Robinson v. Merriman

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided November 15, 2024·No. 3:24-cv-01138·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JARROD ROBINSON,

Plaintiff, Case No. 24-cv-01138-SPM v.

ANGELA CRAIN, and ANTHONY WILLS,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge: This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff Robinson. (Doc. 13). For the following reasons, the motion will be denied. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Robinson, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections, commenced this civil action on April 18, 2024, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated at Shawnee Correctional Center, on January 17, 2024, he was assaulted by correctional officers. He was kicked and punched repeatedly, and he sustained injuries to his face and right hand and arm. Following the incident, Plaintiff was transferred to Menard Correctional Center (Menard). Since his transfer, he has been experiencing pain and numbness in his right hand and arm. He has been seeking but not given medical treatment. Plaintiff asserts that he has filed grievances and sick call requests, but as of filing the Complaint on April 18, 2024, he continues to suffer and still has not been provided medical care for his injuries. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s allegations and related claims regarding the excessive force used against him at Shawnee Correctional Center were severed into a new case and are currently being litigated in Robinson v. Merriman, No. 24-cv-01681-RJD. (Doc. 15). In this case, Plaintiff is only proceeding on a single Eighth Amendment claim against Warden Wills and Nurse Practitioner Crain for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs by failing to act and ensure that he receives medical care for his injuries incurred on January 17, 2024. (Id.).

After initiating this lawsuit, on July 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed the motion requesting a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order that is currently before the Court. (Doc. 13). In the motion, Plaintiff asserts that he still is waiting on medical attention. He states he has “notified literally everyone” but has not received treatment for numbness and nerve pain. (Id.). The Court denied the request for a temporary restraining order. The Court, however, found the allegations that months had passed and Plaintiff had not been seen by a medical provider concerning. Therefore, the Court deferred ruling on the request for a preliminary injunction and instructed Defendants to respond to the motion within fourteen days of services. (Doc. 15, p. 6). Defendants missed the response deadline. The Court then sua sponte extended the date for Defendants to respond and directed Defendants to provide information on Plaintiff’s current

condition and medical care in their response to the motion. (Doc. 24). Defendants again failed to follow the Court’s instructions and did not provide an update on Plaintiff’s medical condition or care. A hearing on the motion was scheduled for September 30, 2024. (Doc. 27). The hearing has since been canceled, reset, and then canceled again because Defendants are having difficult producing a witness who can testify as to Plaintiff’s medical care. (Doc. 30, 33, 42, 43). In the meantime, without opposition from Plaintiff, Defendants have supplemented their response with relevant medical records and an attestation from Connie Dolce, the current healthcare unit administrator at Menard. (Doc. 42-1, 42-2, 42-3, 42-4, 42-5; Doc. 41). In light of these new exhibits, and Plaintiff’s recent motion titled “Order for Show Cause from a Preliminary Injunction

and Temporary Restraining Order,” (Doc. 44), the Court finds it appropriate to rule on the motion based on the record and that rescheduling the hearing is unnecessary at this time. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he will suffer irreparable harm if he does not obtain the requested relief; (2) traditional legal remedies are

inadequate; and (3) he has some likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his claim. See Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2020)). Because preliminary injunctive relief is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy,” it should not be granted “unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). Additionally, in the context of prisoner litigation, the scope of the Court’s authority to enter an injunction is circumscribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the PLRA, preliminary injunctive relief “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683.

The Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction at this time. First, he has not demonstrated that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Wills and Crain. In order to prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must show that his condition was “objectively, sufficiently serious” and that the “prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Assuming that the pain and numbness in his right hand and arm amount to an objectively serious medical condition, Plaintiff has not presented evidence to substantiate his claim that Defendants were aware of and consciously disregarded his medical needs.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that after his transfer to Menard, he “filed grievances scanned in sick calls but to no avail.” (Doc. 1, p. 6). He goes on to state that “Angela Crain and Warden Anthony Wills have done nothing but allowed me to[] suffer.” (Id.). Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff has provided a copy of a counseling summary which states that his grievance regarding lack of medical care sent on February 16, 2024, was deemed a non-emergency by the

Chief Administrative Officer and was still being processed. (Id. at p. 10). While claims can sometimes be made against officials for their failure to exercise their authority to remedy a situation, Plaintiff cannot make out a deliberate indifference claim solely premised on the processing or mishandling of a grievance. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, the single grievance documentation and Plaintiff’s vague allegations in the Complaint are simply not sufficient to show that Walls and Crain received and ignored Plaintiff’s repeated requests for medical assistance. See Doe v. Univ. of Southern Ind., 43 F. 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2022) (stating that in assessing the merits for the purposes of a preliminary injunction motion, the court does not accept allegations as true or give the plaintiff “the benefit of all reasonable inferences in his favor”).

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