Robinson v. Christopher Greater Area Rural Health Planning Corp.

566 N.E.2d 768, 207 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 152 Ill. Dec. 891, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 436, 1991 Ill. App. LEXIS 32

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 7, 1991
• Docket: 5-89-0060
• Status: Published

Opinions

PRESIDING JUSTICE RARICK

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Paul L. Robinson, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Franklin County granting the motion for summary judgment of defendant, Christopher Greater Area Rural Health Planning Corporation, under section 2 — 1005 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1005). We affirm.

In April of 1983, Robinson was hired by defendant, a not-for-profit health care corporation, as its vice-president for fiscal services, at a salary of $40,000 per year. Within 90 days, Robinson’s title was changed to executive vice-president. Robinson, however, did not perceive any change in his duties. Shortly after he began working for defendant, the personnel director gave Robinson a copy of the personnel handbook. Robinson’s understanding of the manual was that “it was to provide directions, procedures, and policies for employees to abide by.” At the time he was hired by defendant, Robinson believed he could remain in defendant’s employ up until the time he retired so long as his work remained satisfactory.

On April 1, 1984, Robinson’s salary was increased to $42,000 per year. Subsequently, on April 1, 1985, his salary was raised to $46,000 per year. In July 1985, defendant terminated Robinson’s employment. Initially, the executive director, Jerry Cummings, informed Robinson in person he had been terminated. A short time later, Robinson received a letter from Cummings stating that the executive vice-president position which he had held had been abolished and that his termination was not a result of poor performance. In his deposition, however, Cummings revealed that one of the reasons Robinson’s position was abolished was because Robinson had voiced a reluctance to travel to defendant’s satellite offices.

Other employees of defendant gave differing versions of why Robinson was terminated. The clinic administrator, Kim Battaglia, stated in her deposition the reason for Robinson’s termination was because a new computer system was not being integrated into the accounting system quickly enough. Battaglia also commented that the termination made no economic sense because a new fiscal officer was hired after Robinson’s termination at a salary of $40,000. This officer performed only fiscal duties while Robinson, at a salary of $46,000 per year, performed the same fiscal duties in addition to serving as assistant executive director. William Moorman, an independent public accountant working for defendant, testified there were several reasons for Robinson’s discharge. First, several members of defendant’s board of directors, including Cummings, were concerned with Robinson’s inability to get the new computer system on line and running properly. Second, they were concerned about his reluctance to travel to satellite offices. Finally, they had reservations about Robinson’s not being a “team player” and his inability to get along with Cummings.

Members of defendant’s board of directors expressed varying accounts of why Robinson was terminated. Norman Snyder stated Robinson was terminated solely at the undertaking of Cummings. According to Snyder, the board was not involved in the decision to terminate him, and Snyder himself had received no complaints about Robinson’s job performance. It was Snyder’s understanding that the position was no longer needed and, therefore, abolished. Board chairman Charles Prather testified Robinson was terminated because he was not doing his job correctly. Another board member, Thomas Vaughn, believed Robinson was fired because he was not doing the job that was expected of him. Vaughn’s understanding was that Robinson did not want to travel as extensively as the job required and that the new computer system was not being brought on line quickly enough. Vaughn further stated he knew nothing specific that Robinson had done or not done from April 1, 1985, when he received a $4,000 raise, until July, when terminated, which would have been grounds for termination.

The 1983 employee handbook, entitled “Christopher Greater Area Rural Health Planning Corporation’s Manual of Rules, Regulations, Policies, and Procedures,” comprising some 58 pages and 10 chapters, contains numerous provisions concerning employee evaluations. Those pertinent to this case include:

“Section 7.030 — Employee Evaluations

a. A written, itemized summary of an employee’s performance shall be termed an employee evaluation.

b. All employee evaluations shall be conducted by said employee’s appropriate authority.

c. All employees shall be evaluated at the end of their probationary period.

d. All employees shall be evaluated at least annually, and said evaluation shall be completed prior to the date of preparation for the annual budget.

e. All employee evaluations shall be reviewed by the President or his designee.

f. All employee evaluations shall be reviewed by the affected employee and signed by said employee.

g. All employee evaluations shall be maintained by the Personnel Manager.

h. All employees being separated from the Corporation shall be evaluated prior to the date of separation, and said evaluation shall follow the guidelines in paragraphs b, e, and f of this section.

i. When a supervisor, manager, Vice-president, or the President is being separated, said person(s) shall evaluate all employees within the scope of their authority.

j. An employee may be evaluated when, at the request of the President or his designee, said employee’s performance is of a nature either being exceptionally outstanding, or exceptionally substandard.”

“Section 7.032 — Evaluation of Vice-Presidents, Managers, and Supervisors

a. Evaluations of Vice-Presidents, Managers, and Supervisors shall be conducted by the President at least annually, and said evaluations shall be referred to the Board for approval and recommendations as to disposition, compensation, and advancement.”

“Section 7.033 — Evaluation Format

a. It shall be the responsibility of the Corporation to provide an appropriate printed format for the documentation of all evaluations.

b. Evaluation Formats shall include at least the following criteria:

1. Quality of Work

(a) Accuracy

(b) Neatness

(c) Thoroughness

(d) Economy

2. Quantity of Work

(a) Productivity

3. Dependability

(a) Follows Instructions

(b) Judgement

(c) Punctuality

(d) Attendance

4. Cooperation

(a) With Appropriate Authority

(b) With Other Employees

(c) With Clients/Patients

(d) With Public

(e) With Other Health Providers

5. Initiative

(a) Ingenuity

(b) Self Reliance

(c) Planning

6. Self Improvement

(a) Interest

(b) Observation

(c) Questions

(d) Study

7. Personality

(a) Appearance

(b) Courtesy

(c) Friendliness

8. Additional Comments by evaluator.

c. All evaluation formats shall be maintained by the Personnel Manager.”

The handbook also contains the following paragraph found in section 7.010(h), entitled “Job Descriptions:”

“h. The Corporation assumes no contractual liability to any employee via the job description or this publication. The employee shall hold the Corporation harmless from liability due to the nature, scope, or assignment outlined by any job description.”

The question we are asked to determine is whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for defendant. Robinson contends the record is replete with testimony supporting his position that the employment manual was a document regarded and relied upon by both employer and employees as creating standards to which both sides had to conform. Robinson asserts the manual made it mandatory for an employee to be evaluated before discharge and, therefore, the manual created an enforceable right to this evaluation prior to discharge. Defendant, on the other hand, replies its manual does not contain any provisions which would change the at-will status of its employees.

Under Illinois law, an employment relationship without a fixed duration is terminable at will for any reason or no reason at all, absent a violation of clearly mandated public policy. (Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353; Hogge v. Champion Laboratories, Inc. (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 620, 628, 546 N.E.2d 1025, 1030.) In Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314, our supreme court interpreted the general “employment-at-will rule” as a rule of construction which mandates a presumption that hiring without a fixed term is at will, a presumption which can be overcome, however, by demonstrating that the parties contracted otherwise using traditional requirements of contract formation. (115 Ill. 2d at 489, 505 N.E.2d at 318.) As stated by the Duldulao court:

“[W]e hold that an employee handbook or other policy statement creates enforceable contractual rights if the traditional requirements for contract formation are present. First, the language of the policy statement must contain a promise clear enough that an employee would reasonably believe that an offer has been made. Second, the statement must be disseminated to the employee in such a manner that the employee is aware of its contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer. Third, the employee must accept the offer by commencing or continuing to work after learning of the policy statement. When these conditions are present, then the employee’s continued work constitutes consideration for the promises contained in the statement, and under traditional principles a valid contract is formed.” 115 Ill. 2d at 490, 505 N.E.2d at 318.

Robinson alleges the provisions in sections 7.030 to 7.034 of defendant’s manual constitute a clear promise for annual evaluations and, more importantly, evaluations prior to discharge which would lead a reasonable employee to conclude defendant was making an offer it would not discharge employees without an evaluation informing the employee of the alleged unsatisfactory conduct and the opportunity to correct such conduct. We need not address this contention as the manual itself contains a disclaimer negating any such possible promises made by virtue of its contents. Unlike the introduction to the handbook in Duldulao, which stated that the policies in the handbook were “designed to clarify your rights and duties as employees” (emphasis in original) (115 Ill. 2d at 491, 505 N.E.2d at 319), here we have an express statement declaring defendant “assumes no contractual liability to any employee via the job description or this publication” (emphasis added). Several courts since Duldulao have held express disclaimers in employee handbooks negate any promises made. For example, in Hogge v. Champion Laboratories, Inc. (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 620, 546 N.E.2d 1025, we determined that the following language found in defendant’s employee handbook constituted an express disclaimer:

“This handbook serves only to outline Champion’s major employment policies. It is not intended, and shall not be considered all inclusive or construed as an employment contract. This handbook reflects the company policy at the time of publication. The Company, of course, may improve or change these policies and reserves the right to do so at any time.” (190 Ill. App. 3d at 623, 546 N.E.2d at 1027.)

Likewise, in Moore v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 781, 508 N.E.2d 519, the court referred to the observation of the Duldulao court that the handbook in question contained no disclaimers to negate the promises made. The Moore court went on to con-elude that under the facts of the case before it, no employee could reasonably have believed an offer to have been made when the incentive plan in question stated: “[T]he Plan is a statement of management’s intent and is not a contract or assurance of compensation.” (155 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 508 N.E.2d at 521.) Such language clearly revealed the employer was promising nothing in the incentive plan. Yet another example is found in Bennett v. Evanston Hospital (1989), 184 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 540 N.E.2d 979, where the employee handbook contained a statement in its introduction declaring that the handbook was not intended to create a contract of employment. This too was found to be an express disclaimer. 184 Ill. App. 3d at 1031, 540 N.E.2d at 980.

Robinson argues, however, that the disclaimer here is limited to job description only. If this were true, why were the words “or this publication” added to the disclaimer? Surely defendant did not include such words solely for the limited effect Robinson suggests. Moreover, Robinson himself testified in his deposition he did not consider the manual any type of contract. If he did not so consider it, how can we declare otherwise? The record reveals the employees used the manual only as a guide, not as a set of mandatory rules and regulations. Even Robinson did not follow all of its suggestions. For instance, he too did not complete evaluations of those employees under his supervision. Under such circumstances, we find the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant in this instance. The question of the existence of a contract is a matter of law for determination by the court. (See, e.g., Bennett, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 1033, 540 N.E.2d at 981.) Robinson quite simply was an at-will employee who could be terminated at any time for any reason. See Hogge, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 546 N.E.2d at 1032. See also Rudd v. Danville Metal Stamping Co. (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1012, 550 N.E.2d 674, 676.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Franklin County granting summary judgment for defendant is affirmed.

Affirmed.

CHAPMAN, J., concurs.