1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROCHESTER MIDLAND CORPORATION, 12 No. 2:26-cv-01776-TLN-CSK Plaintiff, 13 14 v. ORDER 15 CHARLES BORDERS, 16 Defendant.
17 18 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Rochester Midland Corporation’s (“Plaintiff” 19 or “RMC”) Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 2.) For the 20 reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 The instant action arises from Defendant Charles Borders’s (“Defendant”) alleged 3 misappropriation of Plaintiff’s trade secrets. (See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff develops, manufactures, 4 and supplies specialty chemical products, sanitation programs, and related services to commercial 5 and industrial customers across the United States. (ECF No. 2-1 at 2.) Plaintiff’s business 6 depends on long-term customer relationships supported by customer-specific pricing margins, 7 customized chemical programs, standard sanitation operating procedures (“SSOPs”), sales 8 analytics, and detailed knowledge of customer operations. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains this 9 information is not public, derives independent economic value from its secrecy, and would 10 provide a competitor with significant and unfair advantage if misused or disclosed. (Id.) 11 Defendant was a trusted Account Manager and Division Manager with access to Plaintiff’s highly 12 sensitive customer-specific data. (Id.) 13 Plaintiff alleges that on April 29 and April 30, 2026, while he was still employed by 14 Plaintiff and preceding his resignation, Defendant “secretly removed approximately 3.5 gigabytes 15 of core proprietary information in the final days of his employment, compressed that information 16 to obscure its contents, deleted Company records to impair traceability, and transmitted 17 confidential materials to his personal Gmail account” without authorization or any legitimate 18 business purpose. (Id.; ECF No. 1 at 5.) Approximately one month earlier, Defendant was 19 offered and accepted a promotion to District Manager, “a leadership role reflecting [Plaintiff’s] 20 long-term reliance on him and its expectation that he would remain with the Company.” (ECF 21 No. 2-1 at 2.) Instead, on May 1, 2026, Defendant abruptly resigned effective immediately and 22 announced he was joining one of Plaintiff’s direct competitors in the specialty chemical and 23 sanitation services market — Cherokee Chemical, Inc. (“CCI”). (Id. at 2, 4.) Plaintiff alleges it 24 only learned of Defendant’s misconduct through a review of his recent system activity, conducted 25 in light of his irregular departure. (Id. at 2.) 26 Plaintiff asserts Defendant currently possesses its most sensitive pricing, SSOPs, chemical 27 program, and sales data, and once this information is used or disclosed, it cannot be meaningfully 28 contained. (Id.) Plaintiff contends Defendant’s continued possession and potential use of this 1 information “poses an immediate and ongoing threat to [Plaintiff’s] customer relationships, 2 pricing integrity, and goodwill that cannot be adequately remedied after the fact.” (Id. at 5.) On 3 May 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant action and ex parte motion for TRO, seeking to enjoin 4 Defendant and all those acting in concert with him from accessing, using, disclosing, 5 disseminating, copying, transmitting, or otherwise misappropriating any of Plaintiff’s 6 confidential, proprietary, or trade secret information. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) 7 II. STANDARD OF LAW 8 A TRO is an extraordinary remedy. The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo 9 pending a fuller hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. In general, “[t]emporary restraining orders are 10 governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary injunctions.” Aiello v. One West Bank, 11 No. 2:10-cv-0227-GEB-EFB, 2010 WL 406092, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (internal citations 12 omitted); see also E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(a). 13 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 14 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 15 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). “The 16 purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until 17 a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); see also 18 Costa Mesa City Emps. Ass’n v. City of Costa Mesa, 209 Cal. App. 4th 298, 305 (2012) (“The 19 purpose of such an order is to preserve the status quo until a final determination following a 20 trial.”); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney, Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The status quo 21 ante litem refers not simply to any situation before the filing of a lawsuit, but instead to the last 22 uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”). 23 “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed 24 on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 25 [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” 26 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. A plaintiff must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test 27 to obtain a preliminary injunction. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell (Alliance), 632 F.3d 1127, 28 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, a district court 1 may weigh the plaintiff’s showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A 2 stronger showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a preliminary injunction 3 even where the plaintiff shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the 4 plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the 5 public interest.” Id. Simply put, a plaintiff must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to 6 the merits were raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in the plaintiff’s favor 7 in order to succeed in a request for preliminary injunction. Id. at 1134–35. 8 III. ANALYSIS 9 The Court considers each of the Winter elements with respect to Plaintiff’s motion. 10 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 11 Plaintiff asserts it is likely to succeed on the merits of its misappropriation of trade secrets 12 claim.1 (ECF No. 2-1 at 6–8.) California has adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 13 (“CUTSA”). MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. 14 denied, 510 U.S. 1033 (1993). CUTSA is codified at California Civil Code §§ 3426–3426.11 and 15 “creates a statutory cause of action for the misappropriation of a trade secret.” Brescia v. Angelin, 16 172 Cal. App. 4th 133, 143 (2009). Similarly, at the federal level, Congress enacted the Defend 17 Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) which “permits the ‘owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated’ 18 to bring a civil action, [pursuant to] 18 U.S.C. § 1836
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROCHESTER MIDLAND CORPORATION, 12 No. 2:26-cv-01776-TLN-CSK Plaintiff, 13 14 v. ORDER 15 CHARLES BORDERS, 16 Defendant.
17 18 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Rochester Midland Corporation’s (“Plaintiff” 19 or “RMC”) Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 2.) For the 20 reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 The instant action arises from Defendant Charles Borders’s (“Defendant”) alleged 3 misappropriation of Plaintiff’s trade secrets. (See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff develops, manufactures, 4 and supplies specialty chemical products, sanitation programs, and related services to commercial 5 and industrial customers across the United States. (ECF No. 2-1 at 2.) Plaintiff’s business 6 depends on long-term customer relationships supported by customer-specific pricing margins, 7 customized chemical programs, standard sanitation operating procedures (“SSOPs”), sales 8 analytics, and detailed knowledge of customer operations. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains this 9 information is not public, derives independent economic value from its secrecy, and would 10 provide a competitor with significant and unfair advantage if misused or disclosed. (Id.) 11 Defendant was a trusted Account Manager and Division Manager with access to Plaintiff’s highly 12 sensitive customer-specific data. (Id.) 13 Plaintiff alleges that on April 29 and April 30, 2026, while he was still employed by 14 Plaintiff and preceding his resignation, Defendant “secretly removed approximately 3.5 gigabytes 15 of core proprietary information in the final days of his employment, compressed that information 16 to obscure its contents, deleted Company records to impair traceability, and transmitted 17 confidential materials to his personal Gmail account” without authorization or any legitimate 18 business purpose. (Id.; ECF No. 1 at 5.) Approximately one month earlier, Defendant was 19 offered and accepted a promotion to District Manager, “a leadership role reflecting [Plaintiff’s] 20 long-term reliance on him and its expectation that he would remain with the Company.” (ECF 21 No. 2-1 at 2.) Instead, on May 1, 2026, Defendant abruptly resigned effective immediately and 22 announced he was joining one of Plaintiff’s direct competitors in the specialty chemical and 23 sanitation services market — Cherokee Chemical, Inc. (“CCI”). (Id. at 2, 4.) Plaintiff alleges it 24 only learned of Defendant’s misconduct through a review of his recent system activity, conducted 25 in light of his irregular departure. (Id. at 2.) 26 Plaintiff asserts Defendant currently possesses its most sensitive pricing, SSOPs, chemical 27 program, and sales data, and once this information is used or disclosed, it cannot be meaningfully 28 contained. (Id.) Plaintiff contends Defendant’s continued possession and potential use of this 1 information “poses an immediate and ongoing threat to [Plaintiff’s] customer relationships, 2 pricing integrity, and goodwill that cannot be adequately remedied after the fact.” (Id. at 5.) On 3 May 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant action and ex parte motion for TRO, seeking to enjoin 4 Defendant and all those acting in concert with him from accessing, using, disclosing, 5 disseminating, copying, transmitting, or otherwise misappropriating any of Plaintiff’s 6 confidential, proprietary, or trade secret information. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) 7 II. STANDARD OF LAW 8 A TRO is an extraordinary remedy. The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo 9 pending a fuller hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. In general, “[t]emporary restraining orders are 10 governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary injunctions.” Aiello v. One West Bank, 11 No. 2:10-cv-0227-GEB-EFB, 2010 WL 406092, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (internal citations 12 omitted); see also E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(a). 13 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 14 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 15 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). “The 16 purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until 17 a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); see also 18 Costa Mesa City Emps. Ass’n v. City of Costa Mesa, 209 Cal. App. 4th 298, 305 (2012) (“The 19 purpose of such an order is to preserve the status quo until a final determination following a 20 trial.”); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney, Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The status quo 21 ante litem refers not simply to any situation before the filing of a lawsuit, but instead to the last 22 uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”). 23 “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed 24 on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 25 [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” 26 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. A plaintiff must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test 27 to obtain a preliminary injunction. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell (Alliance), 632 F.3d 1127, 28 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, a district court 1 may weigh the plaintiff’s showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A 2 stronger showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a preliminary injunction 3 even where the plaintiff shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the 4 plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the 5 public interest.” Id. Simply put, a plaintiff must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to 6 the merits were raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in the plaintiff’s favor 7 in order to succeed in a request for preliminary injunction. Id. at 1134–35. 8 III. ANALYSIS 9 The Court considers each of the Winter elements with respect to Plaintiff’s motion. 10 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 11 Plaintiff asserts it is likely to succeed on the merits of its misappropriation of trade secrets 12 claim.1 (ECF No. 2-1 at 6–8.) California has adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 13 (“CUTSA”). MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. 14 denied, 510 U.S. 1033 (1993). CUTSA is codified at California Civil Code §§ 3426–3426.11 and 15 “creates a statutory cause of action for the misappropriation of a trade secret.” Brescia v. Angelin, 16 172 Cal. App. 4th 133, 143 (2009). Similarly, at the federal level, Congress enacted the Defend 17 Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) which “permits the ‘owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated’ 18 to bring a civil action, [pursuant to] 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b).” ExamWorks v. Todd Baldini, No. 19 2:20-CV-00920-KJM-DB, 2020 WL 3127928, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2020), vacated in part 20 sub nom. ExamWorks, LLC v. Baldini, 835 F. App’x 251 (9th Cir. 2020). The standards for 21 establishing misappropriation of trade secrets under federal and California law are similar. Under 22 both the DTSA and CUTSA, a prima facie claim for trade secret misappropriation requires the 23 plaintiff to establish: “(1) the plaintiff owned a trade secret; (2) the defendant misappropriated the 24 trade secret; and (3) the defendant’s actions damaged the plaintiff.” Mastronardi Int’l Ltd. v. 25 SunSelect Produce (California), Inc., No. 1:18-cv-00737-AWI-JLT, 2019 WL 3996608, at *9 26 1 Plaintiff also asserts it is likely to succeed on the merits of its breach of contract claim. 27 (ECF No. 2-1 at 8–9.) However, because the Court finds Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of its misappropriation of trade secrets claim, it need not address Plaintiff’s breach of 28 contract claim at this juncture. 1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2019) (quoting Alta Devices, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 868, 877 2 (N.D. Cal. 2018). Furthermore, both “include[ ] substantially similar definitions of ‘trade secret’ 3 and ‘misappropriation.’” ExamWorks, 2020 WL 3127928, at *5. Given the substantial similarity 4 between the statutory elements and definitions of the DTSA and CUTSA, the Court will analyze 5 Plaintiff’s federal and state trade secret misappropriation claims together below. Id. 6 i. Trade Secret 7 The DTSA and CUTSA “both define ‘trade secret’ as information, such as a formula, 8 pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) derives 9 independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or 10 to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) is the subject 11 of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” Bemis Co., Inc. v. 12 Summers, No. 2:19-cv-00344-TLN-KJN, 2019 WL 1004853, at *3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); 13 Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d)). “[W]here [an] employer has expended time and effort identifying 14 customers with particular needs or characteristics,” such information is a trade secret. Morlife, 15 Inc. v. Perry, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1514, 1521 (1997). Thus, “[i]t is well-established that a customer 16 list may constitute a protectable trade secret.” Wyndham Resort Dev. Corp. v. Bingham, No. 17 2:10-cv-01556-GEB-KJM, 2010 WL 2720920, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2010) (quoting Gable– 18 Leigh, Inc. v. N. Am. Miss, No. CV 01-01019 MMM (SHx), 2001 WL 521695, at *15 (C.D. Cal. 19 Apr. 13, 2001)). The Court finds both elements of the “trade secret” definition are likely met 20 here. 21 First, Plaintiff adequately establishes its confidential business information constitute trade 22 secrets. Plaintiff cites to the declaration of Plaintiff’s Vice President of Corporate Development, 23 Robert Matthews, who attests that these trade secrets include “customer pricing, margins, SSOPs, 24 chemical lists, sales analytics, revenue and volume reports, key customer decisionmaker contact 25 information, and outstanding order data.” (ECF No. 2-2 at 2.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff 26 that “[c]ourts routinely recognize such information as trade secrets.” (ECF No. 2-1 at 7 (citing 27 Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Customer information 28 such as sales history and customer needs and preferences constitute trade secrets.”)).) 1 Second, Plaintiff adequately establishes it took reasonable measures to maintain the 2 secrecy of its proprietary information. Plaintiff provides evidence that Defendant was bound by 3 an employment agreement and NDA containing strict confidentiality and return-of-property 4 obligations. (ECF No. 2-1 at 7 (citing ECF No. 2-2 at 8–15).) Further, Mr. Matthews attests in 5 his declaration that throughout Defendant’s employment, Plaintiff maintained Acceptable Use, 6 Data Governance and Classification, and Electronic Communication Retention policies that “(a) 7 restricted sharing and use to authorized business purposes, (b) formally classified the information 8 as ‘high and restricted,’ (c) prohibited unauthorized deletion or external transfer, and (d) 9 preserved [Plaintiff’s] ownership rights regardless of storage location.” (Id. (citing ECF No. 2-2 10 at 3–4).) 11 Accordingly, Plaintiff has shown its ownership of trade secrets under the DTSA and 12 CUTSA. 13 ii. Misappropriation 14 Generally, under both the DTSA and CUTSA, “‘misappropriation’ means either (1) the 15 [a]cquisition of a trade secret by another person who knows or has reason to know that the trade 16 secret was acquired by improper means; or (2) the [d]isclosure or use of a trade secret of another 17 without express or implied consent.” Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Tarantino, 498 F. Supp. 3d 18 1155, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Mastronardi Int’l Ltd., 19 2019 WL 3996608, at *9. With respect to the first description, “improper means” is defined by 20 both the DTSA and CUTSA to include “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement 21 of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(A); Cal. Civ. Code § 22 3426.1(a). With respect to the second description, the statutes specify that “misappropriation” 23 means, “disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a 24 person who . . . at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that the knowledge 25 of the trade secret was . . . derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person 26 seeking relief to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret.” 18 27 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(B)(ii)(III); Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(b)(2)(B)(iii). 28 /// 1 Here, Mr. Matthews attests in his declaration the following: 2 In the final days of his employment, [Defendant] downloaded proprietary customer reports to his RMC OneDrive account and 3 copied approximately 3.5 gigabytes of Company data to an external storage device. Matthews Decl. ¶¶ 15–16. He compressed the files 4 into an archive, obscuring their contents and origins, a method commonly associated with concealment rather than routine work 5 activity. Matthews Decl. ¶ 16. Among the downloaded materials were spreadsheets containing customer pricing margins and SSOPs, 6 as well as multiple proprietary reports covering sales performance, revenue, and outstanding orders across numerous customers. 7 Matthews Decl. ¶¶ 16–17. Immediately after completing the transfers, [Defendant] deleted a substantial portion of the files from 8 his RMC OneDrive, impairing audit trails and forensic traceability. Matthews Decl. ¶ 17. [Defendant] separately transmitted highly 9 confidential internal documents, including variable bonus models and sales targets, to his personal Gmail account. Matthews Decl. ¶ 10 18. [Defendant] had no legitimate business justification for these actions, did not disclose them to [Plaintiff], and never returned the 11 data. The timing and volume of activity were highly unusual compared to his prior usage. 12 13 (ECF No. 2-1 at 8 (citing ECF No. 2-2 at 3–4).) The Court finds these statements demonstrate 14 Defendant likely obtained Plaintiff’s trade secrets through improper means and without express or 15 implied consent. Accordingly, Plaintiff sufficiently establishes misappropriation under the DTSA 16 and CUTSA. 17 iii. Damages 18 As previously mentioned, the final element of trade secret misappropriation under the 19 DTSA and CUTSA is damage to the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s actions. Mastronardi 20 Int’l Ltd., 2019 WL 3996608, at *9. Plaintiff alleges “[a]s a direct and proximate result of 21 Defendant’s violation of the DTSA, Plaintiff has sustained and will continue to sustain irreparable 22 injury, the damages from which cannot now be calculated.” (ECF No. 1 at 8.) According to 23 Plaintiff, it “has no assurance that the information [Defendant] downloaded has not been 24 disclosed to CCI or other third parties.” (Id. at 6.) As previously noted, Plaintiff also alleges 25 Defendant’s conduct “creates a substantial risk of customer diversion, price undercutting, 26 replication of RMC’s SSOPs and chemical programs, and permanent loss of goodwill.” (Id.) The 27 Court finds these statements show Plaintiff is likely to be damaged by Defendant’s action. 28 Although Plaintiff does not submit evidence that it has suffered damages, the Court nevertheless 1 finds the potential for imminent damages is significant. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff 2 adequately establishes damages by Defendant’s actions. 3 In sum, the Court finds Plaintiff sufficiently establishes the elements for trade secret 4 misappropriation claims under the DTSA and CUTSA. 5 B. Irreparable Harm 6 Irreparable harm may be demonstrated by “the evidence of [Plaintiff’s] investment of time 7 and money in the development of the secret processes misappropriated by defendants . . . since 8 harm to [Plaintiff’s] competitive position lacks any adequate remedy at law.” IMI-Tech Corp. v. 9 Gagliani, 691 F. Supp. 214, 231 (S.D. Cal. 1986). Plaintiff asserts Defendant “has likely already 10 removed [its] highly sensitive trade secrets” and Plaintiff “has no visibility into where that 11 information is currently stored or whether it has already been disclosed.” (ECF No. 2-1 at 9.) 12 According to Plaintiff, if Defendant “uses or discloses this information to a competitor, [it] faces 13 immediate price undercutting, loss of customer confidence, replication of [its] SSOP frameworks 14 and chemical programs, and permanent erosion of goodwill.” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff maintains that 15 monetary damages alone are unable to remedy this harm, as the injuries are “inherently non- 16 quantifiable.” (Id.) Though Plaintiff submits no evidence that Defendant has in fact given this 17 information to a direct competitor, this is unsurprising given that the case is in its infancy. The 18 Court nevertheless finds the potential for imminent harm is significant. Accordingly, Plaintiff 19 establishes irreparable harm to its competitive position. 20 C. Balance of Equities 21 A court balancing the equities will look to possible harm that could befall either party. 22 See CytoSport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1081 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 23 348 F. App’x 288 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendant will not suffer 24 any undue hardship if the TRO is granted as Plaintiff only seeks an order that he refrain from 25 using Plaintiff’s confidential business information, return this information, and preserve and 26 prevent spoliation or destruction of any information he wrongfully took. (ECF No. 2-1 at 10.) 27 Conversely, if the Court does not issue a TRO, Plaintiff maintains it risks having its confidential 28 business information disseminated to third parties, including a competitor. (Id.) The Court finds 1 the equities weigh heavily in Plaintiff’s favor. 2 D. Public Interest 3 Although Plaintiff did not address this factor — and the Court could deny the instant 4 motion for this reason alone — the Court nonetheless finds injunctive relief would be in the 5 public interest. As courts have found, California has a strong policy in favor of protecting trade 6 secrets. See Pyro Spectaculars North, Inc. v. Souza, 861 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2012) 7 (citing Retirement Group v. Galante, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1226, 1237 (2009) (“An equally lengthy 8 line of cases has consistently held former employees may not misappropriate the former 9 employer’s trade secrets to unfairly compete with the former employer.”)). The Court agrees that 10 injunctive relief to prevent misuse of Plaintiff’s trade secretes “would serve the policy of 11 protecting trade secrets while simultaneously allowing lawful competition.” Id. 12 Accordingly, because Plaintiff adequately “make[s] a showing on all four prongs” of the 13 Winter test, Alliance, 632 F.3d at 1135, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion. 14 IV. CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 16 2) is GRANTED. The Court further ORDERS as follows: 17 1. Defendant and all those acting in concert with him are hereby ORDERED to refrain from: 18 a. Accessing, using, disclosing, disseminating, copying, transmitting, or otherwise 19 misappropriating any of Plaintiff’s confidential, proprietary, or trade secret 20 information, in any form and on any medium, including but not limited to pricing 21 margins, customer analytics, standard sanitation operating procedures (“SSOPs”), 22 chemical programs, sales data, and outstanding order information; 23 b. Retaining possession or control of any Plaintiff confidential or proprietary 24 information or materials, whether stored on computers, external storage devices, 25 cloud‑based accounts, email accounts, or any other electronic or physical media; 26 c. Destroying, deleting, altering, concealing, or modifying any Plaintiff data, 27 documents, or electronically stored information, including metadata, logs, or audit 28 trails, that relate to Defendant’s possession, access, or use of Plaintiff’s 1 information; 2 d. Assisting, enabling, or permitting any third party, including any competitor of 3 Plaintiff, to access, use, or benefit from Plaintiff's confidential or proprietary 4 information; 5 e. Interfering with or impairing Plaintiffs ability to recover, inspect, preserve, or 6 forensically analyze its confidential information and systems; and 7 f. Taking any action that would further the disclosure, use, or competitive 8 exploitation of Plaintiff's confidential or trade secret information pending further 9 order of the Court; 10 2. Defendant is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE why a preliminary injunction should not 11 issue enjoining Defendant or all those acting in concert with him to refrain from the 12 above-mentioned conduct. Defendant shall file and serve any opposition to the requested 13 preliminary injunction by May 18, 2026. Plaintiff may file a reply, if any, by May 20, 14 2026; and 15 3. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. See Diaz v. 16 Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 | Date: May 12, 2026 Lah oy 20 TROY L. NUNLEY CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10