DENTON, Justice.
The trial judge has rendered a summary judgment in this medical malpractice case, holding that the plaintiff’s cause of action for damages due to misdiagnosis is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The court of civil appeals has reversed and remanded, holding that the “discovery rule” applies and that a question of fact exists concerning when the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury. 536 S.W.2d 243. We reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirm that of the trial court.
The plaintiff injured his back on July 26, 1971. On August 6, 1971, the defendant performed radiographic and other tests upon the plaintiff, and concluded that plaintiff had a herniated disc between his fourth and fifth lumbar vertebrae. Four days later, the defendant surgically repaired the disc diagnosed as herniated. The plaintiff remained in the defendant’s care until late December of 1971, during which time he continued to have back pains. On January 26, 1972, the plaintiff saw another physician,’who’pfescribed'iTback brace, and later on ApriR25,1972,"performed.. radiographic tests which_resulted. .in. a diagnosis of a herniated disc. The following day, April 26, 1972, aTherniated disc between the third and fourth lumbar, vertebrae was excised. The ("gravamen of plaintiff’s claim is, therefore, ⅞(1^ defendant erroneously diagnosed plaintiff’s condition and operated on the wrong intervertebral disc.
This action was filed by plaintiff on April 4, 1974,"more than Two yéarslííteí’plaintiff had chañgécTphysicians, but less than two years after the alleged" actual discovery of an injury'dlfferent from that diagnosed and treated by...defendant in August of 1971. The applicable statute of limitations is Article 5526 of the revised civil statutes, providing:
There shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not after-wards, all actions or suits in court of the following description:
6. Action for injury done to the person of another.
The defendant asserts that plaintiff’s action is barred by limitations. The plaintiff claims he did not actually discover, nor in the exercise of ordinary care should he have discovered, that there was a misdiagnosis until the results of the second operation were known to him, and that his cause of action did not, therefore, accrue until such time.
For the purposes of application of statutes of limitations, a cause of action generally can be said to accrue at the time when facts come into existence which authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy, Williams v. Pure Oil Company, 124 Tex. 341, 78 S.W.2d 929 (1935). In personal injury actions, this means when the wrongful act effects an injury, regardless of when the claimant learned of such injury. An exception to this rule of accrual has been applied by this and many other courts in some situations in which a claimant was unable to know of his injury at the time of actual accrual; the exception is known as the “discovery rule.” The issue in this case is whether this “discovery rule” will be applied to an action founded upon a misdiagnosis.
In Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.1967), we held that a “cause of action for negligent leaving of a foreign object in a patient’s body by a physician accrues when the patient learns of, or, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have learned of the presence of such foreign object in his body.” 417 S.W.2d at 580. Gaddis is representative of what now may be considered the majority rule in the United States. Annot., When Statute of Limi[20]*20tations Commences to Run against Malpractice Action Based on Leaving Foreign Substance in Patient’s Body, 70 A.L.R.3d 7 (1976). The statute of limitations in a cause of action for negligent performance of a vasectomy operation was held in Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.1972), to have commenced to run “on the date of discovery of the true facts concerning the failure of the operation, or from the date it should, in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have been discovered. And we found no reversible error court of civil appeals’ holding that a cause of action for excessive treatment with X-rays did not “accrue” for limitations purposes until the plaintiff, a cancer patient, had learned that excessive radiation, and not a recurrence of cancer, was the cause of her ulcerated epidermis. Grady v. Faykus, 530 S.W.2d 151 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The result in “discovery rule” cases like Gaddis, Hays v. ifaZTand Grady v. Faykus stems from ‘ the recdgmti0iFof~ the purposes of statutes of limitations; and,“at the same time, recognition of what is not the statutes’ • purpose, but an unfortunate, occasional by-product. The primary pur-poseof aTstatute of .limitations is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend while witnesses are available and the evidence is fresh in their minds. Price v. Estate of Anderson, 522 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.1975); Hallaway v. Thompson, 148 Tex. 471, 226 S.W.2d 816 (1950). Statutes of limitations are not directed to the merits of any individual case, they are a result of the legislative assessment of the merits of cases in general. The fact that a meritorious claim might thereby be rendered nonassertible is an unfortunate, occasional by-product of the operation of limitations. All statutes of limitations provide some time period during which the cause of action is assertible. However, preclusion of a legal remedy alone is not enough to justify a judicial exception to the statute. The primary purpose of limitations, to prevent litigation of stale or fraudulent claims, must be kept in _mind. See Note, 30 Sw. L.J. 950 (1976).
This Court has specifically limited its pri- or holdings regarding this discovery rule in malpractice cases. In Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.1967), this Court limited its holding to causes of action in which a foreign object is left in the body of a patient, noting that in this type of ease there is an f^inability to know of the negligent act” and that it is a “peculiar type of case which is not particularly susceptibel to fradulent prosecution." this same rationale was also expressed in the "vasectomy" case, Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.1973). There this Court held “that in malpractice cases arising from vasectomy operations the Statute of Limitations commences to run on the date of the discovery of the true facts concerning the failure of the operation, or from the date it should, in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have been discovered.” 488 S.W.2d at 414. In Gaddis v. Smith, supra this Court quoted with approval, the following language from Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961):
[T]he question when a cause of action accrues is a judicial one, and to determine it. in any particular case is to establish a general rule of law for ¿¡ri'class of cases, which rule must be fourided~on reason and justice. .
In the absence of legislative definition and~ speeification, the . . .
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DENTON, Justice.
The trial judge has rendered a summary judgment in this medical malpractice case, holding that the plaintiff’s cause of action for damages due to misdiagnosis is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The court of civil appeals has reversed and remanded, holding that the “discovery rule” applies and that a question of fact exists concerning when the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury. 536 S.W.2d 243. We reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirm that of the trial court.
The plaintiff injured his back on July 26, 1971. On August 6, 1971, the defendant performed radiographic and other tests upon the plaintiff, and concluded that plaintiff had a herniated disc between his fourth and fifth lumbar vertebrae. Four days later, the defendant surgically repaired the disc diagnosed as herniated. The plaintiff remained in the defendant’s care until late December of 1971, during which time he continued to have back pains. On January 26, 1972, the plaintiff saw another physician,’who’pfescribed'iTback brace, and later on ApriR25,1972,"performed.. radiographic tests which_resulted. .in. a diagnosis of a herniated disc. The following day, April 26, 1972, aTherniated disc between the third and fourth lumbar, vertebrae was excised. The ("gravamen of plaintiff’s claim is, therefore, ⅞(1^ defendant erroneously diagnosed plaintiff’s condition and operated on the wrong intervertebral disc.
This action was filed by plaintiff on April 4, 1974,"more than Two yéarslííteí’plaintiff had chañgécTphysicians, but less than two years after the alleged" actual discovery of an injury'dlfferent from that diagnosed and treated by...defendant in August of 1971. The applicable statute of limitations is Article 5526 of the revised civil statutes, providing:
There shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not after-wards, all actions or suits in court of the following description:
6. Action for injury done to the person of another.
The defendant asserts that plaintiff’s action is barred by limitations. The plaintiff claims he did not actually discover, nor in the exercise of ordinary care should he have discovered, that there was a misdiagnosis until the results of the second operation were known to him, and that his cause of action did not, therefore, accrue until such time.
For the purposes of application of statutes of limitations, a cause of action generally can be said to accrue at the time when facts come into existence which authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy, Williams v. Pure Oil Company, 124 Tex. 341, 78 S.W.2d 929 (1935). In personal injury actions, this means when the wrongful act effects an injury, regardless of when the claimant learned of such injury. An exception to this rule of accrual has been applied by this and many other courts in some situations in which a claimant was unable to know of his injury at the time of actual accrual; the exception is known as the “discovery rule.” The issue in this case is whether this “discovery rule” will be applied to an action founded upon a misdiagnosis.
In Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.1967), we held that a “cause of action for negligent leaving of a foreign object in a patient’s body by a physician accrues when the patient learns of, or, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have learned of the presence of such foreign object in his body.” 417 S.W.2d at 580. Gaddis is representative of what now may be considered the majority rule in the United States. Annot., When Statute of Limi[20]*20tations Commences to Run against Malpractice Action Based on Leaving Foreign Substance in Patient’s Body, 70 A.L.R.3d 7 (1976). The statute of limitations in a cause of action for negligent performance of a vasectomy operation was held in Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.1972), to have commenced to run “on the date of discovery of the true facts concerning the failure of the operation, or from the date it should, in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have been discovered. And we found no reversible error court of civil appeals’ holding that a cause of action for excessive treatment with X-rays did not “accrue” for limitations purposes until the plaintiff, a cancer patient, had learned that excessive radiation, and not a recurrence of cancer, was the cause of her ulcerated epidermis. Grady v. Faykus, 530 S.W.2d 151 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The result in “discovery rule” cases like Gaddis, Hays v. ifaZTand Grady v. Faykus stems from ‘ the recdgmti0iFof~ the purposes of statutes of limitations; and,“at the same time, recognition of what is not the statutes’ • purpose, but an unfortunate, occasional by-product. The primary pur-poseof aTstatute of .limitations is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend while witnesses are available and the evidence is fresh in their minds. Price v. Estate of Anderson, 522 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.1975); Hallaway v. Thompson, 148 Tex. 471, 226 S.W.2d 816 (1950). Statutes of limitations are not directed to the merits of any individual case, they are a result of the legislative assessment of the merits of cases in general. The fact that a meritorious claim might thereby be rendered nonassertible is an unfortunate, occasional by-product of the operation of limitations. All statutes of limitations provide some time period during which the cause of action is assertible. However, preclusion of a legal remedy alone is not enough to justify a judicial exception to the statute. The primary purpose of limitations, to prevent litigation of stale or fraudulent claims, must be kept in _mind. See Note, 30 Sw. L.J. 950 (1976).
This Court has specifically limited its pri- or holdings regarding this discovery rule in malpractice cases. In Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.1967), this Court limited its holding to causes of action in which a foreign object is left in the body of a patient, noting that in this type of ease there is an f^inability to know of the negligent act” and that it is a “peculiar type of case which is not particularly susceptibel to fradulent prosecution." this same rationale was also expressed in the "vasectomy" case, Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.1973). There this Court held “that in malpractice cases arising from vasectomy operations the Statute of Limitations commences to run on the date of the discovery of the true facts concerning the failure of the operation, or from the date it should, in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have been discovered.” 488 S.W.2d at 414. In Gaddis v. Smith, supra this Court quoted with approval, the following language from Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961):
[T]he question when a cause of action accrues is a judicial one, and to determine it. in any particular case is to establish a general rule of law for ¿¡ri'class of cases, which rule must be fourided~on reason and justice. .
In the absence of legislative definition and~ speeification, the . . . courts have often been called upon .to .delineate tlie statute; they have conscientiously sought to apply it with due regard to the underlying statutory policy of repose, without, however, permitting unnecessary jnjustices. . . . [I]n still other instances they have declined to find the bar inequitable though the plaintiff admittedly knew nothing about the cause of action until shortly before the institution of his action; in reaching this result they were not unaware of the individual injustice to the plaintiff but presumably determined that, on balance, it ■ was outweighed by the need for repose and the [21]*21danger that a different approach might undermine the statutory goal.
173 A.2d at 285.
Immediately following the above quoted language, the New Jersey Court in Fernan-di v. Strully.distinguished the “foreign object” case from other types of medical malpractice cases, noting that it “does not raise questions as to [plaintiff’s] credibility nor does it rest on matters of professional diagnosis, judgment_or„dis_cretipn.’’ In such'a' case, “the lapse of time does not entail the danggr_of a false or frivolous claim nor the danger_of a speculative or uncertain claim.”
The case before us however does “rest on matters of professional diagnosis, judgment or discretion.” This distinction between an “alleged misdiagnosis” case and a “foreign object” case was also clearly drawn in Owens v. White, 380 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1967), in the following language:
Extension of the discovery rule to encompass a case of the type involved here would subject physicians to the possibility of liability, or at least to the embarrassment and expense of litigation, upon claims of mistaken diagnosis of any illness, however great may have been the lapse of time between the date of cessation of the doctor-patient relationship and the formal prosecution of the claim. The danger of (“fra u d uleni> and stalejLclhims, which the Idaho court recognized to be diminished in foreign object cases, is obviously..enhanced..when.the_ claim o_fjnedical mjdpractice_Js_predicated upon alleged _ misdiagnosis. In such a case, unlike the_ foreign object situations, not even the fact of injury can alwavs..be..clear. — Even in its present stage of advanced development, medicine is not an exact science. Symptoms and diseases thought at one time, even recently, to fall into one category are later discovered, through the evolution of the science, to fall into another. If the trier of fact should be convinced, upon the basis of new knowledge, that a mistaken diagnosis was made, the defendant’s task of establishing that his conduct did not fall below the standard of care which prevailed in his profession at the time and place of the alleged error could prove insurmountable in the event of sufficient lapse of time.
380 F.2d at p. 316 (emphasis supplied).
The cause of action alleged in the present case is founded upon an alleged misdiagnosis in August of 1971. Plaintiff, to prove his cause of action, faces the burden of proving both a mistake in professional judgment and that such mistake was negligent. Expert testimony would be required. Physical evidence generally i$ not available when the primary issue relgyant to .liability ..concerns _ correctness of past judgment. Unlike Gaddis v. Sniith-there exists in the present case no ^physical evidence which in-and-of-itself establishes The negligence of some person. What physical evidence was to the cause of action alleged f, in Gaddis v. Smith, expert testimony is to] the cause of action in the present case. Even the fact of injury is a matter of expert testimony.
Likewise in Hays v. Hall the defendant doctor’s error was established by the physical fact that plaintiff’s wife became pregnant and was also subject to proof by performance of fertility tests upon the plaintiff. Sterility vel non involved a wholly different line of inquiry from the erroneous judgment vel non involved in the present case. SterilityJ&jsstahlishable by I physical proof; negligently erroneous judg-j mentJby_fixpert. .testimony.
Grady v. Faykus goes somewhat further than did this Court in Hays v. Hall and Gaddis v. Smith, in that the court of civil appeals applied the “discovery rule” to a cause of action founded upon negligent treatment. Mrs. Grady, following a radical mastectomy for breast cancer, was referred by her surgeon to' the defendant physicians for administration of X-ray therapy. Such therapy was concluded by the defendants in November of 1969. Ten months later, in September of 1970, Mrs. Grady was informed by a plastic surgeon that skin ulcers in areas exposed to radiation were the result of excessive doses of radiation. Suit was filed against the therapist-doctors in June of 1972, more than two years after the [22]*22termination of treatments by the defendants, but less than two years following the date on which she became apprised of the cause of her pain. The “discovery rule” was applied, and this Court found no reversible error. It must be pointed out that Mrs. Grady’s claim was not against her surgeon for recommending X-ray therapy; it was for the negligent administration of such therapy. If she in fact received excessive doses of radiation, such could be established by proof of her present bodily condition.
Assuming for the moment that strict application of limitations would have an unintended effect in the present case, in that plaintiff’s claim would be held barred less than two years after he knew of his injury, it is nevertheless clear that the purpose of limitations would be furthered by such application. Proof of plaintiff’s cause of action would demand expert testimony concerning the interpretation of tests made in 1971. While present physical evidence might exist which proves that plaintiff’s disc was excised in 1971, the main issue of negligent exercise of judgment is subject to proof only by expert hindsight. The line between negligent diagnbsis'and the negli^ geñt treatment in Grady v. Faykus may indeed be a fine one, but the. distinction is_ necessary in order to assure that the primary purpose of statute, of limitations is met. We decline to apply the discovery rule to encompass a case of the type involved here.
The judgment of the court of civil appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion by POPE, J., in which ■ McGEE, JOHNSON and YARBROUGH, JJ., join.