Rodriguez Cruz v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 8, 2025
• Docket: 24-3159
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 8 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EVELYN YANIRA RODRIGUEZ CRUZ No. 24-3159 AND J.N.R., Agency Nos. A220-488-780 Petitioners, A220-488-781 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 4, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: HURWITZ, KOH, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Petitioners Evelyn Yanira Rodriguez Cruz and her minor son (collectively

“Rodriguez”) petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge

(“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel previously granted the parties’ joint motion to submit this case on the briefs [Dkt. 32]. Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our review is limited to the grounds relied

upon by the BIA. See Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021).

We review claims of due process violations de novo. See Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d

725, 727 (9th Cir. 2000). We review factual findings underlying denials of asylum,

withholding of removal, and CAT protection for substantial evidence. See Wang v.

Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017). We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.

1. Rodriguez contends that the IJ violated her due process rights by failing to

develop the record when she appeared pro se. “The Fifth Amendment guarantees

that individuals subject to [removal] proceedings receive due process,” which

requires “a full and fair hearing.” Jacinto, 208 F.3d at 727. Because noncitizens

appearing pro se may be unfamiliar with immigration law, “it is the IJ’s duty to

fully develop the record,” to “adequately explain the hearing procedures,” and to

“conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts.”

Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Here, the IJ posed questions to explore Rodriguez’s potential bases for relief,

invited Rodriguez to explain her claim, and asked Rodriguez pertinent questions

directed at determining whether she was eligible for relief based on her fear of

future persecution. Because the IJ appropriately developed the record, the BIA did

2 not err in refusing to find a due process violation. See Gonzalez-Castillo v.

Garland, 47 F.4th 971, 983 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding record sufficiently developed

where the IJ asked relevant questions to determine whether the petitioner was

eligible for relief and offered him the opportunity to provide further information to

support his claim).1

2. Substantial evidence supports the denial of Rodriguez’s asylum and

withholding of removal claims because she did not establish past persecution, nor

demonstrate an objectively reasonable well-founded fear of future persecution.

Rodriguez provided no evidence that she experienced past harm or mistreatment in

Guatemala. Moreover, Rodriguez did not identify evidence suggesting that she

would be singled out for persecution upon her return to Guatemala. Her “vague

and conclusory allegations of fear” of widespread crime in Guatemala are “clearly

insufficient to support a finding of a well-founded fear of future persecution.” See

Mendez-Gutierrez v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006); see also

Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that the

“well-founded fear” standard of proof for asylum is less demanding than the “more

1 In her opening brief, Rodriguez also asserts the IJ denied her due process by failing (1) to explain the government’s burden of proof in establishing her removability, (2) to describe the law governing particular social groups (“PSGs”) and (3) to help Rodriguez formulate her own PSGs. However, as the government notes, Rodriguez did not raise, and thus failed to exhaust, these claims before the agency. See Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th Cir. 2024).

3 likely than not” standard of proof for withholding).

3. “[T]orture is more severe than persecution and the standard of proof for

[a] CAT claim is higher than the standard of proof for an asylum claim.” Nuru v.

Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, “[g]eneralized evidence

of violence and crime is insufficient to establish a likelihood of torture.” Park v.

Garland, 72 F.4th 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2023). Because Rodriguez did not establish

that it is more likely than not that she personally would be tortured if removed,

substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for stay of removal, Dkt. 2, and the renewed motion for stay of removal, Dkt. 17, are otherwise denied.