Robinson v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In Re Johns-Manville Corp.)

52 B.R. 940, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21726
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 15, 1985
Docket84 Civ. 9207(PNL)
StatusPublished
Cited by49 cases

This text of 52 B.R. 940 (Robinson v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In Re Johns-Manville Corp.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robinson v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In Re Johns-Manville Corp.), 52 B.R. 940, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21726 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LEVAL, District Judge.

Procedural History

This bankruptcy appeal arises out of a reorganization proceeding initiated by Johns-Manville Corp. and its affiliated companies (“Manville”). On August 26, 1982, Manville filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1982). At that time, thousands of claims for illnesses caused by asbestos had already been filed against the debtor. A committee was appointed to represent the approximately 17,-000 asbestos victims who had filed actions against Manville before the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings. In October, 1983, Keene Corp., one of Manville’s codefendants in the asbestos actions and a putative creditor, filed a motion for appointment of a legal representative for “future asbestos claimants.” This group consists of an uncertain but large 1 number of individuals exposed by Manville to asbestos in the past and whose disease had not yet manifested itself as of the date of the petition.

On January 23, 1984, Bankruptcy Judge Lifland held that the future claimants were “parties in interest” under § 1109 and ruled, relying in part on its equitable powers under the then-existing provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1481, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), 2 that a *942 representative should be appointed, but reserved decision on the representative’s precise form and function until after a hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1984). In dicta Bankruptcy Judge Lif-land suggested that these future interests may constitute “claims” under § 101(4) of the Code and may therefore be subject to discharge. Id. at 754-56 n. 5.

A hearing was held on July 26, 1984 on the duties of the representative. On August 14, 1984, Judge Lifland ordered the appointment of Leon Silverman, Esq. as a representative for the future claimants. The order defined “future claimants” as those persons who “have been exposed to asbestos or asbestos products mined, manufactured or supplied by Manville [before the August 26, 1983 Chapter 11 petition] and have manifested or will manifest disease post-petition and who are not otherwise represented in these proceedings.” It provided that the legal representative was authorized “to exercise the powers and perform the duties of a Committee under Section 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code subject to the reduction or enlargement of such powers and duties by order of this court.” 3

Appeal was taken from this order by the Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants and/or Creditors, the Committee of Equity Security Holders and Peter John Robinson, a member of the proposed class of future claimants. On December 7, 1984, Judge Carter denied a motion by appellees Keene Corp., Manville, Committee of Unsecured Creditors, and Committee of Asbestos Litigation Co-Defendants to dismiss the appeal. On March 8, 1985, an oral argument was held on the appeal in this court.

I find that the appointment of the legal representative and the specification of his powers was proper exercise of the bankruptcy court’s and this court’s discretion.

Appellants’ Contentions

Initially the briefs of the appellants objected to the finding that the future claimants were parties-in-interest, as well as to the appointment of the representative.

At that time, two other courts in similar proceedings had denied applications to appoint representatives for future claimants, holding that these individuals had no cognizable claims and were not creditors whose claims could be discharged or affected in a reorganization plan. See In re UNR Industries, Inc., 29 B.R. 741 (N.D.Ill.1983), appeal dismissed, 725 F.2d 111 (7th Cir.1984); In re Amatex Corp., 30 B.R. 309 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1983), aff'd, 37 B.R. 613 (E.D.Ill.1983). Appellants relied heavily on these cases in their briefs. However, shortly prior to the oral argument in this case, both decisions were reversed. See UNR, 46 B.R. 671 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1985); Amatex, 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir.1985). Both the Third Circuit in Amatex and the bankruptcy court in UNR held that future claimants are “parties in interest” who deserve to be heard in the reorganization process regardless of whether they are creditors with dischargeable claims. 4

*943 At the oral argument, appellants generally conceded that future claimants could appropriately be considered “parties in interest” under the Code as long as their rights are not subject to discharge. Nor were appellants particularly troubled by with the mere appointment of a representative. The appellants contended, however, that the provision of the August 14, 1984 order authorizing the representative to exercise the § 1103 powers of a committee, implicitly conferred creditor status on the future claimants. They argued that under § 1102 of the Code, committees are to be appointed only for “creditors” or “equity security holders.” They contended that this order, especially when read in conjunction with footnote 5 and other portions of the January 23, 1984 opinion implies dis-chargeability of these future claims.

Discussion

I find no implication in the bankruptcy court’s August 14, 1984 order that the future claimants are “creditors” whose interests are dischargeable in bankruptcy. 5 The reference to § 1103 in the order is simply a convenient, short-hand description of the responsibilities of the representative. The order does not state that the representative shall be a committee under § 1102; nor does it even refer to § 1102 which defines a “committee”; it simply provides that the representative shall exercise like responsibility. Furthermore, the order provides that the representative’s powers may be reduced or expanded by order of the court at any time during the proceedings, confirming that the bankruptcy court does not consider those powers to be dictated by statute.

The appointment of such a representative for future claimants is in my view a wise decision. The future claimants have an important stake in the outcome of the Manville reorganization. 6 Even though they may not have cognizable claims against Manville at present, they have a right to be heard as “parties in interest” under § 1109(b) of the Code. Accord Amatex, 755 F.2d at 1042. Their interests may be substantially affected by the terms of a plan.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Imerys Talc America, Inc v.
38 F.4th 361 (Third Circuit, 2022)
Imerys Talc America, Inc.
D. Delaware, 2020
In re Johns-Manville Corp.
534 B.R. 553 (S.D. New York, 2015)
In re Plusfunds Group, Inc.
492 B.R. 202 (S.D. New York, 2013)
Fireman's Fund Ins. v. Plant Insulation Co.
485 B.R. 203 (N.D. California, 2012)
In Re Teligent, Inc.
640 F.3d 53 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Savage & Associates, P.C. v. K & L Gates LLP
640 F.3d 53 (Second Circuit, 2011)
In Re G-I Holdings, Inc.
292 B.R. 804 (D. New Jersey, 2003)
Greer v. O'Dell
268 B.R. 607 (N.D. Alabama, 2001)
In Re Caldor, Inc.-NY
240 B.R. 180 (S.D. New York, 1999)
In Re Wells
227 B.R. 553 (M.D. Florida, 1998)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
52 B.R. 940, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21726, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robinson-v-johns-manville-corp-in-re-johns-manville-corp-nysd-1985.