UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
RACHEL ROBERTSON,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action 2:23-cv-2473 Judge James L. Graham Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura JOSEPH R. BIDEN,
Defendant.
ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, Rachel Robertson, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of counsel, has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) as part of the statute, which provides in pertinent part: (2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that— * * * (B) the action or appeal— (i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013). Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”
is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up). Instead, in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,
614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). II. ANALYSIS Plaintiff alleges she was injured by one or more executive orders issued by Defendant Joseph Biden, President of the United States, mandating COVID-19 vaccinations for healthcare workers, employees of the federal government or federal contractors, or employees of employers with 100 or more employees. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered overwhelming stress due to having to choose between keeping her job and her personal and religious beliefs precluding vaccination before she ultimately resigned from her job. Plaintiff also complains that President Bident coerced social media platforms to suppress free speech and spread misinformation regarding the safety of the COVID-19 vaccines by threatening to amend Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act to punish social media platforms who did not adhere to his
demands. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID #7–15.) Plaintiff purports to assert her claims directly again President Biden in his individual capacity. As relief, Plaintiff requests that President Biden be required to fund a public access radio and television station, to be managed and formatted by Plaintiff, in the amount of $400,000 per year for not less than eight years. Plaintiff also asserts class action claims on behalf of other American citizens who were similarly harmed. (Id., PAGEID #17.) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of presidential immunity, which entitles the President of the United States to “absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
RACHEL ROBERTSON,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action 2:23-cv-2473 Judge James L. Graham Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura JOSEPH R. BIDEN,
Defendant.
ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, Rachel Robertson, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of counsel, has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) as part of the statute, which provides in pertinent part: (2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that— * * * (B) the action or appeal— (i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013). Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”
is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up). Instead, in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,
614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). II. ANALYSIS Plaintiff alleges she was injured by one or more executive orders issued by Defendant Joseph Biden, President of the United States, mandating COVID-19 vaccinations for healthcare workers, employees of the federal government or federal contractors, or employees of employers with 100 or more employees. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered overwhelming stress due to having to choose between keeping her job and her personal and religious beliefs precluding vaccination before she ultimately resigned from her job. Plaintiff also complains that President Bident coerced social media platforms to suppress free speech and spread misinformation regarding the safety of the COVID-19 vaccines by threatening to amend Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act to punish social media platforms who did not adhere to his
demands. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID #7–15.) Plaintiff purports to assert her claims directly again President Biden in his individual capacity. As relief, Plaintiff requests that President Biden be required to fund a public access radio and television station, to be managed and formatted by Plaintiff, in the amount of $400,000 per year for not less than eight years. Plaintiff also asserts class action claims on behalf of other American citizens who were similarly harmed. (Id., PAGEID #17.) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of presidential immunity, which entitles the President of the United States to “absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982). Although Plaintiff purportedly sues President Biden in his individual capacity, the allegedly unlawful conduct—issuing executive
orders and engaging in discourse regarding potential legislative amendments—was unquestionably undertaken in his official capacity as President of the United States. President Biden is therefore entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiff’s claims. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694 (1997) (presidential immunity extends to actions taken by the President in his official capacity). This is so even though certain of President Biden’s vaccine mandates were later ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265, 282 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding “no support at all” for an exception to presidential immunity “where [the President] is claimed to have violated the Constitution”). For these reasons, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). III. DISPOSITION For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura CHELSEY M. VASCURA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE