Robinson v. Nationstar Mortgage

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-7083 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 04/21/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 21, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court KATRINA ROBINSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 24-7083 (D.C. No. 6:21-CV-00380-RAW) NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, (E.D. Okla.) d/b/a Mr. Cooper,

Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before BACHARACH, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Katrina Robinson appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of defendant

on claims arising under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and Oklahoma state law. On

summary judgment, the district court concluded Robinson lacked standing to bring

her FHA claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-7083 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 04/21/2026 Page: 2

I

Robinson is the daughter of the late Kathalene Terrell, who owned a house

(“Property”) in Muskogee, Oklahoma. Defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, doing

business as Mr. Cooper (“Nationstar”), held a mortgage on the Property as security

for a promissory note Terrell had signed. The mortgage required Terrell to maintain

hazard insurance, and the mortgage payments included premiums for the insurance.

Robinson was not a signatory to the note or the mortgage, but she was the

transfer-on-death beneficiary of the Property.

Terrell’s sole income was government disability benefits. In 2015, she was

hospitalized and fell behind on her mortgage payments. Nationstar notified her that it

was considering foreclosure. In November 2015, Terrell asked Nationstar for a

reasonable accommodation under the FHA. In February 2016, Nationstar filed a

foreclosure action against Terrell and Robinson. Terrell counterclaimed for breach of

contract and failure to accommodate under Oklahoma’s fair housing laws, alleging

Nationstar had made no effort at accommodation.

Nationstar prevailed in the foreclosure action and on Terrell’s counterclaims.

But in April 2018, while the case was on appeal, Terrell and Nationstar entered into a

loan-modification agreement, which resulted in an increased balance and interest rate

effective July 1, 2018. The state court vacated its foreclosure judgment but left in

place its denial of Terrell’s counterclaims.

Also in April 2018, Nationstar informed Terrell’s insurer, American Farmers

& Ranchers Mutual Insurance Company (“AFR”), that “based upon [a] site

2 Appellate Case: 24-7083 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 04/21/2026 Page: 3

inspection, it had “reason to believe” the Property “may be vacant.” Aplee. Suppl.

App. vol. 1 at 241 (capitalization omitted). Nationstar “suggest[ed]” AFR verify the

Property’s status with Terrell and inform Nationstar “if the possible vacancy in any

way impairs, limits, or restricts the Homeowner’s or Fire and Extended Coverage

now in place or would cause any premium increase.” Id. Nationstar added: “Please

terminate coverage only on the [Property] immediately. Pursuant to the terms of the

Mortgage/Deed of Trust, any unearned premiums should be refunded to us.” Id.

In turn, AFR asked Terrell’s insurance agent, the Ogden Insurance Agency,

Inc. (“Ogden”), to inspect the Property for vacancy. An Ogden agent, Marla Mosley,

inspected the property, rang the doorbell several times, and took pictures. “Mail and

papers were packed in the mailbox and paper box.” Aplt. App., vol. 5 at 176. She

also tried to call all the telephone numbers for Terrell, “but they had been

disconnected.” Id. Mosley reported to AFR that the Property “appear[ed] vacant”

and that a neighbor said she had not seen anyone at the Property “in a long time.”

Aplee. Suppl. App. vol. 2 at 241. On May 1, 2018, AFR notified Ogden that it would

not renew Terrell’s policy after it expired in July 2018 because of

“Condition/Upkeep.” Id. at 250. Although “Vacant/Unoccupied” was an option on

the form, id., AFR did not select it. AFR also mailed Terrell notice that the policy

would not be renewed and that AFR was returning unearned premiums to Nationstar.

Meanwhile, on April 25, 2018, Nationstar filed a claim with AFR for storm

damage to the Property’s roof. Terrell, however, withdrew the claim, and AFR

closed the claim file on June 25, 2018.

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In July 2018, after receiving notice from AFR that the policy had been

cancelled, Nationstar called Ogden, which verified that the policy had been cancelled

for an “underwriting reason,” id. at 175 (capitalization omitted). Nationstar then

twice notified Terrell that she was required to obtain insurance and, if she did not,

Nationstar would purchase coverage, as the mortgage required, and such coverage

might be more expensive than insurance Terrell could buy herself. When Terrell did

not obtain insurance, Nationstar informed her that it had purchased insurance. The

new insurance policy increased Terrell’s monthly payment. Nationstar informed

Terrell that she still could obtain a policy herself, but Terrell never did so. Nationstar

continued to maintain insurance on the Property.

In an April 30, 2020, letter to the Oklahoma Insurance Department (“OID”)

Mosley recounted that on May 1, 2018, AFR had notified Ogden that the reason for

nonrenewal of Terrell’s policy was “Condition/Upkeep/Vacant/Unoccupied.” Aplt.

App. vol. 5 at 176. Mosley apparently sent her letter in response to an investigation

Terrell asked the OID to open regarding cancellation of her policy. 1

Terrell died in June 2021, and Robinson inherited the Property. At the time of

Terrell’s death, payments on the Property were current. In September 2021,

Robinson called Nationstar to report that her mother had died and Robinson was

1 Terrell also allegedly filed a housing discrimination complaint with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development that remained pending as of the date Robinson filed the complaint in this action in 2021. 4 Appellate Case: 24-7083 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 04/21/2026 Page: 5

living at the Property. In October 2021, after Robinson missed a payment, Nationstar

mailed a past-due notice to the Property’s address.

In December 2021, Robinson filed the action underlying this appeal. She

asserted Nationstar and Ogden retaliated against her in violation of the FHA, see

42 U.S.C. § 3605, and Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1452(A)(17), both of which prohibit

discrimination in transactions related to residential real estate. She also asserted a

violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act and a claim of fraud.

Nationstar filed a motion for summary judgment. 2 Robinson filed a motion for

partial summary judgment on the FHA claim. After obtaining supplemental briefs on

the traceability component of Article III standing, which the parties had not

previously briefed, the district court concluded Robinson lacked standing to bring her

FHA claim. The court determined that Nationstar’s allegedly retaliatory conduct was

“reporting to AFR that the Property appeared vacant” and that Robinson’s “purported

concrete injury is the financial impact to [her] of having to pay the increased

payments to cope with the lender-placed insurance that was necessary after AFR

non-renewed the [p]olicy.” Aplt. App. vol. 2 at 22. The court concluded that

because of the intervening actions of Terrell, Ogden, and AFR, Robinson’s claimed

injuries were not fairly traceable to Nationstar’s suggestion to AFR that the Property

was vacant. The court observed that there was “scant evidence in the record about

2 Ogden also filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. On appeal, Robinson and Ogden settled. We therefore limit our ensuing discussion to the disposition of the claims against Nationstar. 5 Appellate Case: 24-7083 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 04/21/2026 Page: 6

why AFR declined to renew the [p]olicy”; for example, there was “no deposition

testimony or declarations from AFR employees.” Id. at 24. The court also concluded

that because the nonrenewal was not for vacancy, it was “hard to see how there could

be a substantial likelihood that Nationstar’s vacancy report caused AFR’s

[nonrenewal] of the [p]olicy.” Id. at 25. This left the court with only speculation

about the impact that Nationstar’s report had on the nonrenewal, which was

insufficient to show traceability.

Because Robinson lacked standing to assert the only federal claim she had

advanced, the district court granted Nationstar’s motion, denied Robinson’s motion,

dismissed the FHA claim for lack of jurisdiction, and declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Robinson timely appeals.

II

We review the disposition of cross-motions for summary judgment de novo,

“view[ing] each motion separately, in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party, and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” United States v.

Sup. Ct. of N.M., 839 F.3d 888, 906–07 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). “Summary judgment based on lack of jurisdiction should be granted only

when the record is devoid of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact that

would support the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proving jurisdiction.” Habecker v.

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Town of Estes Park, 518 F.3d 1217, 1223 (10th Cir. 2008) (brackets and internal

quotation marks omitted).

III

Standing is part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III of the

United States Constitution. Id. Article III standing has three components. “First, the

plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected

interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Second, there

must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the

injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the

result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.”

Id. at 1223–24 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Third, it must

be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision.” Id. at 1224 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Like the district court, we rest our disposition on the second component,

traceability, and therefore need not reach Nationstar’s arguments on the other

components. Traceability “need not rise to the level of proximate causation,” but

Article III “require[s] proof of a substantial likelihood that the defendant’s conduct

caused plaintiff’s injury in fact.” Id. at 1225 (internal quotation marks omitted). “If

speculative inferences are necessary to connect a plaintiff’s injury to the challenged

action, this burden has not been met.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks

omitted). Importantly, “where the independent action of some third party not before

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the court—rather than that of the defendant—was the direct cause of the plaintiff’s

harm, causation may be lacking.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “That an

injury is indirect does not necessarily defeat standing, but it may make it

substantially more difficult to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the

consequence of the defendants’ actions.” Id. (brackets, ellipsis, and internal

We conclude that Robinson’s alleged injury—having to pay higher premiums

for the lender-placed insurance Nationstar secured—is not fairly traceable to

Nationstar’s allegedly retaliatory act of reporting to AFR that the Property appeared

vacant. AFR did not cancel the policy because of Nationstar’s report. All that report

led to was AFR’s inspection of the Property. After the inspection, AFR decided not

to renew the policy due to the Property’s condition and the lack of upkeep, which are

evident in the photographs Ogden’s agent, Mosley, sent to AFR. If Robinson

suffered any injury due to nonrenewal of the policy, it did not come from

Nationstar’s report of potential vacancy but from AFR’s independent decision not to

renew the policy after it had inspected the Property. Although Nationstar’s letter to

AFR asked AFR to “terminate” the Policy, the letter’s context makes clear that

termination was dependent on AFR determining that any “possible vacancy in any

way impair[ed], limit[ed], or restrict[ed] the Homeowner’s or Fire and Extended

Coverage now in place,” Aplee. Suppl. App. vol. 1 at 241.

Moreover, any injury arising from having to pay the increased insurance

premiums is further causally separated from Nationstar’s report by Terrell’s own

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actions. After being notified she could obtain insurance on her own and that such

insurance would likely be less expensive than lender-placed insurance, she never did.

And even earlier, Terrell declined the opportunity to improve the Property’s

condition when she withdrew the insurance claim Nationstar had filed for storm

damage to the roof, which might have helped avoid AFR’s nonrenewal of the policy.

We agree with Nationstar that AFR and Terrell “took, or failed to take, the actions

that led to the increased mortgage payments,” and because “neither are a party to this

case, that break in the chain destroys traceability.” Aplee. Response Br. at 17.

Robinson’s arguments do not persuade us otherwise. Principally, she points to

the letter Mosley sent to the OID in 2020 stating that in 2018, AFR told Ogden it was

cancelling the policy not only because of the Property’s condition and upkeep, but

also because it was vacant and unoccupied. The district court considered Mosley’s

letter to be only a mere “scintilla of evidence,” and therefore insufficient to avoid

summary judgment, because it “was written years after the actual non-renewal by an

individual who was not involved in the actual non-renewal process” and therefore

“cast[] little light on the question at issue.” Aplt. App. vol. 2 at 27 n.17. We are

inclined to agree. But even if vacancy was the sole reason for AFR’s decision, our

conclusion would be the same—AFR inspected the Property and made an

independent determination not to renew the policy, which causally severs the

connection between Nationstar’s report to AFR that the Property appeared vacant and

AFR’s nonrenewal of the policy, thus cutting off traceability.

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Robinson also alleges that in January 2018, on the heels of the

loan-modification agreement, Nationstar retained a company named “DIMONT as its

agent to file a claim with AFR for wind damage to the [P]roperty” and “through

DIMONT, informed AFR that the property was vacant and that the notice of claim

also served as the notice of change of occupancy/risk.” Aplt. Br. at 6. Robinson

alleges that Nationstar “had no reasonable basis to inform AFR that a change in

occupancy had occurred because it had just approved” the loan modification, so

Nationstar “knew that the [P]roperty was occupied.” Id. at 24. Robinson concludes

that “[t]he only reasonable inference that may be drawn” is that Nationstar “intended

to interfere with the relationship” between Terrell and AFR, thus demonstrating “a

causal connection.” Id. Robinson’s record citations for these allegations do not

support them. The notice of claim DIMONT filed as Nationstar’s agent contains

boilerplate language stating that the notice “acts in all appropriate

circumstances as a notice of change in the occupancy/risk.” Aplt. App. vol. 4 at 96

(some boldface omitted). Because this language concerns occupancy and risk and is

limited to “appropriate circumstances,” it is not tantamount to informing AFR that

the property was vacant.

Finally, Robinson contends she suffered “additional financial injury, stress and

anguish . . . as a result of [Nationstar’s] actions.” Aplt. Br. at 20. To the extent she

is suggesting that traceability may be found with respect to injuries she alleged in her

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complaint, 3 she has waived appellate review because she did not rely on those

injuries in her supplemental brief on traceability and, unsurprisingly, the district

court did not consider them. See Impact Energy Res., LLC v. Salazar, 693 F.3d 1239,

1246 n.3 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that failure to raise issue at appropriate time in

the district court waives appellate review). For the same reason, she has waived

appellate review of any injury she may be claiming she sustained due to the increased

balance and interest rate Terrell incurred as part of the loan modification

agreement—she did not rely on any such alleged injuries in her supplemental brief on

traceability, and the district court did not consider them. See id.

In sum, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Robinson

lacked standing to assert her FHA claim and therefore properly granted Nationstar’s

motion for summary judgment on that claim.

IV

Robinson argues that because she had standing to bring her FHA claim, the

district court should have granted her motion for summary judgment on that claim

and should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This argument necessarily fails because we have

3 In her complaint, Robinson claimed injuries stemming from listening to Terrell talk about the stress defendants’ actions had caused—“struggl[ing] to pay her bills” and going “without food and medications to meet the demands of Nationstar’s oppressive house payment.” Aplt. App., vol. 1 at 28, ¶ 78. Robinson also alleged she had “diverted financial resources” to help Terrell and suffered emotional and mental distress from “listening to and watching the impact of the stress of the situation on her mother.” Id. 11 Appellate Case: 24-7083 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 04/21/2026 Page: 12

determined that the district court correctly concluded Robinson lacked standing to

bring her FHA claim. Thus, the court properly denied her motion for summary

judgment on the FHA claim and, having dismissed the sole federal claim, reasonably

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See Crane v.

Utah Dep’t of Corr., 15 F.4th 1296, 1314 (10th Cir. 2021) (“When all federal claims

have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise

jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

V

We affirm the district court’s judgment.

Entered for the Court

Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge