Rocio Boheli Mokara v. Warden Chuck DeRosa, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Rocio Boheli Mokara, No. CV-26-01653-PHX-KML (ASB)

10 Petitioner,

11 v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

12 Warden Chuck DeRosa, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 TO THE HONORABLE KRISSA M. LANHAM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 16 JUDGE: Pending before the Court is pro se Rocio Boheli Mokara’s Petition for a Writ of 17 Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1)1, filed on March 9, 2026. Petitioner is 18 detained at Eloy Detention Center and seeks release from immigration custody or a bond 19 hearing. (Id. at 1, 7.) For the reasons that follow, undersigned recommends the Petition be 20 denied in part and granted in part. 21 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 22 The facts before this Court appear largely undisputed. (See Docs. 1, 12.) Petitioner 23 is a citizen of Equatorial Guinea who entered the United States without inspection on 24 November 6, 2024, at or near Sasabe, Arizona. (Doc. 12-1 at 1.) Petitioner was considered 25 subject to removal from the U.S. pursuant to § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and 26 Nationality Act (“INA”) as an “alien present in the United States without being admitted 27

28 1 Citation to the record indicates documents as they are displayed in the District of Arizona’s official Court electronic document filing system under Case No. CV-26-01653-PHX-KML (ASB). 1 or paroled[.]” (Id. at 1-4.) It is unclear from the record when Petitioner entered Immigration 2 and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody, but Petitioner was released from ICE custody 3 in Louisiana on December 18, 2024, into the custody of her sponsor, Lori Portillo. (Doc. 1 4 at 12-15.) Ms. Portillo lives in Yucca Valley, California with her family. (Id.) Petitioner 5 remained with her sponsor, Ms. Portillo, until July 9, 2025, when Petitioner was again 6 detained by ICE. (Id. at 12.) Petitioner had attended her immigration hearing in March 7 2025, in Santa Ana, California, where she was told to return home and would be informed 8 of her next court date because the immigration court did not yet have records for her. (Id.) 9 On July 9, 2025, Petitioner and her sponsor went into the ICE Office in San Bernardino, 10 California for a “routine reporting visit” and Petitioner was detained. (Id.) According to 11 Petitioner’s sponsor, “[n]o reason was given to us by the ICE Officers as to why [Petitioner] 12 was being detained again.” (Id.) Petitioner’s sponsor attests that she is “extremely eager, 13 willing, and able to provide the [Petitioner] with accommodation, free room and board, at 14 [her] house[.]” (Id. at 13.) She argues that Petitioner “has only been a source of pure joy to all of us in the community, and is neither a flight risk, nor a danger to any person in our 15 community.” (Id.) Petitioner pleads in her Petition that her health has declined since being 16 in ICE custody, as she has suffered a knee injury and deterioration of her vision in her left 17 eye. (Id. at 22.) Petitioner also includes in her Petition affidavits and letters of support from 18 other members of the Yucca Valley community, as well as medical records to substantiate 19 her claims regarding her deteriorating physical condition. (See id. at 12-25.) 20 Based on the record before this Court, it appears Petitioner was given an “in custody 21 redetermination proceeding” before an immigration judge (“IJ”) on August 5, 2025. (Doc. 22 1 at 10.) The IJ denied Petitioner’s motion for a custody redetermination “due to lack of 23 jurisdiction” but included an alternative finding, where, if there were jurisdiction, 24 Petitioner should be released on a $3,500 bond. (Id.) On December 5, 2025, an immigration 25 judge ordered Petitioner removed. (Doc. 12 at 1.) Petitioner pleads that although she was 26 ordered removed, the IJ “found [her] testimony to be credible throughout the process.” 27 (Doc. 1 at 5.) Petitioner’s sponsor attests in her affidavit “I am informed and believe, and 28 thereon state that [Petitioner] was given a credible fear interview by [Department of 1 Homeland Security] Officials[] before she was paroled into the U.S.[] to apply for asylum.” 2 (Id. at 13.) Petitioner filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on 3 December 5, 2025. (Id. at 5.) 4 Petitioner filed a Petition in this Court on March 9, 2026, in which she contests her 5 detention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner filed three claims in her 6 Petition, which were previously summarized by the Court as follows: 7 Petitioner contends her prolonged detention violates her due process rights (Ground One), is arbitrary (Ground Two), and is unreasonable and punitive 8 due to the conditions of her confinement (Ground Three). She seeks 9 immediate release or a bond hearing. 10 (Doc. 3 at 2.) This Court dismissed Ground Three of the Petition and ordered Respondents 11 to answer Grounds One and Two. (Id.) In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that her prolonged detention without individualized review violates the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. 12 (Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner argues that “[a]t no point has any neutral decision-maker evaluated 13 whether my decision is justified, leaving me detained for many months without any 14 individualized custody review.” (Id.) In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that her continued 15 detention is arbitrary because the immigration judge found her suitable for release in the 16 bond hearing but lacked jurisdiction to grant bond. (Id.) 17 Respondents Eric Rokosky; U.S. Attorney General Pamela Bondi; and U.S. ICE 18 Acting Director Todd Lyons (collectively, “Respondents”)2 filed a Response to Court 19 Order on April 8, 2026. (Doc. 12.) In their Response, Respondents argue that the Petition 20 should be denied because Petitioner’s detention is statutorily authorized and constitutional. 21 (Id. at 2-5.) Respondents also argue that “only Warden Eric Rokosky is a proper 22 respondent.” (Id. at 1.)3 Respondents assert that Petitioner’s detention is lawful pursuant to 23

24 2 Petitioner initially named “Chuck DeRosa, Eloy Detention Center Warden, AFOD of ICE, ICE Director, and Attorney General” as Respondents. (See Doc. 1.) Pursuant to this Court’s March 25 16, 2026 Order, Eric Rokosky replaced Respondent Chuck DeRosa, Acting ICE Director Todd Lyons replaced Respondent ICE Director, and Pamela Bondi replaced Respondent Attorney 26 General. (See Doc. 5 at 4.) Respondent ICE Acting Field Office Director (AFOD of ICE) was dismissed as a Respondent. (See id.) 27 3 Respondents thus request that the Court dismiss all Respondents other than Warden Rokosky. (Doc. 12 at 2.) “[L]ongstanding practice confirms that in habeas challenges to present 28 physical confinement-‘core challenges’-the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote 1 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), because Petitioner’s immigration appeal remains 2 pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and Petitioner is not subject to 3 an administratively final order of removal. (Id. at 2.) Respondents argue that Petitioner is 4 subject to mandatory detention as an applicant for admission. (Id. at 2-3.) Respondents also 5 argue that Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. 6 Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), a class action out of the Central District of California, has no 7 preclusive effect outside of the Central District of California. (Id. at 4-5) (citing a Ninth 8 Circuit temporary stay of the Bautista judgment). 9 Petitioner has not filed a Reply with the Court, and the time for such Reply has now 10 elapsed.4 (See Doc. 5.) 11 II. GOVERNING STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 12 “The writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within 13 the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. 14 I, § 9, cl. 2). Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in federal custody if the petitioner can demonstrate he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 15 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Accordingly, federal courts have 16 jurisdiction to grant writs of habeas corpus to non-citizens who are being unlawfully 17 detained under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956 (9th 18 Cir. 2012) (“The writ of habeas corpus historically provides a remedy to non-citizens 19 challenging executive detention.”) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301-303 (2001)); 20 21 supervisory official.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). The Ninth Circuit further 22 clarified this position and “affirm[ed] the application of the immediate custodian and district of confinement rules to core habeas petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, including those filed 23 by immigrant detainees.” Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024). However, other courts in this Circuit have found that Doe “did not necessarily preclude naming more than one 24 respondent so long as the immediate custodian is named.” See, e.g., Doe v. Chestnut, 810 F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1169 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Gonzalez Elias v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Det. 25 Facility, No. 1:26-CV-01835-JLT-EPG, 2026 WL 901288, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2026). Because Petitioner names his immediate custodian, and this Court has already dismissed improper 26 Respondents (see Doc. 5), undersigned declines to dismiss the other Respondents. 4 Based on the Referral Order issued by this Court, Petitioner had 10 days from the date of 27 service of Respondents’ Answer to file a Reply. (Doc. 5 at 5.) Respondents filed their Answer (“Response to Court Order”) on April 8, 2026, and included a Certificate of Service to Petitioner, 28 dated April 8, 2026. (Doc. 12.) Accordingly, based on the record before this Court, this Petition became ripe for ruling 11 days later, on April 19, 2026. 1 Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[D]istrict courts retain 2 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to immigration detention 3 that are sufficiently independent of the merits of the removal order”) (citation omitted). 4 Respondents do not dispute this Court’s jurisdiction over considering Petitioner’s 5 prolonged detention. (See Doc. 12.) 6 The statutory scheme at issue here involves two statutory provisions governing the 7 detention of non-citizens: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. Governing the detention of 8 “applicants for admission” is 8 U.S.C. § 1225. The statute defines “applicants for 9 admission” as “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who 10 arrives in the United States” following inspection by immigration authorities. 8 U.S.C. § 11 1225. On the other hand, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs the “apprehension and detention of 12 aliens” and provides a discretionary framework regarding the detention of a non-citizen 13 “who is statutorily inadmissible (for example, if they appear at the border without a proper 14 travel document), but may be entitled to admission or withholding of removal, such as a noncitizen who has no criminal history, who has not previously been removed from the 15 United States, and who has stated a credible fear of persecution if removed to the country 16 of their birth.” See Gomez v. Doe, No. CV 25-03255-PHX-JJT (CDB), 2025 WL 3269886, 17 at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 3, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Gomez v. 18 Unknown Party, 2025 WL 3269055 (D. Ariz. Nov. 24, 2025). According to 8 U.S.C. § 19 1226(a), “an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is 20 to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending 21 such decision, the Attorney General...may continue to detain the arrested alien; and...may 22 release the alien on...bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing 23 conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or...conditional parole.” 24 As this Court has previously recognized, the detention analysis changes based on 25 whether a non-citizen is detained pursuant to § 1225 or § 1226. See Echevarria v. Bondi, 26 No. CV-25-03252-PHX-DWL (ESW), 2025 WL 2821282, at *4-9 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025), 27 appeal dismissed, No. 25-7569, 2026 WL 595586 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026). Courts in this 28 Circuit and across the country have continued to grapple with whether a non-citizen is an 1 “arriving alien” and thus subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225 as an 2 “applicant for admission,” or if rather the non-citizen was “already present in the United 3 States” and thus subject to the detention parameters in 8 U.S.C. § 1226. See id. (collecting 4 cases and analyzing the statutory framework of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226). While some 5 courts disagree, the majority of district courts have “concluded that an alien in Petitioner’s 6 situation (i.e., an alien who entered the United States without inspection, never formally 7 applied for admission, and has been living in the United States for years or decades) is 8 entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a).” Id. at 4 (collecting cases); but cf. Chavez v. 9 Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ---, No. CV-26-00323-PHX-MTL-JFM, 2026 WL 381618, at *1 (D. 10 Ariz. Feb. 9, 2026) (collecting cases indicating that while most district courts arrived at the 11 conclusion that non-citizens living in the U.S. “for years or decades” were entitled to a 12 bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), many district courts did not). Accordingly, 13 undersigned will follow the “dozens of other district courts” that “have recently held that 14 immigration petitioners present in the United States without admission are not applicants for admission under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and, therefore, are not subject to mandatory 15 detention.” Rodriguez v. Bondi, No. CV-25-03917-PHX-JJT (DMF), 2025 WL 4058331, 16 at *2 n.2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 6, 2025) (collecting cases). 17 III. ANALYSIS 18 In the present action, Petitioner arrived in the United States on November 6, 2024, 19 at or near Sasabe, Arizona. (Doc. 12-1 at 1.) According to the documents provided by 20 Respondent, Petitioner was considered “an alien present in the United States without being 21 admitted or paroled” and was classified as subject to removal pursuant to § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) 22 of the INA. (Id. at 1-4.) Petitioner was then released from ICE custody on December 18, 23 2024, and lived in Yucca Valley, California, until she was again detained by ICE at her 24 routine reporting visit on July 9, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 12-15.) While Respondents argue that 25 Petitioner “is an applicant for admission” and thus subject to mandatory detention, “[i]t is 26 unclear why Respondents persist in this belief when she was placed in removal proceedings 27 under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the [INA] as ‘[a]n alien present in the United States 28 without having been admitted or paroled,’ and not as ‘an arriving alien’ and applicant for 1 admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).” See Rodriguez, 2025 WL 4058331, at *2. 2 After Petitioner was detained near the border, she was released into the country “in 3 effect paroled into the United States, on recognizance.” See Gomez, 2025 WL 3269886, at 4 *10. Accordingly, Petitioner would not be considered an “applicant for admission” after “a 5 determination was made that [Petitioner] should not be in custody[.]” See id.; see also 6 Echevarria, 2025 WL 2821282, at *6 (“Given that an immigrant submits an ‘application 7 for admission’ at a distinct point in time, stretching the phrase ‘at the time of application 8 for admission’ to refer to a period of years would push the statutory text beyond its breaking 9 point.”) (quoting Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2020)). Undersigned will 10 follow the majority view by this District, as detailed in Echevarria, and find that Petitioner, 11 as a non-citizen released into the United States, is appropriately considered under the 8 12 U.S.C. § 1226(a) framework. Thus, undersigned will recommend that this Court find 13 Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 14 IV. CONCLUSION AND REMEDY Having concluded that Petitioner is not an “arriving alien” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 15 and her detention is thus governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), undersigned will recommend 16 that this Court grant the Petition in part. Specifically, undersigned will recommend that this 17 Court order a bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator that complies with the requirements 18 set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). In the alternative, should the 19 District Judge find that the bond has already been assessed by the IJ pursuant to its 20 alternative determination, undersigned will recommend the District Judge release 21 Petitioner according to the previously determined bond of $3,500. (See Doc. 1 at 10); see 22 Zepeda v. Noem, No. CV-25-04236-PHX-KML-JFM, slip op. at 3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 11, 2025) 23 (ordering release of Petitioner upon payment of previously-ordered bond); Aldana 24 Sanabria v. Rosa, No. CV-25-04439-PHX-JJT (ASB), 2025 WL 3561632, at *2 (D. Ariz. 25 Dec. 11, 2025) (ordering Petitioner’s release in compliance with the IJ’s alternative bond 26 determination). 27 In addition to a bond hearing, Petitioner requests immediate release from detention. 28 (See Doc. 1.) Courts in this Circuit have found in situations similar to Petitioner’s that a 1 bond hearing before an IJ is the appropriate remedy. See Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 2 3d 870, 882-883 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (“The [c]ourt finds, consistent with other post-Jennings5 3 cases, that the appropriate remedy is a bond hearing before an immigration judge rather 4 than immediate release.”) (collecting cases). 5 Accordingly, undersigned recommends the Petition (Doc. 1) be granted in part 6 (insofar as a bond hearing is granted or the previously determined bond is followed) and 7 denied in part (denying other requested relief). 8 RECOMMENDATION 9 Based on the foregoing, 10 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas 11 Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be granted in part and denied in part as 12 follows: 13 1. Undersigned recommends that the Court grant Petitioner’s request for a bond 14 hearing and order that, within thirty (30) days of the date her Petition being granted, Petitioner be afforded a bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator at 15 which hearing the government must bear the burden of showing that Petitioner 16 should not be released on bond because she is a flight risk or a danger to the 17 community or Petitioner be released upon her payment of the previously- 18 ordered bond of $3,500; 19 2. It is recommended that the Court order Respondents to provide a notice of 20 compliance to this Court within seven days of releasing Petitioner or providing 21 her with a bond hearing. 22 3. It is recommended all other forms of relief in the Petition be denied. 23 EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION 24 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 25 Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 26 Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 27 28 5 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) |] parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 2|| which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. 3|| R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a 4|| response to the objections. 5 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 6 || Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 7 || district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 8 || 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the || Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the || findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 11 || recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 12 Dated this 22nd day of April, 2026.

amawiis Alison S. Bachus 16 United States Magistrate Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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