United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 22-1624
IN RE: NATALY MINKINA,
Debtor.
RODGERS, POWERS & SCHWARTZ, LLP,
Appellant,
v.
NATALY MINKINA,
Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Frank J. Bailey, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Howard and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.
Dana E. Casher, with whom Casher Law Offices was on brief, for appellant. Marques C. Lipton, with whom Lipton Law Group, LLC was on brief, for appellee.
August 24, 2023 HOWARD, Circuit Judge. This appeal requires us to assess
the propriety of a valuation method espoused in the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel's ("B.A.P.") decision in Snyder v. Rockland Tr.
Co. (In re Snyder), 249 B.R. 40 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2000), for a
debtor's interest in property held as a Massachusetts tenant by
the entirety for purposes of the lien avoidance formula of 11
U.S.C. § 522(f). The bankruptcy court below departed from that
approach, and appellant Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz, LLP ("RPS") -
- a law firm that is the holder of the judicial lien that appellee
Nataly Minkina seeks to avoid -- asserts that doing so constituted
legal error. Finding no such error, we affirm the bankruptcy
court's order. In doing so, we also clarify that the B.A.P.'s
decision in Snyder both misapplied Massachusetts law and
impermissibly derogated from the plain text of § 522.
I.
We recite the factual background and procedural posture
of this appeal, "rely[ing] principally on the bankruptcy court's
recounting of the facts." Goat Island Condo. Ass'n v. IDC
Clambakes, Inc. (In re IDC Clambakes, Inc.), 852 F.3d 50, 54 (1st
Cir. 2017). In August 2018, Minkina filed a petition for relief
under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. In re Minkina, 631 B.R.
544, 546 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2021). She and her husband owned their
home in Brookline, Massachusetts as tenants by the entirety as of
the time of the filing of the petition. Id. The property was
- 2 - subject to (1) two mortgages totaling $177,741 and (2) a judicial
lien solely on Minkina's interest in the property in favor of RPS
in the amount of $250,094.1 Id. The latter originated from a
Massachusetts Superior Court judgment that ordered Minkina to
reimburse RPS for the expenses the law firm incurred in defending
against a malpractice suit Minkina brought that the court
ultimately deemed frivolous. In addition, Minkina and her husband
were entitled to a $500,000 homestead exemption, since Minkina's
husband caused a homestead declaration to be recorded in December
2010 under then-applicable provisions of Massachusetts law. Id.;
see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1 (2010).
Minkina moved to avoid the RPS judicial lien in March
2019 on the grounds that the lien "impair[ed] her homestead
exemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)." By way of context --
and as will be further discussed below -- the lien-avoidance
formula of § 522(f)(2)(A) in part requires an assessment of "the
value that the debtor's interest in the property would have in the
absence of any liens." Minkina agreed to a valuation of the
property as a whole at $1,050,000 for purposes of the motion.
However, the point of contention in Minkina's case is how to
appraise the value of her interest in the property as a tenant by
the entirety for purposes of the formula. Minkina urged the
1 For the sake of clarity and consistency, we use the figures cited by the bankruptcy court and round to the nearest dollar.
- 3 - bankruptcy court to adopt either an actuarial approach to
determining her share or to simply "treat [her share] as 50% of
the value of the [p]roperty." Crucially for Minkina, her
calculations suggested that using an actuarial approach would have
allowed her to avoid all but $4,759 of the judicial lien, and a 50
percent approach would have allowed her to avoid the lien in its
entirety. However, either of these approaches would have
constituted a departure from the B.A.P.'s decision in Snyder, in
which the B.A.P. opted to value a Massachusetts "[d]ebtor's
interest in [a] tenancy by the entirety property for purposes of
the section 522(f) formula . . . at 100 percent" of the property's
value. 249 B.R. at 46. By contrast, RPS urged the court to follow
the Snyder approach -- an unsurprising development, given that
such an approach would have prevented Minkina from avoiding the
lien under the § 522(f) formula.
Given the centrality of Snyder to the avoidance motion,
both parties asked the bankruptcy court to first indicate whether
it would follow that case's valuation method before reaching a
final decision on avoidance. The court indicated that it would
not follow the B.A.P.'s Snyder decision, reasoning that "[a]
property interest can be compared to a bundle of sticks . . . ; it
is undisputed that one spouse in a tenancy by the entire[t]y does
not hold all the sticks and that the other spouse holds many sticks
that limit the value of the debtor spouse's interest . . . ."
- 4 - Accordingly, the court noted that it was "inclined to hold that,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the interest of each
spouse in a tenancy by the entirety is equal to 50 percent of the
property's fair market value."
Two crucial events then transpired between the
bankruptcy court's issuance of its preliminary and final decisions
on Minkina's motion to avoid the RPS judicial lien. First, the
parties stipulated to the following with regards to the valuation
of Minkina's share "to minimize the expense to the parties of the
needless exercise of an evidentiary hearing":
1. For purposes of the Motion to Avoid Judicial Lien only, the value of the Property owned by the Debtor with her husband as tenants by the entirety, . . . is $1,050,000.
2. That, for purposes of the Motion to Avoid Judicial Lien only, the market value of the Debtor's interest in the Property subject to her non-debtor spouse's right of survivorship does not exceed $525,000.
3. Nothing in this Stipulation shall be deemed to be an admission by RPS that, as a matter of law, the Debtor's interest in the Property is anything less than 100% of the Property's value.
Second, RPS "raised a new ground of opposition [to the motion to
avoid]: that if the value of the [p]roperty is to be allocated as
in a tenancy in common, then the homestead exemption and the other
liens . . . must also be allocated" between Minkina and her
husband. In re Minkina, 631 B.R. at 547.
- 5 - The bankruptcy court ultimately granted Minkina's motion
to avoid. It once again rejected the Snyder approach, reiterating
that -- contrary to RPS's assertions and the B.A.P.'s reasoning -
- Massachusetts law, and particularly the Supreme Judicial Court's
("SJC") decision in Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Sav. Bank, 415
Mass. 145 (1993), did not compel the conclusion that a spouse's
share in a tenancy by the entirety had to equal the full value of
the property. In re Minkina, 631 B.R. at 551-55. The court
consequently accepted the parties' stipulation that Minkina's
share in the property was worth no more than $525,000, and
separately rejected RPS's arguments that the other liens and
homestead exemption needed to be allocated between the spouses.
Id. at 548, 556, 558-59. Given these conclusions, Minkina could
avoid the judicial lien in its entirety under the § 522(f) formula.
Id. at 559.
We permitted a direct appeal of the bankruptcy court's
interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), and this appeal
followed.
II.
"When considering an appeal from a bankruptcy court,
under most circumstances, '[w]e review the bankruptcy court's
legal conclusions de novo, its findings of fact for clear error,
and its discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion.'" United
- 6 - Sur. & Indem. Co. v. López-Muñoz (In re López-Muñoz), 983 F.3d 69,
71 (1st Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting United Sur.
& Indem. Co. v. López-Muñoz (In re López-Muñoz), 866 F.3d 487,
496-97 (1st Cir. 2017)). These principles apply to direct appeals
from a bankruptcy court. Cf. Coughlin v. Lac du Flambeau Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (In re Coughlin), 33 F.4th 600, 604
(1st Cir. 2022), aff'd, 143 S. Ct. 1689 (2023) (applying de novo
review to a direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)). As RPS has
solely raised claims of legal error on appeal, we review the
bankruptcy court's prior treatment of these claims de novo.
III.
A.
Before turning to the merits, we note that the parties
remain bound on appeal by the stipulation that they entered. See
Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 303 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002) ("A
party's stipulations are binding on that party and may not be
contradicted by him at trial or on appeal."). As excerpted above,
the parties agreed in the stipulation "[t]hat, for purposes of the
Motion to Avoid Judicial Lien only, the market value of the
Debtor's interest in the Property subject to her non-debtor
spouse's right of survivorship does not exceed $525,000," but that
"[n]othing in this Stipulation shall be deemed to be an admission
by RPS that, as a matter of law, the [d]ebtor's interest in the
[p]roperty is anything less than 100% of the [p]roperty’s value."
- 7 - "Stipulations are interpreted according to general contract law
principles," Lestage v. Coloplast Corp., 982 F.3d 37, 48 n.5 (1st
Cir. 2020), and we are mindful of the maxims that "contracts
containing unambiguous language must be construed according to
their plain and natural meaning" and that "[a]ccepted canons of
construction forbid the balkanization of contracts for
interpretive purposes," Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability
Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1995). We interpret the
combination of the two clauses highlighted above to mean that the
valuation of no more than $525,000 controls unless we conclude
that Minkina's interest in the property must equal the full market
value of the property "as a matter of law," since that is the claim
that RPS explicitly preserved through the stipulation. As detailed
below, we do not so conclude.
B.
Section 522(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "value"
for the purposes of § 522 -- and, therefore, for the judicial lien
avoidance formula of § 522(f)(2)(A) -- as the "fair market value
as of the date of the filing of the petition." While the Bankruptcy
Code does not define the term "fair market value," the phrase
generally refers to "[t]he amount at which property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being
under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts." Fair Market Value, Black's Law
- 8 - Dictionary (6th ed. 1990); see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub.
L. 103-394, § 303, 108 Stat. 4106, 4132 (enacting the § 522(f)
formula); cf. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738
(2020) ("[We] normally interpret[] a statute in accord with the
ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its
enactment."); Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 783 (2010) ("[W]e
may look to dictionaries . . . to determine the meaning of words
the [Bankruptcy] Code does not define[.]"). At the same time,
"[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state law [for
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code] [u]nless some federal interest
requires a different result." Butner v. United States, 440 U.S.
48, 55 (1979), superseded in part by statute, Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994. This appeal trains on the interplay between those
two principles. RPS claims that the fact that a Massachusetts
tenancy by the entirety comprises a "unitary title" compels the
conclusion that the value of Minkina's share in the property must
equal the full value of the property. Minkina counters that such
a conclusion both rests on a misinterpretation of Massachusetts
law and raises preemption concerns, given the Code's
aforementioned definition in § 522 of value as "fair market value."
Minkina has the better of the argument. The fact that
a Massachusetts tenancy by the entirety constitutes a "unitary
title" plainly does not compel the conclusion that an individual
spouse's interest in the tenancy must be valued at the fair market
- 9 - value of the entire property in question. Moreover, the Snyder
approach impermissibly departed from Congress's explicit
instructions to value the debtor's interest in the property absent
any liens as the fair market value thereof for the purposes of the
§ 522(f) formula. We address these two points in turn.
1.
We begin with RPS's Massachusetts law claim,
irrespective of any preemption concerns the claim may raise. Much
like the B.A.P. in Snyder, RPS claims that the SJC's description
of a Massachusetts tenancy by the entirety in Coraccio as a
"unitary title . . . [that, in the wake of statutory amendments,]
guarantees each spouse an equal right to a whole," and -- therefore
-- a tenancy for which "it does not follow that each [spouse] has
an equal one-half interest in the property," supports their
preferred approach to valuation. 415 Mass. at 151; see also
Snyder, 249 B.R. at 44 (interpreting the "unitary title" language
to mean that a tenancy by the entirety represents "a title in which
the interests of both husband and wife extend to the whole of the
property, not merely to some fractional interest that the other
does not also hold").2
2 To be sure, our court did affirm Snyder in an unpublished decision. See Snyder v. Rockland Tr. Co. (In re Snyder), 2 F. App'x 46 (1st Cir. 2001). However, that opinion lacks precedential value, see 1st Cir. R. 36.0(c), and -- as RPS acknowledges -- our court did not address the valuation issue on the merits there because we found that Snyder waived his valuation-based arguments.
- 10 - This argument stretches selected quotes from Coraccio
too far. As the bankruptcy court noted, Coraccio simply did not
concern valuation. See In re Minkina, 631 B.R. at 553-54. In
that case, the SJC sought to address whether the Massachusetts
legislature's statutory equalization of rights between men and
women in tenancies by the entirety in 1979 "prevents one spouse,
acting alone, from encumbering his or her interest in property
held by the entirety." Coraccio, 415 Mass. at 148; see Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 209, § 1 ("A husband and wife shall be equally entitled
to the rents, products, income or profits and to the control,
management and possession of property held by them as tenants by
the entirety."). The excerpted passages served to reaffirm that
the statutory modification of the common-law tenancy "did
not . . . alter the characteristics of the estate itself,"
including the features discussed above. Coraccio, 415 Mass. at
151. Indeed, the SJC did not so much as include the word "value"
in its opinion, and perhaps for good reason. As the bankruptcy
court noted, valuation and a delineation of rights are different
enquiries. See In re Minkina, 631 B.R. at 554-55. Coraccio's
RPS also points to our decision in Garran v. SMS Financial V, LLC (In re Garran), 338 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Snyder v. Rockland Tr. Co. (In re Snyder), 279 B.R. 1, 4 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2002)), for the proposition that our court has "cited Snyder . . . as authority for purposes of a motion to avoid [a] lien," but that case cited to a subsequent B.A.P. decision that did not concern the specific valuation question at issue in this appeal.
- 11 - "unitary title" language describes the extent of the interest, not
the value thereof, and therefore imposes no requirement to value
Minkina's interest in the property as the full value of the
property. Valuing a spouse's undivided interest in the property
at up to 50 percent of its fair market value, as the parties did
here through the stipulation, therefore does not run afoul of
Coraccio's explanation that a tenant by the entirety possesses "an
equal right to the whole" as part of a "unitary title," as opposed
to an "equal one-half interest." 415 Mass. at 151. Given that
this Coraccio-based argument is RPS's sole argument on appeal
predicated on Massachusetts law, we conclude that the firm's state
law argument is unavailing.
2.
We thus turn to analyzing the propriety of the bankruptcy
court's valuation method under federal law. RPS in essence claims
that "seek[ing] to apply the concept of value as 'the price at
which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and
a willing seller'" -- almost verbatim the above-referenced
definition of fair market value -- is improper because such an
approach rests on a "legal fiction [that] is [ostensibly]
impossible" under Massachusetts law.3 The challenge with this
argument is that, rather than federal law preempting Massachusetts
3 RPS also notes that that there is "no preemptive federal law to consider" in this case.
- 12 - law, RPS's position is tantamount to an argument that Massachusetts
law reverse-preempts the definition of "value" in § 522(a). Of
course, given our above conclusion that RPS's Coraccio-based
argument misapplies Massachusetts law, there is no genuine
preemption issue here -- after all, there is no Massachusetts law
to preempt.4 But teasing out the logic of RPS's argument also
helps illustrate how the Snyder approach in effect ignored
Congress's fair market value directive.
Reaching such a conclusion requires an explanation of
Massachusetts tenancies by the entirety and the valuation problems
they raise in the context of § 522(f). Indeed -- as both parties
acknowledge, and as previously noted -- even though the valuation
question is ultimately controlled by the plain text of § 522,
"[p]roperty interests are [in general] created and defined by state
law." Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 (emphasis added). Under
Massachusetts law, a spouse's interest in a tenancy by the entirety
is both highly encumbered by the other spouse's interest and -- in
part because of these encumbrances -- also necessarily distinct
4 We also have no occasion to reach the preemption issue Minkina raises by the same logic. Cf. Vaquería Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Pagan, 748 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2014) ("[F]ederal courts are not to reach constitutional issues where alternative grounds for resolution are available." (quoting Am. C.L. Union v. U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2013))); PDK Lab'ys Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enf't Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring) ("[T]he cardinal principle of judicial restraint -- if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more -- counsels us to go no further.").
- 13 - from the tenancy as a whole. As the bankruptcy court noted, a
spouse holding property in a Massachusetts tenancy by the entirety
"may [not] compromise or alter the tenancy unilaterally." In re
Minkina, 631 B.R. at 552. "For as long as the marriage continues,
the estate cannot be severed, terminated, or partitioned by either
spouse without the assent of the other." Id.; see also Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 241, § 1 (exempting tenants by the entirety from the
entitlement to partition). However, despite the unitary title,
the SJC in Coraccio held that "either spouse [in a tenancy by the
entirety] may convey or encumber his or her interest in property
held as tenants by the entirety." 415 Mass. at 152.5 Even so, an
encumbered or conveyed interest is still subject to the limitations
outlined above. Perhaps most importantly, a spouse's interest is
also limited by the other spouse's "indestructible right of
survivorship"; or the notion that, once one spouse is deceased,
the other "becomes seised as sole owner of the whole estate
5On a related note, RPS claims that "Coraccio concludes only that one spouse may encumber his or her interest in property held in a tenancy by the entirety, not convey it," and that the "language from Coraccio seeming to allow a conveyance by one spouse of that spouse's interest . . . referenc[es] New York state law - - not that of Massachusetts." That is patently incorrect. The "may convey" passage was written without reference to New York law, and the SJC also explicitly wrote that "the view expressed by the New York Court of Appeals in V.R.W., Inc. v. Klein, 68 N.Y.2d 560, 565 (1986), [i.e., that 'each tenant may sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber his or her rights in the property'] sets forth the appropriate rule." Coraccio, 415 Mass. at 152 (quoting V.R.W., Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 565).
- 14 - regardless of anything the other may have done" -- including,
crucially for the purposes of this case, any encumbrances on the
deceased spouse's interest. Coraccio, 415 Mass. at 149, 151
(second quoting Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 404 (1929),
superseded by statute, 1979 Mass. Acts 768, as recognized in
Coraccio, 415 Mass. at 150). As Judge Kenner put it in her seminal
opinion on Massachusetts tenancies by the entirety:
By virtue of the right of survivorship, the interest of the first spouse to die is no more than a life estate. That spouse's interest terminates upon his or her death, and, with it, any interest acquired (by assignment or encumbrance, whether voluntary or not) from that spouse alone.
In re Snyder, 231 B.R. 437, 442 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999), aff'd as
modified, 249 B.R. at 47.6 In turn, from the point of view of a
conveyee of the spouse's interest, the interest he or she acquires
through the conveyance "would, among other things, be wholly
defeasible upon the death of the conveying spouse and survivorship
6 We note that the right of survivorship does not appear to be a lien under the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of the § 522(f) formula. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) (incorporating into the formula "the value that the debtor's interest in the property would have in the absence of any liens"). 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) defines a "lien" as a "charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." Nothing in this definition suggests that a "right of survivorship," which does not pertain to "secur[ing] payment of a debt or performance of an obligation," can plausibly be construed as a lien. And no argument has been made to us that a non-debtor spouse's right of survivorship should be so construed for purposes of the § 522 formula.
- 15 - of the other."7 Id. In sum, "Massachusetts law makes clear that
the unitary title does not give each spouse the same rights in the
property as he or she would have as sole owner." Id. at 443.
"Each spouse's rights in the property are drastically
circumscribed by those of the other." Id.
Those encumbrances on a spouse's interest in a tenancy
by the entirety both serve to differentiate it from the tenancy as
a whole and also pose the valuation problem in Minkina's case and
others like it. RPS's argument illustrates the first point. As
noted above, the firm claims that attempting to apply fair market
value to a debtor's interest in property held in a tenancy by the
entirety is a "legal fiction [that] is impossible, [because] it
necessarily presumes that the seller [i.e., the debtor spouse] has
the capacity to make a sale, . . . [when] no sale is possible
without destroying the tenancy." That argument misses the point
-- the value in question here is not of the property, nor of the
tenancy as a whole, but rather of the debtor's interest in the
7 Massachusetts law also mandates that "[t]he interest of a debtor spouse in property held as tenants by the entirety shall not be subject to seizure or execution by a creditor of such debtor spouse so long as such property is the principal residence of the nondebtor spouse," Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209, § 1, but we note (without weighing in ourselves) that lower courts in our circuit have concluded that this prohibition is preempted by the trustee sale provision of 11 U.S.C. § 363(h). See, e.g., Whitman v. Lassman, No. 06–11780, 2007 WL 2259108, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2007); Desmond v. Green (In re Green), No. 13-10204, 2018 WL 4944988, at *4-5 (Bankr. D. Mass. Oct. 11, 2018).
- 16 - tenancy, which is subject to the suite of encumbrances described
above that do not apply to the tenancy as a whole. Just as
importantly, the argument also ignores the fact that a spouse's
interest should have an identifiable present value, given that
Coraccio allows a tenant by the entirety to convey or encumber his
share.
As to the second point, the discrepancy between a sole
owner and a spouse's interest as a tenant by the entirety
necessarily affects the valuation question, as well. A market
participant attempting to value a debtor's interest in a tenancy
by the entirety is simply analyzing a different (though subsidiary,
and much more limited) bundle of sticks than a property held in
fee simple absolute or one being conveyed with the assent of both
tenants by the entirety. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S.
274, 278 (2002) ("A common idiom describes property as a 'bundle
of sticks' -- a collection of individual rights which, in certain
combinations, constitute property."). As Judge Kenner wrote,
anyone attempting to appraise a debtor's interest in a tenancy by
the entirety has to grapple with the "uncertainty about the
[tenancy's] future," In re Snyder, 231 B.R. at 445, given that
a debtor spouse's interest will eventually come to one of three possible ends: (1) the debtor spouse will survive the nondebtor spouse and thereupon becomes seised of the whole estate, subject to seizure and execution by his creditors; (2) the debtor spouse will predecease the nondebtor spouse, resulting in
- 17 - termination of the decedent's interest and of liens attaching exclusively thereto; or (3) the tenancy will be terminated (by voluntary conveyance, foreclosure on a jointly given mortgage, or divorce) before the death of either spouse, resulting in termination of the unitary title, division or apportionment of the net proceeds among the spouses (or at least the possibility thereof), and vulnerability of the debtor spouse's interest in the proceeds to seizure or execution by creditors.
Id. at 443.
Indeed, it is that quandary that gave rise to the Snyder
approach. However, as explained below, the logic of the B.A.P.'s
solution ran afoul of the plain text of the Code.
Understanding the development of the B.A.P.'s approach
requires detailing Snyder's procedural history. There, Judge
Kenner originally entered a provisional order that valued the
debtor's interest as the full value of the property "based on the
express assumption that, upon termination of the tenancy by the
entirety, the [d]ebtor's interest will extend to the whole of the
property," but preserved the option to "reconsider[] [the order]
on the basis of actual knowledge about how the tenancy is
terminated." Id. at 445. The B.A.P. nevertheless proceeded to
reject the provisional aspect of the order, reasoning that "[o]ne
of the principal tenets of bankruptcy is finality in order to
insure . . . a fresh start," but upheld the full-value aspect of
the order. Snyder, 249 B.R. at 45-46. The panel concluded that
- 18 - the approach was warranted because a 50 percent approach would
ostensibly run afoul of Coraccio (an incorrect assumption, as
discussed above) and an actuarial approach would run afoul of the
panel's determination that "a hearing on a motion to avoid a lien
pursuant to section 522(f) . . . should be a summary proceeding
susceptible to a quick and binding resolution," as evidenced by
legislative history related to the formula and the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure's treatment of these proceedings. Id. at
46.
Whatever the logic and advantages of the B.A.P.'s
approach to such a complex question might be, we conclude that (in
addition to our disagreement with its reading of Coraccio) it
departed from the language of the Code itself. Indeed, two words
were conspicuously absent from the B.A.P.'s ruling: fair market.
Suffice it to say that legislative history, the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy's treatment of a provision, considerations of finality,
"basic" or "overarching principles" of bankruptcy (as RPS argues),
or even the fact that the Snyder approach "employ[ed] a bright
line that is easy to follow and apply," In re O'Connell, 334 B.R.
312, 315 n.6 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005), cannot trump our obligation
to follow the plain text of a statute. See Puerto Rico v. Franklin
Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 579 U.S. 115, 125 (2016) ("The plain text of
the Bankruptcy Code begins and ends our analysis."). Consequently,
bankruptcy courts applying the § 522(f) formula should instead
- 19 - calculate "the value that the debtor's interest in the property
would have in the absence of any liens" as the "fair market value
[of the foregoing] as of the date of the filing of the petition,"
just as Congress required -- no more and no less.
IV.
To be sure, we are acutely aware of the fact that
applying such a definition does not always prove an easy task (as
illustrated above), and that rejecting the legal bases of the
Snyder decision -- a decision which, as the bankruptcy court noted,
has been followed numerous times both within and outside this
circuit, see In re Minkina, 631 B.R. at 550 (collecting cases) --
could create some uncertainty. However, on that note, there are
also reasons to be skeptical of the proposition that the fair
market value of any debtor's share in a tenancy by the entirety
equals the full value of the property "as of the date of the filing
of the petition," given the encumbrances discussed above. 11
U.S.C. § 522(a)(2); see In re Naples, 521 B.R. 715, 717 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 2014) (postulating that to conclude that a spouse being
"seized of the whole [tenancy] means valuing the [spouse's]
interest of all of the equity value [of the
property] . . . [ignores] the freedom that one entireties tenant
has to alienate his or her own undivided interest" (citing In re
Levinson, 372 B.R. 582 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007))); In re Bradigan,
501 B.R. 151, 154 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013) ("Although fully seized
- 20 - of the whole, the separate interest of one spouse is subject to
rights of the co-owner. By reason of this limitation, we must
value the debtor's interest at something less that the interest of
a single owner in fee simple absolute."); Town of N. Reading v.
Welch, 711 N.E.2d 603, 605 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (noting, in the
context of a tax foreclosure on a property held in a tenancy by
the entirety, that "[t]he actuarial value of [the spouse's]
survivorship interest . . . is likely to be less than the fair
market value of the locus unencumbered").
Bankruptcy courts are in the best position to divine
fair market value in any individual case, and we go no further
than to reiterate the need to focus on the text of the Code. The
task in this appeal is simple enough at this juncture: the
stipulation stands, because neither state nor federal law requires
a valuation of Minkina's interest as the full value of her home,
and the bankruptcy court thus correctly accepted the valuation of
- 21 - no more than $525,000.8 The bankruptcy court's order is therefore
affirmed.9
8 RPS also urges us to cap Minkina's homestead exemption for the purposes of the § 522(f) formula at 50 percent if we affirm the bankruptcy court's order (as we have done). The firm claims that, because Massachusetts law provides that a homestead exemption "shall remain whole and unallocated" in the case of a tenancy by the entirety or a joint tenancy, but the bankruptcy court's valuation approach ostensibly constitutes "treating each individual as a tenant in common," we should treat the homestead exemption in line with provisions for the latter, as well. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1. However, as explained above, abiding by the no more than $525,000 valuation does not negate the nature of Minkina and her husband's tenancy by the entirety. RPS's argument is therefore unavailing. 9 Our holding in this case is limited to Massachusetts law and -- as illustrated above -- is intertwined with the SJC's holding in Coraccio that a tenant by the entirety may convey her share in the tenancy. We express no opinion on whether the outcome would be different in a jurisdiction where such a conveyance would not be allowed.
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