Roden v. Floyd

District Court, E.D. Michigan·Decided April 17, 2020·No. 2:16-cv-11208·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

JONATHAN RODEN,

Plaintiff, Case No. 16-11208 District Judge Victoria A. Roberts v. Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti

MICHELLE FLOYD, et al.,

Defendants. _______________________/

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND CIVIL CONTEMPT [ECF No. 113] I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jonathan Roden (“Roden”) filed a Motion for Sanctions and Civil Contempt against Defendants Michelle Floyd, Richard Cady, and Shawn Brewer, all Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) employees. Roden alleges a host of discovery violations pertaining to his First Amendment retaliation action. He claims Defendants transferred him to another correctional facility because he filed multiple grievances against them. Roden asks the Court to: (1) establish Defendants’ liability for retaliation and due process violations, grant his Motion for Summary

Judgment [ECF No. 106] and award $50,000 plus interest and costs; (2) reimburse Roden $5,500 for discovery costs; and (3) set his remaining claim of conspiracy to manufacture a sexual harassment for trial with evidentiary

restrictions. Because Roden fails to show by clear and convincing evidence that Defendants violated any court order, or that Defendants engaged in bad faith

conduct, the Court DENIES his Motion. The standard for sanctions is high, and the Court does not find Defendants’ conduct sanctionable. However, Defendants must amend and/or supplement their discovery responses as

outlined in this order by April 30, 2020. II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Roden filed a Motion to Compel Shawn Brewer to provide answers to several discovery requests. [ECF No. 80]. Magistrate Judge Patti ordered Brewer to supplement and/or amend his responses to several discovery

requests by March 27, 2019. [ECF No. 89, PageID.1294]. Request No. 7 required Defendants to disclose “all facility wide [sic] J-

Pay messages sent from [Brewer] to JCF population concerning more phones being requested, denied, and approved sent between May 1, 2015 and June 7, 2015.” Brewer objected to the request, saying he was not in

possession of and did not have access to the requested messages since he was no longer assigned to the Cotton Correctional Facility. Magistrate Judge Patti sustained the objection and found that Roden failed to show that

Brewer, in his capacity, had access to the requested messages. Magistrate Judge Patti noted that MDOC had since transitioned from J-Pay to a new third-party vendor.

Roden objected to this finding. He stated that while J-Pay is no longer used to deposit money into prisoner accounts, MDOC still utilizes J-Pay for “all electronic messaging communications and media.” [ECF No. 90,

PageID.1297]. Roden explained the process by which Brewer could access messages he sent through the system while he was the Cotton Correctional Facility warden.

The Court held a status conference on November 12, 2019. The Court ordered defense counsel to contact the MDOC Office of Legal Affairs at the Cotton Facility, and find out who had possession, custody, and control of the

requested information. [ECF No. 110]. After a second status conference on November 21, 2019, the Court ordered defense counsel – in his capacity as counsel for the MDOC – to obtain and provide Roden with the requested J- Pay records that were in the possession, custody, or control of MDOC personnel. [ECF No. 111]. Defense counsel filed proof of service on

December 5, 2019. He certified that he served one J-Pay message via first class mail to Roden. This message is dated June 24, 2015, Bates Numbered RODEN001049. The Court notes that this message is outside the range of

dates Roden requested. Now, Roden says what remains in dispute are responsive J-Pay messages within the range of dates requested, texts, and emails from MDOC

employees J. Rohrig and M. Bennett. He also alleges Defendants made several false submissions to the Court throughout this litigation.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Roden cites Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b) and (c), and 11(b) and (c) as the bases for his Motion.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), a district court may sanction parties for failure to comply with discovery orders in several ways. “A district court

unquestionably has the power to hold a litigant in civil contempt for failure to comply with a discovery order.” United States v. Conces, 507 F.3d 1028, 1041 (6th Cir. 2007). The moving party must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the party to be held in contempt violated a court order. Id. at 1042 (citing Grace v. Ctr. For Auto Safety, 72 F.3d 1236, 1241 (6th Cir. 1996). “The order in question must be ‘definite and specific,’ and ‘ambiguities

must be resolved in favor of” the persons alleged to be in contempt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Except where Rule 37(c) applies, Rule 37(b) usually has “no application” where there is no court order. United States v. Reyes, 307 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2002). Under Rule 37(c), the Court may impose appropriate sanctions for a party’s failure “to provide information or identify a witness as

required by Rule 26(a) or (e).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). See E.E.O.C. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 295 F.R.D. 166, 173 (S.D. Ohio, Fed. 28, 2013).

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, a Court may impose appropriate sanctions “when a party submits to the court pleadings, motions or papers that are presented for an improper purpose, are not warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous extension of the law, or if the allegations and factual contentions

do not have evidentiary support.” First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 501, 510 (6th Cir. 2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) through (3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). However, Rule 11 – by its own

terms – “does not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 37.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(d). Independent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court has the inherent authority to sanction parties for bad faith conduct in

litigation. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (“[W]hen there is bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately sanctioned under the Rules, the court should ordinarily rely on the Rules

rather than the inherent power. But if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.”).

IV.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Roden v. Floyd, (E.D. Mich. 2020).

Roden v. Floyd (Roden v. Floyd) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related