Rock v. State

681 A.2d 901, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 217, 1996 WL 454778

• Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
• Decided: August 9, 1996
• Docket: 94-618-Appeal
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

MURRAY, Justice.

The case before us is a wrongful-death action filed by the plaintiffs, Peter J. Rock and Linda K. Rock (plaintiffs), against a number of defendants including the State of Rhode Island and Motoring Technical Services, Inc. (Motoring). This action arises out of the sexual assault and murder of the plaintiffs’ minor daughter, Kimberly Ann Rock, by Robert Jewett (Jewett). During the course of the proceedings below, Motoring filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the Superior Court on August 30, 1994. This case comes before us now on the appeal by the plaintiffs from the summary judgment entered in favor of Motoring. This appeal therefore involves the defendant Motoring only. After reviewing the record before us, we affirm the Superior Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Motoring.

The facts giving rise to the instant appeal are as follows. Jewett was an inmate at the Rhode Island Training School (training school), serving a sentence on a charge of first-degree sexual assault of a twelve-year-old girl; Jewett was a minor at the time he was charged with that crime. While incarcerated, Jewett participated in a temporary community-placement program with Motoring. Motoring is a private vocational-training school open to the general public.

In his application to the program at Motoring, Jewett indicated that he was incarcerated for breaking and entering only. Neither Jewett nor Robert McCutcheon (McCut-cheon), in his capacity as an agent for the state, provided any information to Motoring regarding Jewett’s prior adjudication for sexual assault. McCutcheon did inform Motoring, however, that Jewett was to be treated “like any other student.” Jewett was not to be given any special supervision. He also informed Motoring that Jewett would be escorted to and from Motoring’s premises in a state transport van and that Jewett was to eat his lunch on the premises. In addition, Motoring was to contact the training school whenever Jewett was absent or whenever a disciplinary problem arose. On or about January 22, 1990, Jewett began classes at Motoring.

On February 8, 1990, during a morning recess, Jewett left Motoring’s premises. He entered plaintiffs’ home, which was located approximately one block from Motoring, and sexually assaulted and murdered plaintiffs’ minor daughter. On October 30, 1991, Jew-ett pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The plaintiffs have now filed the instant wrongful-death action against numerous defendants including Motoring. In regard to their claim against Motoring, the complaint alleged that “Motoring owed a duty of care to Kimberly Ann Rock which included, inter alia, a duty to adequately monitor and supervise Training School inmate Robert E. Jewett while he was a participant in the [temporary-community placement] Program at Defendant M[otoring] S[chool].” Motoring subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to plaintiffs under the facts of the instant case. The Superior Court justice agreed and found that Motoring did not owe a duty to plaintiffs. On August 30, 1994, summary judgment was entered in favor of Motoring. The plaintiffs have now filed the instant appeal with this court. As we address the issues raised in this appeal, any additional facts as may be necessary will be provided.

We pause now to make an observation with respect to one of the facts as related by the dissent. We find nothing in the record before us in reference to the deposition of Thomas Ring that would have alerted Motoring, in this first-time venture with the state, that this inmate had violent tendencies. The cases quoted in the dissent involve entities which were in the business of admitting inmates. The case before us involves an entity, which as the record indicates, did not make it a business to take in inmates. This was Motoring’s first and last contact with the penal system of the State of Rhode Island.

When reviewing the granting or the denial of a motion for summary judgment, this court applies the same analysis that the motion justice applied. See E.W. Audet & Sons, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 635 A.2d 1181 (R.I.1994). Rule 56(e) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as [a] matter of law.” Our review includes examining the pleadings and the affidavits in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. E.W. Audet & Sons, Inc., 635 A.2d at 1185. We shall uphold the Superior Court’s order granting summary judgment “[o]nly when our review reveals no issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Barratt v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219, 1220 (R.I.1985).

Here plaintiffs argue that the trial justice erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Motoring. They contend that material issues of fact exist regarding Motoring’s negligence in supervising Jewett and in placing him in an adult program which allowed him to roam freely off the school premises. We note that in order for plaintiffs to recover in a negligence action, they must prove, inter alia, a duty or an obligation owed by Motoring. Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 685 (R.I.1994) (“[a] defendant cannot be liable under a negligence theory unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff’). Accordingly, the threshold issue to be determined on appeal is whether Motoring owed a duty to plaintiffs in the instant case.

We have stated that as a general rule the existence of a duty is a question for the court and not for the jury. See id; Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1224 (R.I.1987). This court has previously recognized the difficulty of constructing a workable test to determine whether a duty exists in a particular case. See Ferreira, 636 A.2d at 685. We have stated that foreseeability of harm to a plaintiff is a factor to be considered when evaluating whether a duty exists. Builders Specialty Co. v. Goulet, 639 A.2d 59, 60 (R.I.1994); see Banks, 522 A.2d at 1225. However, “foreseeability of injury does not, in and of itself, give rise to a duty.” Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1051 (R.I.1994). We are mindful that any consideration regarding the existence of a duty in a particular case “should reflect considerations of public policy, as well as notions of fairness.” Ferreira, 636 A.2d at 685.

In light of the above principles we now turn to the specific issue before us, which is whether Motoring owed a duty to plaintiffs. For the reasons stated below, we are not persuaded by plaintiffs’ contentions that Motoring was under a duty to supervise Jewett or that Motoring was under a duty to investigate further into Jewett’s juvenile record in order to prevent the type of harm sustained by plaintiffs as a result of Jewett’s criminal actions. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Motoring could have reasonably foreseen that Jewett would leave Motoring’s premises and sexually assault and murder plaintiffs’ minor daughter.

We note, as the Superior Court indicated, that Motoring is not a custodial or a penal facility. It is a vocational school open to the public and therefore is under no obligation to maintain continuous supervision of its students. See Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 88 Cal.App.3d 342, 151 Cal.Rptr. 796 (1979) (a private drug rehabilitation center to which courts referred some offenders owed no duty to the general public with respect to the precautions it took against escape of those persons who were referred to it and were accepted so that a member of the public who was shot by one who escaped from the center could not recover from the center on a negligence theory). See also Smith v. Day, 148 Vt. 595, 538 A.2d 157 (1987) (although the university exercised a large degree of control over student activities and imposed stringent rules and regulations governing student life at the university, it did not have a legal duty to control the volitional criminal acts of its students).

Although Motoring knew that Jewett was transported to and from its premises in a state-owned van and that Motoring was to inform the state if Jewett left its premises, the record before us indicates that the state never requested Motoring to provide custodial services in regard to Jewett’s attendance at Motoring. In fact, the state, through its representative, dispelled any reason for Motoring’s providing continuous supervision of Jewett while he attended classes at Motoring. The state portrayed Jewett as a highly motivated individual and indicated that he was among “the best kids [who were] allowed to utilize this opportunity in terms of working off grounds.” The state also informed Motoring that Jewett had been allowed to spend weekends away from the training school and that only one adult was required to supervise him during the weekends. It appears that the state persuaded Motoring to treat Jewett as it would any other student attending its program. In these circumstances we are not persuaded that Motoring could have reasonably foreseen that Jewett would leave its premises and subsequently commit a criminal act. We are therefore of the opinion that the trial justice correctly found that Motoring owed no duty to supervise Jewett or to prevent him from leaving its premises.

Moreover, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, the mere fact that Jewett was an inmate at the training school was not sufficient to place Motoring on notice that it was dealing with a potentially dangerous individual or that Motoring was under a duty to investigate further into Jewett’s juvenile record. We note that Motoring was never fully informed of Jewett’s criminal background. The record indicates that when Motoring questioned Jewett and the state regarding the reasons for Jewett’s confinement, Jewett informed Motoring that he was incarcerated for a breaking and entering charge only. Neither he nor the state apprised Motoring of the rape and attempted-strangulation charge. As the Superior Court noted, Motoring could not have obtained, nor was it able to obtain, such information. Because Jewett was a juvenile at the time he was adjudicated of the charge of rape and attempted strangulation, Motoring was precluded from obtaining this information pursuant to G.L.1956 § 42-72-8.¹ We therefore cannot conclude that Motoring could have reasonably foreseen that Jewett would enter plaintiffs’ home and sexually assault and murder plaintiffs’ minor daughter.

We are mindful that the facts of this case as construed by the dissent could seduce one into a belief in an interpretation of the law that would impose a duty upon the Motoring. Unfortunately, the facts of the record do not support such a construction. There is not a shred of evidence that Motoring had the slightest notice that Jewett was dangerous or had been so regarded by the authorities at the training school. Indeed, the evidence and the record indicate precisely the contrary. He was represented to Motoring as a good student who was about to be released from custody. The fact of the mode of transportation by van from the training school to Motoring’s premises was utterly without significance. Any training school resident would be so transported. The dissent attempts to characterize Motoring as a jailer. It was not. It was a vocational school and nothing else. The citation of Welsh Manufacturing, Division of Textron, Inc. v. Pinkerton’s, Inc. 474 A.2d 436 (R.I.1984), is without relevance. In that case Pinkerton was in the security business and hired a young man to guard a gold supply without having checked him out adequately to ascertain that he had a criminal record. Pinkerton’s obligation bore no relationship whatever to that of Motoring, which was neither a jailer nor a security agency. It is significant to note that Jewett was the first and only resident of the training school who had ever been referred to Motoring as a student.

Given the totality of the circumstances in the instant case, we cannot conclude that Jewett’s actions were within the scope of foreseeability. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Jewett would leave Motoring’s premises, arrive at plaintiffs’ home, and sexually assault and murder plaintiffs’ minor daughter. We therefore agree with the Superior Court’s determination that defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiffs in the instant case.²

If the leap of logic suggested by the dissent were to become the law of the State of Rhode Island, such options as work-release programs for adult offenders and off-premises education and rehabilitative programs for residents of the training school would come to an abrupt end. The parties responsible for determining whether a resident can be given educational or vocational training off the training school premises are solely that of the parties who are in charge of the training school. We do not enhance this duty by punishing the innocent. If Jewett had been sent into a university or a secondary school setting for off-premises education, he would not then have become subject to a custodial arrangement. The duty of custody remains that of the state, not of an educational institution which is persuaded to accept a resident for the limited purpose of education and training.

In reaching our decision today, we are mindful that any consideration in the instant case must reflect not only public policy but also notions of fairness. As indicated earlier, Motoring was under no obligation to treat Jewett differently from other students attending its program, was never informed of Jewett’s juvenile record regarding the earlier charge of rape and attempted strangulation, and was precluded by law from obtaining such information. In these specific circumstances we believe that it would be contrary to fundamental notions of fairness to impose a duty upon Motoring in situations in which Jewett’s actions were volitional criminal acts for which Motoring had absolutely no reasonably foreseeable notice.

Since we find that no duty was owed by Motoring to the plaintiffs in the instant matter, we need not reach the plaintiffs’ remaining issues raised on appeal. We are of the opinion that the trial justice did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant Motoring. We therefore affirm the summary judgment entered in Superior Court. The plaintiffs’ appeal is denied and dismissed, and the papers of this case are remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings against the remaining defendants.

1 . General Laws 1956 § 42-72-8(a) provides that "[a]ny records of the department pertaining to children and their families in need of service pursuant to the provisions of this chapter or for whom an application for services has been made shall be confidential and only disclosed as provided by law.” Although disclosure of confidential information is permitted under certain circumstances as provided for in the statute, there is nothing in the record before us to indicate that Jewett’s juvenile records may he disclosed under those particular exceptions.

2 . Because plaintiffs in the instant case have failed to show that Motoring knew or should have known that Jewett would cause bodily harm to others if not controlled, their reliance on the Restatement (Second) Torts § 319 is misplaced. The Restatement (Second) Torts § 319 provides that ”[o]ne who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.” (Emphasis added.) The plaintiffs’ reliance on case law which comports with the principles § 319 is equally unpersuasive. See Dudley v. Offender Aid and Restoration of Richmond, Inc., 241 Va. 270, 401 S.E.2d 878 (1991).