Robinson v. Ethicon, Inc.

District Court, S.D. Texas·Decided March 4, 2022·No. 4:20-cv-03760·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT March 04, 2022 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk HOUSTON DIVISION

MARIA ROBINSON, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § CIVIL ACTION H- 20-03760 § ETHICON, INC. and JOHNSON & JOHNSON, § § Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Pending before the court is a motion to exclude the expert testimony of Christina Pramudji, M.D., by plaintiff Maria Robinson. Dkt. 132. After considering the motion, response, and applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion should be DENIED. I. BACKGROUND Robinson had a device called TVT-O, comprised of mesh, surgically implanted on October 27, 2011. Dkt. 132, Ex. 1. The purpose of the surgery was to treat stress urinary incontinence (“SUI”). Dkt. 132. Robinson claims that the device caused significant medical problems, and she has had multiple surgeries to remove the mesh. Id. Her case was part of multi-district litigation involving thousands of plaintiffs. It has been transferred to this court for trial. This memorandum opinion and order deals with a pre-trial motion filed by Robinson to exclude the expert testimony of Pramudji. Pramudji is a board-certified urologist with a subspecialty board certification in Pelvic Floor Medicine and Reconstructive Surgery. Pramudji filed a Rule 26 expert report on February 26, 2016, and she filed a supplemental report on June 5, 2021. Dkt. 132, Ex. 1, 2. She opines that, relevant to Robinson’s motion to exclude, that (1) “TVT-O Type 1 macroporous Prolene polypropylene mesh is biocompatible, has a minimal inflammatory response, allows for adequate tissue ingrowth and is not associated with a significantly increased risk of infection over that generally associated with SUI and vaginal surgery”; (2) the data does not support that the mesh degrades; and (3) she has not seen evidence of degradation. Dkt. 132, Ex. 1. Additionally, with

regard specifically to Robinson, Pramudji opines, after a complete review of Robinson’s medical history related to the current issues and a review of deposition testimony, that the “use of TVT-O to treat [Robinson’s SUI] was a safe, effective, appropriate and accepted surgical treatment option for her based on the data as discussed in [Pramudji’s] general report and this report” and that “recent systematic reviews and metaanalysis involving Ethicon TVT and TVTO continue to support [her] opinion that they are safe, effective, and desirable.” Dkt. 132, Ex. 2. Pramudji notes that Robinson reports pain and dyspareunia, but these types of reports “are very common in women” and Robinson’s “pain is due to unnecessary revision surgeries with exploration and aggressive removal to appease her desire to have surgery.” Id. Pramudji notes that Robinson continued to report pain after her revision surgeries, and Robinson claimed to have pudendal

neuralgia, “but this has not been demonstrated and it has been ruled out based on her reported pain and the evaluations” in her recent medical records. Id. Pramudji believes the cramping Robinson recently complained about “was inconsistent with involvement of the pudendal nerve.” Id. Pramudji opines that “the TVT-O is not a source of [Robinson’s] pain and instead it is more likely from lumbar entrapment and radiculopathy.” Id. Pramudji concludes that there “is no evidence of mesh defect, degradation, cytotoxicity or adverse effect of the TVTO sling.” Id. Robinson argues that Pramudji’s opinions exceed the bounds of her qualifications and are founded on insufficient facts and unreliable methodology. Dkt. 132. She asks the court to exclude (1) opinions related to polypropylene, its use in the body, and whether it is subject to degradation, which Robinson claims are not supported by medical literature in Pramudji’s report; (2) opinions related to tissue integration and pore size, which Robinson says are not supported by citations; (3) opinions regarding the TVT-O Instructions for Use (“IFU”), which Robinson asserts are contained in the supplemental report even though the MDL court already ruled Pramudji could not testify

about the IFU or product warnings; (4) discussion of Robinson’s treating physician’s testimony, which Robinson asserts Pramudji mischaracterizes; and (5) testimony about whether the TVT-O caused vulvar pain and pudendal neuralgia because Pramudji allegedly did not consider all relevant material. Dkt. 132. Ethicon argues that (1) the MDL court already ruled that Pramudji is qualified to offer opinions about degradation; (2) Pramudji did cite a number of peer-reviewed articles to support her opinions on degradation; (3) Pramudji’s opinions about pore size and biocompatibility of TVT- O mesh have ample support outlined in her report; (4) Pramudji will not testify about the adequacy of the IFU; (5) Pramudji accurately characterizes Robinson’s treating physician’s testimony and to the extent Robinson wishes to further explore she can do so on cross examination; and (6) with

regard to pudendal neuralgia, the MDL court already ruled that the defense experts do not have to conduct a differential diagnosis because the defense does not bear the burden. Dkt. 138. The court will first discuss the standard for excluding expert testimony and then address each of Robinson’s arguments for exclusion in seriatim. II. LEGAL STANDARD The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 serves as the proper standard for determining the admissibility of expert testimony. 509 U.S. 579, 597-98, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). The party offering expert testimony has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered testimony satisfies the admissibility requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 460 (5th Cir. 2002). Rule 702 provides: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. Under Daubert, a trial court acts as a “gatekeeper,” making a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93; see also Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999); Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 243-44 (5th Cir. 2002). Daubert and its principles apply to both scientific and non-scientific expert testimony. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147. Experts need not be highly qualified to testify, and differences in expertise go to the weight of the testimony, rather than admissibility. Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, courts need not admit testimony that is based purely on the ipse dixit of the expert. GE v.

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