Robinson v. New York City Housing Authority

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Robinson v. New York City Housing Authority

89 A.D.3d 497, 932 N.Y.2d 337

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 10, 2011

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 89 A.D.3d 497 (Robinson v. New York City Housing Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Robinson v. New York City Housing Authority, 89 A.D.3d 497, 932 N.Y.2d 337 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011).

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Opinion

Plaintiff’s cross motion to amend his complaint and bill of particulars to assert a claim under Multiple Dwelling Law § 62 was untimely since the claim is based on a theory not previously advanced and the applicable statute of limitations has expired (see CPLR 203 [f]). The new theory went beyond mere amplification of the pleadings, constituting a new, distinct, and independent theory of liability (Lopez v New York City Hous. Auth., 16 AD3d 164, 165 [2005]). In any event, even had plaintiff timely asserted this claim, Multiple Dwelling Law § 62 is inapplicable here where the structure from which plaintiff allegedly fell was an overhang, not a roof, terrace, or other structure under the ambit of Multiple Dwelling Law § 62.

Furthermore, NYCHA established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that it had no notice of any defective or unsafe condition necessary to sustain a General Municipal Law § 205-e claim based on either Multiple Dwelling Law § 78 or § 62 (Fernandez v City of New York, 84 AD3d 595, 596 [2011]). For the same reason, the motion court properly dismissed the common-law negligence claim. Concur — Tom, J.E, Andrias, Acosta, Freedman and Richter, JJ.

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Plaintiff’s cross motion to amend his complaint and bill of particulars to assert a claim under Multiple Dwelling Law § 62 was untimely since the claim is based on a theory not previously advanced and the applicable statute of limitations has expired (see CPLR 203 [f]). The new theory went beyond mere amplification of the pleadings, constituting a new, distinct, and independent theory of liability (Lopez v New York City Hous. Auth., 16 AD3d 164, 165 [2005]). In any event, even had plaintiff timely asserted this claim, Multiple Dwelling Law § 62 is inapplicable here where the structure from which plaintiff allegedly fell was an overhang, not a roof, terrace, or other structure under the ambit of Multiple Dwelling Law § 62.

Furthermore, NYCHA established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that it had no notice of any defective or unsafe condition necessary to sustain a General Municipal Law § 205-e claim based on either Multiple Dwelling Law § 78 or § 62 (Fernandez v City of New York, 84 AD3d 595, 596 [2011]). For the same reason, the motion court properly dismissed the common-law negligence claim. Concur — Tom, J.E, Andrias, Acosta, Freedman and Richter, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

89 A.D.3d 497, 932 N.Y.2d 337, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robinson-v-new-york-city-housing-authority-nyappdiv-2011.

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