Rochford v. State

153 Misc. 239, 274 N.Y.S. 656, 1934 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1716
CourtNew York Court of Claims
DecidedSeptember 20, 1934
DocketClaim No. 23586
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 153 Misc. 239 (Rochford v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rochford v. State, 153 Misc. 239, 274 N.Y.S. 656, 1934 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1716 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1934).

Opinion

Ryan, J.

Claimants were seized and in possession of a parcel of land consisting of seventy-one one-hundredths of an acre situate in the town and village of Van Etten, Chemung county. Their title extended back to January 3, 1838, and the land laid between the Susquehanna turnpike, now Waverly street, on the east and the Seneca Lake road, now Main street, on the north. Susquehanna turnpike, or Waverly street, runs in a direction from southwest to northeast and Seneca Lake road, or Main street, runs in a direction from slightly northwest to slightly southeast. They intersect at an acute angle, their boundary lines forming an apex of a triangle which with an unplotted line incloses approximately 1,101 square feet of land with which we are particularly concerned. The unplotted line is determined by a row of boulders, seven in number, stretched in an arc across the front of the building on the premises, bordering on a grass plot and painted white.' The property is improved with a frame structure which has stood, upwards of one hundred years and which' constitutes the village hotel.. It faces towards the intersection, its main entrance located directly southwesterly of the triangular plot of ground.

The intersection of Waverly and Main streets in front of claimants’ premises is the business center and “ Four Comers ” of the village of Van Etten. From this point Waverly street éxtends northeasterly, becoming Front street. Running from the intersection to the southeast is Warner street, which crossed the Lehigh Valley railroad at a grade at a point several hundred feet distant from claimants’ property.

[241]*241Pursuant to chapter 678 of the Laws of 1928, the grade crossing on Warner street was eliminated. In bringing about this elimination Warner street was cut off and a new road constructed lying between Warner street and Waverly street, its center line running practically due south from the apex of the triangle hereinabove described. As this road proceeded south it was graded up and carried over the railroad on a bridge structure. Final approval of this elimination work was given by the Public Service Commission on February 13, 1934.

Prior to the work of elimination, the 1,101 square feet of land comprising the triangular piece was rough and rutted and consisted merely of the natural soil and gravel lying between the intersection of the two streets. Unquestionably it had been driven over and upon for many years by users of the public highway, particularly in making a short cut from Waverly street into Main street, or vice versa. With the closing of Warner street and the opening of the new road this triangular piece was brought directly into the line of traffic and if left in its natural state would have become a serious menace to travel. A view of the situation would convince any reasonable person of the necessity of acquiring this triangular piece of land and including it as part of the public highway. This so impressed the engineers for the State that under their direction the contractor who was completing the elimination work proceeded on or about July 8, 1933, over the vigorous protests of the claimants, to fill in the rough and rutted spot with gravel, finishing the same a few days later with a tar and stone compound which was rolled down and leveled to an approved smooth road surface. Thenceforth the eye of the traveler found no distinction between the surface of the 1,101 square foot piece and the surface of the adjoining Waverly street and of the new road. In other words, the action of the State made the 1,101 square feet of land indisputably a physical part of the highway.

■ Before us is the question, What was the legal status of the 1,101 square feet of land prior to July 8, 1933, and what was the legal effect of the State's action? We repeat that there is no question in this case that under their deeds and chain of title, the claimants were seized in fee of the 1,101 square feet of land. They have never dedicated it to the public use.

Claimants have proceeded upon the theory that the State by its action has entered into permanent possession of the said parcel and has actually and permanently taken and appropriated it for railroad grade crossing elimination purposes and that they are entitled to be compensated in damages for the difference between the fair market value of their whole property just prior to the [242]*242taking and the value of the remainder immediately thereafter. Concededly no map or description of the land in question has been approved by or filed in any department of the State or filed in the Chemung county clerk’s office, and no notice of appropriation has been served upon the claimants. This is the first defense of the State. We shall return to it later.

The chief defense is that the triangular piece of land in question had become a highway by user. In support of this many witnesses were called; some whose recollection went back beyond fifty years. In general this testimony was to the effect that the triangular piece of land had never been barricaded or posted with signs and had always been driven over and was always in the same condition of gravel and dirt prior to July 8, 1933. One of the most important witnesses for the State was Fred Hotchkiss, who was seventy-eight years old and had lived in the village since 1881 and prior to that time had lived nearby. He testified that he had known the.property for fifty-seven years and from 1886 to 1898 had owned and operated a dray; that he used to drive over the triangular piece from Main street to Waverly street and Waverly to Main and traveled this piece of land probably twelve or fifteen times daily. That he would drive up onto the triangle to unload his dray and also stopped and stood his horses there using it for his stand. The effect of the testimony of this witness was lost, however, when he testified in substance, Burch used to let me stand there. I had his permission to do that.” The record shows that Corydon Burch was the owner of the property from June 11, 1881, to March 18, 1891.

The claimant John Rochford testified that he was seventy-nine years old and had been acquainted with the property since 1878, He bought it in 1915. Since coming into possession of it, he testified that he had kept the triangular piece rutted and covered with stones so that people would not drive on it; that his predecessor in title, Kendall, did the same thing. Claimant Rochford testified to repeated attempts of the street commissioner of the village of Van Etten to fill in the triangular piece and level it off and that at each attempt claimant forbade this being done and it was not done.

Claimant having established title to the property in question, the burden was on the State to establish that this land had become a highway by user. Upon the whole record, we find that the State has failed to meet this burden. As in the leading case on this question, the evidence produced by the State may be reduced to one sentence to the effect that the triangular piece of land was “ used by the public generally."” This is not sufficient.

[243]*243But the mere fact that a portion, of the public travel over a road for twenty years cannot make it a highway; and the burden of making highways and sustaining bridges cannot be imposed upon the public in that way. There must be more. The user must be like that of highways generally. The road must not only be traveled upon, but it must be kept in repair or taken in charge and adopted by the public authorities.

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Bluebook (online)
153 Misc. 239, 274 N.Y.S. 656, 1934 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1716, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rochford-v-state-nyclaimsct-1934.