Robertson v. Superior PMI, Inc.

600 F. Supp. 790, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23414
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedJanuary 15, 1985
DocketCiv. A. 82-0350
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 600 F. Supp. 790 (Robertson v. Superior PMI, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robertson v. Superior PMI, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 790, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23414 (W.D. La. 1985).

Opinion

OPINION

NAUMAN S. SCOTT, District Judge.

This is a products liability action brought by Richard T. Robertson (Robertson) against Superior PMI, Inc. (Superior) for injuries sustained by Robertson during his employment at Hunt Plywood Company, Pollock, Louisiana (Hunt). Robertson alleges that he was injured by a flying saw, manufactured by Superior and installed by Hunt in its layup line where Robertson worked.

We have diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On July 8, 1981, Robertson was working for Hunt on an assembly layup line in its plywood manufacturing plant in Pollock, Louisiana.

2. The plywood assembly layup line was designed and built for Hunt by Hunt.

3. Hank Clark (Clark), manager of the Pollock facility, who had previously seen flying saws operating in other plants, made the decision to incorporate a flying saw into Hunt’s layup line. This was done because the flying saw reduced waste and automated the layup line which would give Hunt great economic benefit.

4. Hunt purchased and installed a flying saw, manufactured by Superior PMI, Inc. (Superior), along with other machinery needed for the manufacture of plywood. The flying saw was installed by Hunt.

5. Although Superior manufactured entire layup lines, Hunt never considered buying the entire line from Superior.

6. A control panel was furnished by Superior, along with the flying saw. Hunt did the complete installation of the saw and the control panel. Superior, however, did assist in the wiring and start-up of the flying saw.

7. No advice was given by the Superior serviceman regarding safety. Superior only advised Hunt as to mechanical operations of the flying saw and made a mechanical inspection at the first start-up procedure of the flying saw.

8. The control panel (switches) was located approximately two feet upstream from the flying saw which operated automatically. There was no need for an operator to be near the flying saw. Limit switches assured that the flying saw always clamped and cut at the same location on the conveyor.

9. The chain drive, which propelled the layup line conveyor, was attached to the flying saw so that the movement of the layup line and the operation of the flying saw were synchronized. This allowed the flying saw’s upstream and downstream movement to be stopped automatically when the conveyor line was stopped.

10. At the time the saw was purchased, the only application for the flying saw was on a plywood assembly layup line.

11. During the cutting cycle of the flying saw, the flying saw would travel to its furtherest upstream position, clamp and then make its cut as the material traveled downstream on the conveyor. Once at its furtherest downstream position, the clamp, which was also a guard for the saw blade, *793 would raise up and travel back upstream to the starting position. At the same time, the saw blade automatically lowered underneath the conveyor line and traveled back to the starting position.

12. The conveyor line could be stopped and started at several locations along the layup line. At some of the work stations along the layup line, the workers would have foot pedals which would disengage the chain drive to the conveyor. This would indirectly cause the cutting cycle of the flying saw to halt because of its synchronization with the conveyor line. The saw blade would still continue spinning, but the travel and movement of the saw and clamp would be halted by the disengagement of the chain drive.

13. The control panel, furnished by Superior and installed by Hunt, was located at Robertson’s work station. By use of these controls, Robertson could have stopped and started the flying saw or the whole layup line. These were the only controls which could completely shut down the entire layup line and the flying saw.

14. The foot pedals, which were at the core layers’ stations, were used by the core layers to stop the layup line so that the veneer sheets and pieces of core could be straightened on the conveyor.

15. Every 3 to 5 minutes the layup line would be stopped by one of the core layers using the foot pedals. Many times a sheet turner such as Robertson, would yell to a core layer to hold the line. The core layer would step on the foot pedals in order to stop the layup line, so that material could be straightened at his or another worker’s station. This was the standard operating procedure for the workers on the layup line at Hunt, because not all work stations had these foot pedals. The workers stopped the line by use of the foot pedals rather than the control panel because it was more convenient and kept production at a higher level. Despite the high level of noise at the plant, this procedure had been successfully followed for a significant period of time by the employees at Hunt.

16. Before Robertson’s injury, the workers on the layup line, including Robertson, believed that this standard operating procedure was safe. Hunt had no written procedures regarding the straightening of materials on the line.

17. The workers on the layup line, including Robertson, knew that the layup line and the flying saw could be stopped by use of the control panel, but they also knew that stopping the layup line by use of the foot pedals would also stop the cutting cycle of the flying saw.

18. On the day of the accident, Robertson was working as the last sheet turner on the layup line. His work station was closest to the flying saw. Although the flying saw itself required no operator, Robertson’s work station was located within a few feet of the flying saw.

19. Hunt designed the layup line compactly so as to save money and space at their plant.

20. On July 8, 1981, as the material traveled down the conveyor line, Robertson saw a broken piece of core material sticking out from between the veneer on the opposite downstream corner of the material. Robertson thought that the material would cause a jam-up if it went into the flying saw in that condition.

21. Robertson yelled to Allen Hebert (Hebert), who was at the closest core layer’s station, 8 to 10 feet upstream from Robertson, to stop the conveyor line.

22. The layup line had actually been stopped by someone other than Hebert and for reasons other than to allow Robertson to straighten the material. When the other core layer had accomplished his purpose, he freed his foot pedal. Since Hebert had not depressed his pedal control, the eonveyor line began to move.

23. Thinking that Hebert had stopped the conveyor line for him and that all was safe, Robertson stretched across the 4 foot wide sheets of veneer and core lying on the conveyor. Robertson then attempted to straighten the material, on the opposite *794 side of the conveyor and downstream toward the flying saw, with his right hand.

24. The flying saw was in the up position, about 1 to Yk

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
600 F. Supp. 790, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23414, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robertson-v-superior-pmi-inc-lawd-1985.