsel’s] testimony that the petitioner was unwilling to accept the twenty-five year plea offer, therefore, is one we cannot disturb. In light of that evidence, we conclude that the court’s finding that there was not a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have accepted the pretrial plea offer but for the deficient performance of counsel is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the petitioner cannot establish prejudice resulting from any deficiency in the advice provided by [his trial counsel] on that plea offer.” (Citations omitted .) Id.

Our appellate courts consistently have adhered to the principle that a habeas court’s credibility determinations are entitled to deference and have held that, when a habeas court’s finding that a petitioner has failed to establish prejudice is premised on a credibility determination of the court, we must defer to the habeas court’s finding and not reevaluate the credibility of the testimony before the court. See, e.g., Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 354 Conn. 840 (appellate courts “must defer to the habeas court’s credibility determination[s]”; id., 835 (“[a] habeas court’s pure credibility determination is unassailable, and we will not disturb it on appeal”);9 Dyous v. Commissioner of Mental Health & Addiction Services, 324 Conn. 163, 188–89, 151 A.3d 1247 (2016) (deferring to habeas court’s credibility determination regarding petitioner’s self-serving testimony); Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 228 Conn. App. 715 (“[t]his court defers to a habeas court’s finding that a petitioner was not willing to accept a plea offer when that finding was based on the court’s credibility determination ”); Bonds v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 223 Conn. App. 653, 656 (upholding habeas court’s determination that petitioner had failed to establish that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance during plea negotiations and failure to adequately advise petitioner to accept plea deal, as habeas court’s finding was based on its determination that petitioner’s testimony that he would have pleaded guilty instead of proceeding to trial was not credible, and that finding called for deference); Soto v. Commissioner of Correction, 215 Conn. App. 113, 127–29, 281 A.3d 1189 (2022) (habeas court, in finding that petitioner failed to show prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance during plea process, 9 In Hilton, our Supreme Court noted that, in Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, 316 Conn. 225, 272–73, 112 A.3d 1 (2015), it had “recognized an ‘exceptional factual and procedural scenario’ in which [it had] held that the habeas court’s credibility assessment of expert witnesses was clearly erroneous.” Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 354 Conn. 836. In doing so, however, the court in Lapointe explained that it “did not substitute its own credibility determination for that of the habeas court but, instead, concluded that the underlying factual findings on which the habeas court relied to discredit the petitioner’s experts were clearly erroneous because they were unsupported by the record.” Id., 837. In the present case, the petitioner does not contend that this case is analogous to Lapointe.

credited trial counsel’s testimony that petitioner had insisted that he was innocent of crimes and thought plea offer was unfair, and discredited petitioner’s habeas trial testimony that, but for counsel’s deficient advice, he would have accepted plea offer, and this court would not reevaluate that credibility determination); Cruz v. Commissioner of Correction, 206 Conn. App. 17, 26, 257 A.3d 399 (“[a]lthough the petitioner testified that he would have gone to trial but for [trial counsel’s] advice, the habeas court, as the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony, was entitled to reject his testimony in light of the other evidence presented during trial”), cert. denied, 340 Conn. 913, 265 A.3d 926 (2021); Watts v. Commissioner of Correction, 194 Conn. App. 558, 566–67, 221 A.3d 829 (2019) (“[b]ecause the habeas court discredited the petitioner ’s testimony [that he would have accepted the plea offer], and there was no other evidence from which the court could have found that the petitioner would have accepted the plea deal offered, the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating prejudice”), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 919, 222 A.3d 514 (2020); Rogers v. Commissioner of Correction, 194 Conn. App. 339, 350–51, 221 A.3d 81 (2019) (habeas court discredited petitioner’s testimony that he would have accepted plea offer if counsel had performed competently, and this court deferred to that determination in upholding habeas court’s conclusion that petitioner was not prejudiced); Fields v. Commissioner of Correction, 179 Conn. App. 567, 577, 180 A.3d 638 (2018) (affirming judgment of habeas court that petitioner had not been prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance, as record showed “no evidence independent of the petitioner’s own testimony that he would have accepted the state’s plea offer had [his counsel] conveyed it to him,” which court discredited , and it was “not the role of this court on appeal to second-guess credibility determinations made by the habeas court” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Furthermore, the habeas court’s finding that the petitioner had maintained his innocence and did not want to accept a plea is supported by other evidence before the court, including the transcripts from the underlying criminal trial proceedings. Those transcripts demonstrate that the petitioner initially had been presented with the plea offers on August 1, 2017, at which time Attorney Eddy asked for, and was granted, a continuance so that the petitioner could have time to consider the offers. On August 29, 2017, twenty-eight days later, Attorney Eddy informed the trial court that the petitioner was rejecting the offers and wanted to proceed to trial, after which the court canvassed the petitioner regarding his decision. During that canvass, the petitioner indicated to the court that he was factually innocent of the charges, that he had discussed the risks of conviction after trial with his counsel and that he wanted to proceed with trial. On March 5, 2018, the petitioner again indicated to the court that he did not want to accept the plea offers and wanted to proceed to trial, even though the on-the-record discussions at the March 5 proceeding demonstrated that the petitioner was aware that the state had increased the number of charges against him and that he was facing sixty years of imprisonment if convicted of those charges after trial.

Accordingly, because the habeas court’s finding that the petitioner did not establish a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance of Attorney Eddy, he would have accepted one of the plea offers was based on a credibility determination, to which this court must defer, and was supported by other evidence in the record, and because the only evidence provided by the petitioner in support of his claim of prejudice was his self-serving testimony that he would have accepted a plea offer if Attorney Eddy had advised him properly with respect to the plea offers, which the habeas court did not credit, the petitioner failed to establish prejudice stemming from any deficiency in Attorney Eddy’s performance concerning the plea offers.

The petitioner relies on federal case law to support his contention that a “significant disparity between the terms of the plea offer and the maximum exposure faced by the defendant himself [can] suffice to show prejudice,” and that “evidence that [he] wanted a trial rather than a generous plea offer must be viewed in the context of the omissions and misinformation of counsel.” See United States v. Knight, 981 F.3d 1095, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2020); United States v. Herrera, 412 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 2005); Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 737–38 (6th Cir. 2003); Pham v. United States, 317 F.3d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 2003). We find this reliance misplaced. Significantly, those cases did not involve credibility determinations by the habeas court, to which controlling Connecticut case law clearly directs that we must defer, and the factual circumstances of those cases, in which the habeas petitioners either had not been informed of a plea offer at all or had been misinformed as to the sentencing consequences of proceeding to trial or accepting the plea, are inapposite to the present case, in which the petitioner was fully aware of the plea offers, the habeas court specifically found not credible the petitioner’s testimony that he did not understand the plea offers, the trial court transcripts clearly show that the petitioner was made aware of the full exposure he faced if convicted of the charges after trial, and there was no evidence demonstrating that the petitioner was amenable to a plea.10 Accordingly, the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. 10 In his appellate reply brief, the petitioner asserts, again after citing federal case law; see Pham v. United States, supra, 317 F.3d 182; that our Supreme Court, in Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 343 Conn. 367, recognized the validity of the principle set forth in that federal case law that “a petitioner’s statement of intentions, combined with a significant disparity between the actual sentence and the sentence offered in a plea deal, can indeed sufficiently prove prejudice.” The issue in Barlow concerned the habeas court’s failure to incorporate contemporaneous evidence into its prejudice analysis and the applicability of Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 359, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 198 L. Ed. 2d 476 (2017), “which requires that ‘post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies’ must be substantiated by ‘contemporaneous evidence,’ meaning evidence from the time of the underlying plea negotiations, to support the petitioner’s after-the-fact testimony.” Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 360. Our Supreme Court in Barlow cited to United States v. Knight, supra, 981 F.3d 1106, in the context of evaluating whether “the absence of unequivocal contemporaneous evidence . . . [necessarily] mean[s] that [a petitioner] cannot show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer if he had been provided the effective assistance of counsel.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 366.

In the present case, the habeas court’s finding of prejudice was made on the basis of a credibility determination, not a lack of contemporaneous evidence, and the petitioner’s reliance on the principles set forth in federal case law, as we have indicated, fails to recognize the significant differences in the factual contexts in which those principles were applied, when compared to the circumstances of the present case.