Rodney Skurdal v. USA

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 24, 2025
• Docket: 23-35564
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 24 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RODNEY OWEN SKURDAL, No. 23-35564

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00092-SPW

v. MEMORANDUM* UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 17, 2025**

Before: CANBY, R. NELSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Rodney Owen Skurdal appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his action challenging Internal

Revenue Service (“IRS”) tax collection efforts. We have jurisdiction under 28

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Skurdal’s request for oral argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied. U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 535

(9th Cir. 1992). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Skurdal’s claims seeking injunctive

relief as barred by the Anti-Injunction Act because the claims are an attempt to

restrain the IRS’s tax assessment and collection activities, and no exception

applies. See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (providing that “no suit for the purpose of

restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court

by any person” and listing statutory exceptions); Elias v. Connett, 908 F.2d 521,

523, 525 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the district court “must dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction any suit that does not fall within one of the exceptions to

the [Anti-Injunction] Act” and setting forth limited judicial exception).

The district court properly dismissed Skurdal’s claims seeking declaratory

relief as barred by the Declaratory Judgment Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)

(prohibiting actions for declaratory judgment in federal tax cases); Gilbert v.

United States, 998 F.3d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 2021) (discussing this prohibition).

The district court properly dismissed Skurdal’s damages claims against the

United States as barred by sovereign immunity because Skurdal failed to show that

his claims fell within a waiver of sovereign immunity. See Gilbert v. DaGrossa,

756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that the United States is immune from

suit unless it has expressly waived its sovereign immunity); see also 26 U.S.C.

2 23-35564 § 7433(a) (waiving sovereign immunity in certain civil damages actions related to

collection of taxes); Conforte v. United States, 979 F.2d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir. 1992)

(explaining that a plaintiff “may not bring [an] action against the United States

under 26 U.S.C. § 7433 without exhausting . . . administrative remedies”); 26

C.F.R. § 301.7433-1(e) (specifying required administrative remedies).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint

without leave to amend and with prejudice. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home

Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review

and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment

would be futile); Frigard v. United States, 862 F.2d 201, 204 (9th Cir. 1988)

(setting forth standard of review and explaining that a dismissal with prejudice

may be proper where “the bar of sovereign immunity is absolute” and redrafting

will not cure the pleading).

AFFIRMED.

3 23-35564