Rodriguez, Jose Juan v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 15, 2005
• Docket: 14-04-00379-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 15, 2005

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 15, 2005.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-04-00379-CR

JOSE JUAN RODRIGUEZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 56th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 00CR1892

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

Appellant was convicted of possessing more than 400 grams of cocaine, a felony offense.  Following a jury trial, the trial court assessed punishment at ten years’ confinement.  On appeal, appellant asserts the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress the cocaine found in a search of appellant’s car.  Appellant contends he was detained for an unreasonable amount of time and his subsequent consent to the search was the fruit of an illegal detention.  Because we find appellant was reasonably detained, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Officer Blackwell of the Galveston Police Department pulled over appellant’s car when the officer saw appellant was not wearing his seat belt.  Officer Blackwell had difficulty communicating with appellant, whose first language is Spanish, but was able to obtain appellant’s driver’s license and insurance information before radioing for a Spanish-speaking interpreter.  While waiting for the interpreter to arrive, Officer Blackwell checked to see if appellant had any outstanding warrants; this check was completed in about three minutes.  Officer Delossantos, the interpreter, arrived 10 to 15 minutes after Officer Blackwell pulled over appellant’s car.  Officer Delossantos explained to appellant why Officer Blackwell pulled him over.  When informed of the reason for the stop—not wearing a seatbelt—appellant told Officer Delossantos that he inadvertently had failed to put the seatbelt back on when he got back into his car.  When asked, appellant agreed to allow the officers to search his car and signed a consent form to that effect.  During the search, the officers discovered a brick of cocaine in a gift bag in the backseat of appellant’s car.  At that time, the officers arrested appellant for possession of cocaine.  Officer Blackwell ultimately decided not to issue appellant a traffic citation for failing to wear his seat belt.

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the felony offense of possessing more than 400 grams of cocaine.  Before trial, appellant moved to suppress the cocaine found in his car.  Appellant asserted the seat belt violation was a pretext when, in fact, the officers lacked probable cause to detain him.  Appellant also claimed that waiting for a Spanish-speaking officer to arrive unreasonably extended the length of his detention.  After holding a hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress.  On appeal, appellant concedes the traffic stop was reasonable and legal at its inception, but maintains the detention was unconstitutionally extended by the wait for a Spanish-speaking officer to arrive.  As a result, appellant argues the consent he gave to search his car was the fruit of an illegal detention.

Appellant’s detention was reasonable

Standard of Review

Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.  We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion.  Villareal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Ross v. State, No. 14-02-00413-CR, 2003 WL 1987848, *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 1, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication).  An appellate court must give great deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially when they are based on credibility and demeanor.  Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)); Ross, 2003 WL 1987848 at *1.  Because no explicit findings of fact were filed, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.  Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89; Ross, 2003 WL 1987848 at *2.  We review the trial court’s application of law de novo.  Ornelas v. United States, 547 U.S. 690, 697–99 (1996); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Simpson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 324, 327 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d).  We must uphold the ruling admitting the evidence if it is supported by any legal theory.  Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 857 (citing Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)); Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Ross, 2003 WL 1987848 at *2.

Reasonableness of Detention

A traffic stop is a detention and must be reasonable.  Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc); Simpson, 29 S.W.3d at 327.  To be reasonable, a traffic stop must have been justified when the person was initially stopped and not be longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.   Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 591, 500 (1983); Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245; Simpson, 27 S.W.3d at 327.  Appellant concedes his traffic stop was justified when it began and contends only that he was detained for an unreasonably long period of time.  Once the reason for the stop has been satisfied, officers cannot use the stop as a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity.  Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243.  Appellant urges this court to find it was unreasonable for Officer Blackwell to continue to detain appellant for ten to fifteen minutes while waiting for a Spanish-speaking officer to arrive.  Because Officer Blackwell already had determined appellant had no outstanding warrants, appellant argues Officer Blackwell had no further reason to detain him and appellant should have been free to go rather than forced to wait for a Spanish-speaking officer. 

We find Officer Blackwell’s further detention of appellant was reasonable under these circumstances for the following reasons.  Officer Blackwell testified that he had not decided whether to issue a citation when he asked for a Spanish-speaking officer to assist him.  Officer Blackwell testified he would not have issued a citation if, for example, appellant had a medical reason he could not wear his seat belt.^[1]  Officer Blackwell further testified that he had difficulty communicating with appellant because of the language barrier.  And appellant acknowledged that, when Officer Blackwell attempted to explain why he was stopped, appellant only “understood a little bit.”  Officer Delossantos, the Spanish-speaking officer, testified that he communicated with appellant entirely in Spanish about the reason for the traffic stop and the subsequent search of appellant’s car.  We conclude it was reasonable to detain appellant for such a short time period so that an officer who spoke Spanish, appellant’s first language, could be present.^[2] 

Appellant’s case, though factually similar to Herrera v. State, 80 S.W.3d 283, 286 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d), is distinguishable.  A police officer stopped Herrera for a traffic violation, although the State never disputed that the traffic stop was a pretext for a narcotics investigation.  Like appellant, Herrera spoke little English and a Spanish-speaking officer was called to the scene.  Id. at 287.  But unlike Officer Delossantos in appellant’s case, the Spanish-speaking officer who spoke with Herrera did not help “further the investigation of the initial stop in any way.”  Id.  For that reason, the Texarkana Court of Appeals concluded Herrera’s detention was unreasonably prolonged by the wait for the interpreter’s arrival.  Id.  In appellant’s case, Officer Delossantos furthered the investigation of Officer Blackwell’s initial traffic stop by explaining to appellant why he was stopped, by asking appellant why he was not wearing his seat belt, and by providing that answer to Officer Blackwell, who needed the information to decide whether to issue a citation.  Because of this distinction, we decline to apply the Herrera holding in appellant’s case. 

The trial court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress.  Having overruled appellant’s only issue on appeal, we affirm.

/s/      Wanda McKee Fowler

Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed February 15, 2005.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Fowler and Frost.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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^[1]  When asked why he ultimately did not issue a citation to appellant, Officer Blackwell explained it was not his custom to issue a traffic citation when, as in appellant’s case, the stop resulted in a felony arrest.

^[2]  When confronted with communication barriers, we are hesitant to adopt an approach that would penalize an officer for taking the necessary steps to ensure the citizen knew the reason for the traffic stop and temporary detention rather than plowing ahead—with or without the citizen’s understanding—in an effort to keep the detention as short as possible.  See Reyes-Perez v. State, 45 S.W.3d 312, 319 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref’d) (reversing appellant’s conviction upon finding State had not proved appellant voluntarily consented to officer’s search of his car when appellant spoke little English and communication between officer and appellant took place mainly in the form of hand gestures).