NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 18 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBIN WINGER, No. 18-56118
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 8:13-cv-00267-AG-RNB v.
CITY OF GARDEN GROVE; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 9, 2019 Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and LEE, Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY,** District Judge.
In her second appeal to this Court, Robin Winger challenges the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of City of Garden Grove police
officers Charles Starnes and Michael Elhami on the basis of statutory immunity.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we repeat them only as necessary to
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. explain our reasoning. For the reasons stated below, we reverse and remand.
We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Rojas v. FAA, 941 F.3d
392, 402 (9th Cir. 2019). “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact,
and decide whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive
law.” Id. (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
I
The initial issue in this case is whether, under California law, a law
enforcement officer owes a duty of reasonable care to an arrestee in his custody
who needs immediate medical attention. See Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32
Cal. 3d 197, 201–02, 649 P.2d 894, 896 (1982) (courts address legal duty before
addressing statutory immunity). When, as here, we confront a state law issue
without precedent from the state’s highest court, we
“predict how the state high court would resolve it” by, among other things,
looking for guidance to decisions by the state’s intermediate appellate courts.
Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2007) .
Although no California court has squarely decided the issue presented by this case,
the California Supreme Court has stated that a law enforcement officer has a duty
of care when his conduct, “in a situation of dependency, results in detrimental
reliance on him for protection.” Williams v. State of California, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 25,
2 664 P.2d 137, 141 (1983); see also Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol, 26 Cal.
4th 703, 718, 28 P.3d 249, 257 (2001) (“[A] law enforcement officer has a duty to
exercise reasonable care for the safety of those persons whom the officer stops,
and . . . this duty includes the obligation not to expose such persons to an
unreasonable risk of injury by third parties.”).
In an analogous case, a California intermediate appellate court concluded
that a jailer owes a duty of care to a prisoner who needs immediate medical
attention. Giraldo v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 168 Cal. App. 4th 231, 250, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 371, 386 (2011). The reasoning employed by the court in Giraldo and the
general principles just referenced persuade us that the California Supreme Court
would hold that a law enforcement officer owes a duty of care to an arrestee in his
custody who needs immediate medical care. In Giraldo, the court found that a
jailer owes a duty of care to a prisoner because it is foreseeable that a prisoner
suffering from a medical emergency “may be at risk of harm,” and because a
prisoner in need of medical attention is vulnerable and dependent upon the jailer,
who controls the prisoner’s ability to seek medical care. Id. A similar relationship
exists between a law enforcement officer and an arrestee in his custody in need of
immediate medical attention.
Our conclusion that the California Supreme Court likely would apply the
reasoning of Giraldo to this case is buttressed by the California Supreme Court's
3 later reliance on Giraldo to state that “[a] typical setting for the recognition of a
special relationship is where the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable and dependent
upon the defendant who, correspondingly, has some control over the plaintiff’s
welfare,” Regents of Univ. of California v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 607, 621,
413 P.3d 656, 665 (2018) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Giraldo, 168 Cal.App.4th at 245-246, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d at 382). Therefore,
we conclude that the California Supreme Court would conclude that a law
enforcement officer owes a duty of reasonable care to an arrestee in his custody
who needs immediate medical attention.
II
The district court erred in finding that Elhami and Starnes were entitled to
immunity under California Government Code § 845.6. Because Winger was not “a
prisoner in [their] custody” as state law defines that term, Elhami and Starnes are
not eligible for immunity under Section 845.6. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 845.6, 844;
Fearon v. Dep’t of Corr., 162 Cal. App. 3d 1254, 1256, 209 Cal. Rptr. 309, 311
(1984); Larson v. City of Oakland, 17 Cal. App. 3d 91, 97, 94 Cal. Rptr. 466, 470
(1971).
III
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Winger, there is a
genuine factual dispute regarding whether Elhami and Starnes breached the duty of
4 reasonable care they owed to Winger by failing to take her to the hospital after they
arrested her. The issue of breach is a factual determination based on “the totality
of the circumstances.” See Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 46 Cal. 4th 501, 514,
207 P.3d 506, 515 (2009); see also Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church, 3 Cal. 5th
1077, 1084, 404 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2017).
A.
There is a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Elhami and Starnes
should have recognized that Winger needed immediate medical care and thus
whether they acted unreasonably by taking her to the police lockup instead of to a
hospital. Winger was unable to spell her first name, recall her last name, or
provide coherent answers to basic questions such as where she lived, what the time
was, and when she last ate. She repeatedly told Elhami that she did not feel well,
and that she recently had spent time in the hospital, which Elhami conveyed to
Starnes. She placed her hand near her chest when Elhami first approached her,
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 18 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBIN WINGER, No. 18-56118
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 8:13-cv-00267-AG-RNB v.
CITY OF GARDEN GROVE; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 9, 2019 Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and LEE, Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY,** District Judge.
In her second appeal to this Court, Robin Winger challenges the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of City of Garden Grove police
officers Charles Starnes and Michael Elhami on the basis of statutory immunity.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we repeat them only as necessary to
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. explain our reasoning. For the reasons stated below, we reverse and remand.
We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Rojas v. FAA, 941 F.3d
392, 402 (9th Cir. 2019). “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact,
and decide whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive
law.” Id. (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
I
The initial issue in this case is whether, under California law, a law
enforcement officer owes a duty of reasonable care to an arrestee in his custody
who needs immediate medical attention. See Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32
Cal. 3d 197, 201–02, 649 P.2d 894, 896 (1982) (courts address legal duty before
addressing statutory immunity). When, as here, we confront a state law issue
without precedent from the state’s highest court, we
“predict how the state high court would resolve it” by, among other things,
looking for guidance to decisions by the state’s intermediate appellate courts.
Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2007) .
Although no California court has squarely decided the issue presented by this case,
the California Supreme Court has stated that a law enforcement officer has a duty
of care when his conduct, “in a situation of dependency, results in detrimental
reliance on him for protection.” Williams v. State of California, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 25,
2 664 P.2d 137, 141 (1983); see also Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol, 26 Cal.
4th 703, 718, 28 P.3d 249, 257 (2001) (“[A] law enforcement officer has a duty to
exercise reasonable care for the safety of those persons whom the officer stops,
and . . . this duty includes the obligation not to expose such persons to an
unreasonable risk of injury by third parties.”).
In an analogous case, a California intermediate appellate court concluded
that a jailer owes a duty of care to a prisoner who needs immediate medical
attention. Giraldo v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 168 Cal. App. 4th 231, 250, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 371, 386 (2011). The reasoning employed by the court in Giraldo and the
general principles just referenced persuade us that the California Supreme Court
would hold that a law enforcement officer owes a duty of care to an arrestee in his
custody who needs immediate medical care. In Giraldo, the court found that a
jailer owes a duty of care to a prisoner because it is foreseeable that a prisoner
suffering from a medical emergency “may be at risk of harm,” and because a
prisoner in need of medical attention is vulnerable and dependent upon the jailer,
who controls the prisoner’s ability to seek medical care. Id. A similar relationship
exists between a law enforcement officer and an arrestee in his custody in need of
immediate medical attention.
Our conclusion that the California Supreme Court likely would apply the
reasoning of Giraldo to this case is buttressed by the California Supreme Court's
3 later reliance on Giraldo to state that “[a] typical setting for the recognition of a
special relationship is where the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable and dependent
upon the defendant who, correspondingly, has some control over the plaintiff’s
welfare,” Regents of Univ. of California v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 607, 621,
413 P.3d 656, 665 (2018) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Giraldo, 168 Cal.App.4th at 245-246, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d at 382). Therefore,
we conclude that the California Supreme Court would conclude that a law
enforcement officer owes a duty of reasonable care to an arrestee in his custody
who needs immediate medical attention.
II
The district court erred in finding that Elhami and Starnes were entitled to
immunity under California Government Code § 845.6. Because Winger was not “a
prisoner in [their] custody” as state law defines that term, Elhami and Starnes are
not eligible for immunity under Section 845.6. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 845.6, 844;
Fearon v. Dep’t of Corr., 162 Cal. App. 3d 1254, 1256, 209 Cal. Rptr. 309, 311
(1984); Larson v. City of Oakland, 17 Cal. App. 3d 91, 97, 94 Cal. Rptr. 466, 470
(1971).
III
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Winger, there is a
genuine factual dispute regarding whether Elhami and Starnes breached the duty of
4 reasonable care they owed to Winger by failing to take her to the hospital after they
arrested her. The issue of breach is a factual determination based on “the totality
of the circumstances.” See Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 46 Cal. 4th 501, 514,
207 P.3d 506, 515 (2009); see also Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church, 3 Cal. 5th
1077, 1084, 404 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2017).
A.
There is a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Elhami and Starnes
should have recognized that Winger needed immediate medical care and thus
whether they acted unreasonably by taking her to the police lockup instead of to a
hospital. Winger was unable to spell her first name, recall her last name, or
provide coherent answers to basic questions such as where she lived, what the time
was, and when she last ate. She repeatedly told Elhami that she did not feel well,
and that she recently had spent time in the hospital, which Elhami conveyed to
Starnes. She placed her hand near her chest when Elhami first approached her,
which, he testified, indicated to him that “there was something possibly internally
wrong with her”; within one minute of encountering Winger, he reported to a
police dispatcher than she complained of “pains to the chest.” Both officers had
completed training on how to recognize the symptoms of a stroke, and a doctor
who treated Winger testified that her inability to state her last name was not a
typical sign of intoxication but rather a stroke symptom that should have been
5 recognizable to someone trained in stroke detection.
Further, there is a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Winger
exhibited facial drooping, a common symptom of a stroke. Starnes and Elhami
both testified that Winger’s eyelids looked “droopy,” although she exhibited no
facial asymmetry; Starnes circled the words “[d]roopy eyelids” on a police report
entitled “drug influence report”; Winger’s daughter testified that Winger’s face
showed drooping on the left side when she pulled over the car, and when she spoke
to the paramedics; and Winger’s boyfriend testified that “one side of her face
looked droopy” when he picked her up at the jail.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Winger, a reasonable jury considering
this evidence could find that the officers should have recognized that she needed
immediate medical care and that they acted unreasonably by declining to take her
to a hospital.
B.
A reasonable jury also could find that Winger was not capable of refusing
medical care, that Elhami and Starnes should have recognized her incapacity, and
that as a result they were negligent in taking her to a lockup instead of to a hospital
even though she refused medical care. The jury could base this finding on
Winger’s incoherent and confused answers to questions before, and after the
paramedics examined her. Additionally, a retired deputy chief of police testified
6 that reasonable law enforcement officers would have recognized that if Winger
was not fully coherent, she was not capable of refusing medical care. Further,
firefighters who were at the scene testified that they believed that Winger should
have gone to the hospital, and encouraged her to do so. One firefighter testified
that he informed Elhami, in the presence of Starnes, of his belief that Winger
should be taken to a hospital, though it is disputed whether the firefighter
suggested to the officers that they should take her to the hospital against her will.
Because there is a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Elhami and
Starnes breached their duty of reasonable care to Winger, we reverse the grant of
summary judgment and remand the case to the district court for trial.1
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1 Contrary to the dissent’s characterization of today’s decision, we do not find that Elhami and Starnes acted unreasonably and do not impose liability. Our opinion does nothing more than conclude that there is a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Elhami and Starnes breached their duty of reasonable care to Winger.
7 FILED Robin Winger v. City of Garden Grove, No. 18-56118 MAR 18 2020 LEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
There are no real winners in this case. Robin Winger suffered a stroke while
driving her car, but she did not realize it and repeatedly refused medical care
offered by first-responders. Garden Grove police officers Starnes and Elhami
mistakenly — but reasonably under the circumstances — believed that she was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and booked her in jail. As a result, Winger
suffered unnecessarily. With the benefit of hindsight, the police officers should
have perhaps compelled Winger to go to the hospital against her wishes. But I do
not believe that the police officers acted unreasonably, given what they knew at the
time. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.1
While Garden Grove police officers receive some training on how to
recognize symptoms of a stroke (e.g., disorientation, facial drooping), those
symptoms are also consistent with drug or alcohol use. The Garden Grove Police
Department Drug Influence Report form — which was filled out by Officer
Starnes — lists various drugs, along with common symptoms associated with
them. For “OPIATE,” it lists “Droopy Eyelids” (which Officer Starnes circled).
For “DEPRESSANTS,” it includes “Droopy Eyes” (which was also circled).
1 I am assuming that California law imposes a duty of reasonable care to an arrestee in need of immediate medical attention, and that California Government Code § 845.6’s immunity provision does not apply here. Under “HALLUCINOGENS,” the symptoms “Dazed” and “Disoriented” were
both circled by Officer Starnes. And “INHALANTS” notes “Confusion” and
“Disorientation.” Similarly, the Garden Grove Police Sobriety Form lists “sleepy”
eyes as a symptom of intoxication, and Officer Starnes circled that symptom as
well.
The police officers were not alone in their mistaken assessment of Winger.
Emergency room doctor Bharath Chakravarthy who examined Winger wrote that
he doubted that she had suffered a stroke, but rather believed that she was likely
suffering from a “drug-induced psychosis.” It was only after further testing that
the doctors confirmed that Winger had in fact suffered a stroke. We ask too much
of first-responders if we expose them to potential liability for failing to recognize a
stroke when an emergency doctor did not initially diagnose it, either.
Furthermore, Officers Elhami and Starnes acted reasonably when they
declined to take her to the hospital against her wishes when Winger repeatedly
rejected medical care. After pulling Winger over and speaking with her, Officer
Elhami called the police dispatcher and requested medical assistance to the scene.
Winger explained that she had been to the hospital recently, but told him that she
was “okay” and declined medical assistance. Officer Elhami told her that the
paramedics were nonetheless coming. After the paramedics evaluated Winger, she
again declined medical attention and signed a waiver form declining it. Even after that, Officer Elhami again suggested that Winger go to the hospital, but Winger’s
daughter said her mother “seems much better.” While the police officers
ultimately arrested Winger for suspected intoxication or drug use, they knew that
Winger would receive a medical screening at jail prior to being booked. And
Winger did receive that medical screening — without anyone diagnosing her as
suffering from a stroke.
Because I believe Officers Elhami and Starnes made difficult judgment calls
and acted reasonably based on what they knew at the time, we should not second-
guess their decisions. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.